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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis covers the constraints, both theoretical 
and practical, on the growth and evolution of the 
Zimbabwean informal sector, in particular of informal 
clothing and footwear production. The aim of the study 
was to provide a foundation for decision-making in the 
intersectoral allocation of resources. To this end, a 
survey was conducted of over one hundred and twenty 
formal and informal clothing producers in Bulawayo. 
The questionnaire was administered and completed by the 
author during the course of an interview, the questions 
requiring specific, as opposed to open-ended, answers. 
The production data obtained were analysed using the 
Kmenta formulation of the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (C.E.S.) production function, with a view 
to obtaining the production parameters. The data from 
formal and informal sector interviewees were analysed 
separately and in aggregate and tested for constancy of 
variance, significance of parameters and explanatory power . 
. Whilst a number of conclusions are drawn in the course of 
the thesis, the central finding is that allocation of 
scarce resources to the informal sector should be based 
on the standard procedures used by venture capital seeking 
an outlet in a normal market economy, and in particular on 
the ability of the entrepreneur, since this appears to be 
an increasingly crucial variable as firm sizes fell. 
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P R E F A C E 
Humpty Dumpty insisted that a word meant just what he thought 
it meant, neither more nor less. Unfortunately, the same 
cannot be said of a thesis; I am, therefore, making use of 
a preface to describe the limitations of this study, and to 
acknowledge the extensive help which so many people have 
accorded me. 
In Zimbabwe the 1970s were a decade of general economic traumas. 
One of the most evere of these was the high incidence of job-
lessness amongst the Black urban population. The growth rate 
of this group was also particularly high, a combination of an 
exceptionally fast natural rate of increase, and migration from 
the rural areas as a result of hardships endured during the 
11 bush war". 
It should not be surprising that economists welcomed the hope-
ful note which was sounded by the I.L.O.'s 1972 report on 
"Employment Incomes and Inequality in Kenya", which mooted 
the idea that very small-scale private enterprises, though 
unregistered and apparently under-capitalised, could thrive 
and apparently support large populations in low income urban 
areas. The term "informal sector 11 was coined to describe 
this concept, and has remained in general use although others 
had been used before, and have been used since. 
(ii) 
With the passage of time, however, doubts have been expressed 
as to the value of the I.L.O. claims for the informal sector, 
in particular there have been ideological objections on the 
grounds that it constitutes a "petty bourgeois" class. 
Empirical analysis (as opposed to description) has, however, 
remained rare. 
With this in mind, it was felt that five fundamental questions 
needed to be answered in terms of Zimbabwe's informal economy: 
1. Do informal enterprises benefit from financial aid? 
2. In a given industry would a limited amount of aid 
achieve greater employment and output effects if 
addressed to formal or informal enterprises? 
3. Can the results to question (2) be tested empirically, 
and what are the limitations of the testing 
procedure? 
4. What long-run political and economic ramifications 
might emerge subsequent to the stimulation of the 
informal sector? 
5. How effective would non-financial assistance of the 
informal sector (e.g. easing constraining legislation, 
provision of additional infrastructure and develop-
ment of human capital through training schemes) be in 
rendering the informal entrepreneur more efficient 
and more vertically mobile? 
{iii) 
The first three of these questions formed the basis of the 
empirical research dealt with in Chapters IV and v., while 
the final two questions, with their greater latitudes of 
interpretation, have formed the background to the discussion 
in Chapters I, II and III. 
In the course of this thesis, it will be shown that theoretical 
opinion on the informal sector is divided. Much of this 
division may be traced back to the standpoints from which 
the sector is viewed. One issue, however, may not be re-
garded in this way, the problem of involutionary growth, 
where expansion is accompanied by worsening conditions. 
Although it is espoused most ardently by members of neo-
Marxist schools, it is visible in terms of any ideology. 
Whether or not informal sector expansion in response to 
economic stimulation is involutionary depends on the indi-
vidual circumstances of the branch of the formal economy 
viewed. The probability of involution is substantially 
reduced, however, where barriers to entry in the form of 
capital and skill requirements exist concurren~ly with the 
prospect of entry into the formal sector as the individual 
firm expands. This situation pertains in clothing manufac-
ture, the area on which this study has particularly focused; 
it does not apply, however, to petty retailing which seems 
to eomprise the largest single portion of the informal 
economy. For this reason, the specific results of Chapters 
IV and V must be read as describing a special case. 
(iv) 
If a general solution to the employment problems of Zimbabwe 
is sought within the bounds of the market mechanism, as 
opposed to central planning, then indigenous enterprise 
will have to form part of it. The African-owned store is not 
a new phenomenon in the state, but the capacity of commerce 
to alleviate unemployment is limited. What this thesis will 
try to describe is the capacity of investment in petty pro-
duction to generate employment. A glance at Chapter V will 
show that the results are often ambivalent: investment in 
established formal enterprise is more productive and its 
manpower training role is more substantial, but informal 
production has the capacity both to expand and to transform 
itself. In the conclusion I shall, .therefore, try to describe 
both the endogenous and exogenous constraints on such ex-
pansion and transformation. 
Two minor points remain to be clarified. Firstly, where I 
refer to informal operators, it is the "owners" rather than 
their employees to whom I refer. Secondly, the name 
Zimbabwe has been used to describe the country both before 
and after 1980, except when quoting or when confusion might 
result, in which case the former name Rhodesia has been used. 
No value judgement is implied by this, the decision being 
made purely on the grounds of convenience. 
The initial impetus for this research came from Toby Brooke, 
then manager of FEBCO who demonstrated the importance of 
entrepreneurial flair in the success of small enterprises. 
The problem which emerged focused on the necessity for a 
study of the needs of small-scale and informal African 
(v) 
businessmen and the characteristics of their enterprises 
so that the limited development funds available for their 
assistance could be used to maximum effect. In this, I 
was particularly assisted by my colleague at the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, Steve Gwasira, and in Bulawayo by the 
staff of the City Council's Department of Housing and 
Community Services. 
It will be clear that the scope of this thesis extends beyond 
being an abstract problem in constrained optimisation, I have 
tried to keep real issues in mind so as to give it some 
practical worth. There is no doubt, however, that Zimbabwe's 
informal economy warrants a more detailed and extensive 
examination using the established tools of micro-economics 
and econometrics, than has been given here. There is also 
no doubt that to be truly effective, a study wuch as this 
requires more detailed data collection than that which can 
be achieved by a single researcher alone! 
It is impossible for work to proceed in a vacuum, and 
inevitably my views have been shaped by those of the people 
to whom I have gone for assistance, in temporal order; 
the staff of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, FEBCO and SIAS, 
the Bulawayo Municipality's Department of Housing and 
Community Services, in particular Dr Eric Gargett, and the 
members of the School of Economics at UCT, in particular 
Haim Abraham, Charles Simkins, John Whittaker and my 
supervisor, Professor Ben Gurzynski. Whilst acknowledging 
(vi) 
their help, the usual proviso naturally still applies: 
any errors or omissions are strictly my own. Finally, 
I would like to thank Sally Ramsbotham and Mr T.S.J. Makoni 
for the trouble they have gone to on my behalf in Harare, 
similarly Arthur Kaplan and Mr N.M. Moya in Bulawayo, and 
my typist, Bea Cornell, who has accepted my handwriting 
without demur. 
Anthony Leiman 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE INFORMAL SECTOR, A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The main objective of this chapter is the provision of an 
overview of informal sector literature as a whole, while 
concentrating on work with Zimbabwean relevance. It thus 
aims at setting up a frame of reference against which the 
following two chapters, on relations with the remainder of 
the economy, and with Government, can be fitted. 
Unfortunately, there is no unified theory of informalism, 
although Tokman (1978) has provided the closest approach to 
one thus far. (See Section 3 of this chapter). Indeed, a 
spectrum of opinions, from libertarian to Marxist, have been 
expressed on the subject since the informal sector became 
fashionable in the early 1970s. For this reason, the spread 
of opinions presented in this, and the two succeeding chapters, 
should not be regarded as evidence of general eclecticism, but 
as an attempt to link theory to the diversity of interest groups 
involved with Zimbabwe's informal economy. 
In an attempt to place some order in the spread of published 
opinions on the informal sector, this chapter has been split into 
six sections: 
1. The dual economy and the origins of the informal economy; 
2. The informal economy in terms of the nee-classical paradigm; 
3. The benign/subordination debate; 
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4. Dissenting views; 
5. The informal sector and economic growth, and 
6. Constraints on the growth of the informal sector. 
1.1 THE DUAL ECONOMY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
What theoretical explanation is there for the existence of the 
informal sector? The early dualistic models of the developing 
economy (Lewis, 1954; Fei & Ranis, 1961) depicted an economy 
composed of two elements - rural subsistence and urban com-
mercial/industrial. In terms of these models, labour would 
leave the rural economy, in which there was underemployment 
(i.e. where the average product of labour exce~ded its marginal 
product), and enter employment in the urban areas, where the 
wage marginally exceeded the rural average product of labour 
(wage). Given perfectly competitive labour and product markets, 
this suggested that full employment would always prevail in the 
urban areas. 
The weakness of these models lay in their failure to take due 
cognisance of factors other than the individual's wage, as 
incentives to labour mobility. Thus, despite the early economy 
of Rhodesia having accorded fairly closely with the dualistic 
models, a history of urban unemployment has been noted for some 
time. 
Clarke (1977) showed that large numbers of local workers were 
unabl.e to obtain employment in the early years of White settle-
ment. His finding contrasted with the views expressed by the 
early settlers themselves who brought in workers from Nyasaland 
and Portuguese East Africa to satisfy an apparent labour shortage. 
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These two views of the situation need not be mutually exclusive. 
Cash wages fell in the early years of this century, as did the 
average product of labour in the rural subsistence economy. 
If wage expectations were formed adaptively, the apparent 
shortfall of local labour observed by the White settlers could 
have resulted from the gap between the income expectations of 
unskilled labour and the wage rate on offer to it. The unem-
ployment described by Clarke would, therefore, have been 
'voluntary'. In terms of the strict definition that unemploy-
ment only describes those who are willing and able to work at 
the going wage, but cannot find jobs, it could therefore be 
concluded that unemployment was not a true feature of the 
early years of White settlement. 
By the later 1940s, unemployment, even in the strict sense, 
became a feature of the economy. This may partly have arisen 
from the rapid growth in the Black population, but significant 
too was the 1941 Land Apportionment Act. By the end of the 
following decade, the problem was serious enough to justify an 
official investigation. (The Stent Commission, 'Unemployment 
in Southern Rhodesia and Policy to Eliminate it', 1954.) 
Despite this, an attempt was made by the Central Statistical 
Office in the early 1970s to show that local levels of unem-
ployment were, and had been, low. The deficiencies of the new 
computations were shown up by Hawkins (1972) and there has 
I 
been a general awareness that unemployment was, and remains, 
a major problem. 
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It is not conceivable that wage expectations, based solely on 
earnings in the first few years of White settlement, should 
have prevailed for the better part of a century. Nonetheless, 
unjustifiably high wage expectations may well have played a 
part in the. establishment of a body of urban unemployed. As 
Todaro (1971) pointed out, the perceived rather than the actual 
differences between rural and urban wages, and the perceived 
probabilities of obtaining urban employment at the desired wage, 
determine the level of urban frictional unemployment. 
Sandbrook (1982, pp.48/9), however·~ makes it clear that other 
factors must be taken into account. 
'psychic rewards'). 
(He refers to them as 
The concept of perceived rewards over the individual's working 
life (i.e. lifetime wage expectations suitably discounted) was 
further expanded on and used by Harberger (1971) who intro-
duced the social opportunity cost of labour to explain urban 
unemployment. 
Fields (1975) used Harberger's ideas within a Todaro framework 
to show the effect on urban unemployment and underemployment, 
of an informal sector (referred to by him as 'murky' or 'urban 
traditional'). Fields pointed out that the informal sector 
results in a 'lower equilibrium' unemployment rate than the 
original Harris-Todaro result, despite the reduction in the 
individual's available time for job searching should he 
accept informal employment. 
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Taking this into account, the conclusions reached were that, 
given a free labour market, as the probability of an informally 
employed worker getting a formal sector job rises: 
1. the equilibrium wage rate in the informal sector falls; 
2. the equilibrium labour force in the informal sector rises; 
3. the equilibrium labour force in the formal sector falls; 
4. the total urban labour force in equilibrium falls, and 
5. the equilibrium urban employment rate rises, i.e. there 
are fewer openly unemployed engaged in job search. 
(Fields, 1975, p.175). 
It should be clear that the significance of the Fields' model 
will depend on the extent to which it conforms to reality. 
The implication which particularly needs to be scrutinised is 
that the urban informal economy acts as a buffer to unemploy-
ment, being a third best option as a long-term prospect, since 
the model predicts that the informal wage will be even lower 
than the average product of labour in agriculture. 
The idea that informal work is a cushion against frictional 
unemployment was put forward strongly by Hart (1973). Using 
a case ~tudy approach, he tried to show that the informal sector 
in Ghana could " ••• act as a buffer, for those who are 'out of 
work~, against destitution or dependence on others.' (p.81) 
It cannot be denied that in Zimbabwe informal self-employment 
does act in a buffer capacity to some extent. However, whether 
this is its primary r6le is open to dispute. All the studies 
which have been done in Zimbabwe, and mentioned in the biblio-
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graphy to this text, mention the local informal sector as a 
permanent rather than a temporary source of employment. 
Di Seager's 1977 study of Derbyshire squatter camp outside 
Harare showed that over 80% of the camp's residents were 
urban dwellers of over six years standing. While a number 
commuted to formal employment in the city, many were perman-
ently informally employed. 
In more concrete terms, a 1973 study of Hartley (Cheguta) 
(Davies, 1978) found that the average income in the informal 
sector exceeded the average offered by formal employment in 
domestic service, agriculture and mining, the three sectors 
which absorbed the bulk of the unskilled labour in formal 
employment (p.8). These figures are deceptive in that they 
exclude allowances for food, clothing, accommodation and other 
benefits provided by fonnal sector employers. Nevertheless, 
Davies's conclusion seems justified by the extent of the 
quoted discrepancies between informal earnings and those in 
these three formal sector occupations. 
Even taking into account the insecurity generated by the 
absence of a contract to guarantee employment, Davies found 
that " ••• most informal workers are at least no worse off - in 
terms of income and security - than their counterparts in 
formal employment" (ibid., p.10). He added that the informal 
sector employment is not only viable, but " ••• is also often 
economically preferable to formal work" (ibid., p.10). 
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The same conclusion may be drawn from studies of the informal 
sector in Bulawayo and Harare. The data collected for this 
study showed that 74% of the informal clothing, shoe repair 
and upholstery enterprises approached, had been operating for 
over 10 years. Their informal employment was not generally 
regarded as a second-best by them. Even amongst the less 
financially successful, a number said that they would not 
enter formal employment at the going wage rates since they 
preferred the freedom of action given by self-employment. 
To these must be added the sizeable group who remain self-
employed from religious conviction, in accordance with the 
tenets of the Apostolic Church (M'Apostoli). Indeed, the 
recent University of Zimbabwe study showed that only 41% of 
urban informal sector respondents would accept factory jobs 
(the most favoured of the formal sector options) at salaries 
of under Z$300/month. 1 
All of these observations have pointed to the informal sector 
as a viable first choice by the worker. A caveat which must 
be taken into account, however, is that these were responses 
by those actually in the sector rather than the population as 
a whole. 49% of the University of Zimbabwe survey's urban 
respondents indicated that they entered the informal sector 
because they could not find formal employment, while only 31% 
entered because of a belief that it would pay better or from a 
preference for independence. 
1. Assuming that purchasing power parity holds between South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, which is not unreasonable since the 
relatively low price of staples and accommodation in ZiIDbabwe 
is accompanied by high prices on imported items and luxuries, 
the sum of Z$300 would be roughly equivalent to R375. 
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The belief that the informal sector is more than a simple 
buffer against frictional unemployment also has exponents in 
West and East Africa. Nihan and Jourdain (1978) viewed it as 
" ••• a magnet for workers who have been able 
to build up sufficient capital in the 
industrial sector, or even in commerce, to 
set up in business on their own and .thus 
escape the constraints of a work pattern 
that is often inimical to their way of life." 
(p.713) 
They add that 93% of informal manufacturers in their Nouakahott 
survey had profits equal to or greater than the wage of a 
skilled worker in the modern sector. 
The indication is that the informal sector serves a dual 
function, acting as a primary employer to a substantial portion 
of the population, for whom it provides reasonable incomes and 
security, and also as a buffer against poverty for a floating 
population of new migrants and frictionally unemployed. The 
capital and skill requirements which tend to typify the former 
group are generally accompanied by competitive incomes, as 
would be expected in a market economy in which the individual 
is free to sell his labour as he likes. The occupations of 
the latter group, however, are more strictly those described 
by the early literature on the subject, in particular with 
regard to ease of entry through low capital and skill require-
ments, and hence low profit margins. 
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1. 2 INFORMAL PRODUCTION·, THE NEO-CLASSICAL PARADIGM AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL DUALISM 
In the tradition of conservative economics, sectoral dualism 
is not the only source suggested for the informal sector. 
Technological dualism has also been presented as a progenitor 
of informalism. It is thus possible to explain the existence 
of the informal sector in terms of the fixed proportions pro-
duction theory of Leontieff and of Eckaus (1955). 
If the manufacture of an item requires fixed amounts of capital 
and labour, and the distribution of income among the population 
is such that capital intensive goods are required (as is 
expected where the bulk of purchasing power is in the hands 
of the wealthy), the result is a high capital/labour ratio in 
production, irrespective of factor abundance and prices. 
This suggests that a bi-modal distribution of income, such as 
that prevailing in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, would result in demand 
for two types of good, one characteristically capital-
intensive and geared to the high income group; and a secondary 
labour-intensive low price set of goods aimed at the lower in-
come groups. The relevance of this theory within a single 
industry is one of the issues at stake in the analysis of the 
production functions in Chapter V. 
It is important to note the distinction which the fixed factor 
proportions thesis makes to the production concepts underlying 
the idea of the informal sector. 
1 0 
The theory heretofore has been that factors of production may 
be substituted for one another in varying proportions in the 
manufacture of a homogeneous product. The factor mix providing 
economic and productive efficiency is therefore found by a 
simple process of constrained efficiency maximization; 
graphically using the point of tangency between an isocost 
representing the appropriate factor price ratio, and the iso-
quant denoting the desired level of output; or algebraically 
using the Lagrangean function. (See, for example, Sydsaeter, 
1981, pp.167/70.) 
The implication of this is that, as the factor prices between 
the two sectors vary, so too will the ratios of factor inputs. 
It is generally assumed that the informal sector prices its 
labour at a lower level than does the formal sector, and will 
therefore choose a more labour-intensive production system, 
. 
given equivalent prices of capital equipment, in order to 
product a given output. (See Diagram 1). 
The relative price dimension of the choice of techniques 
(described by Forsyth et al, 1980, as the rotation effect) 
has been the subject of abundant debate and empirical testing. 
Pack (1976) suggested that there is ex ante choice available, 
even if the capital/labour ratio is fixed once production has 
commenced. Moreover, good management can achieve disembodied 
productivity gains in both capital and labour. 
1 1 
Diagram 1 The effects of relative factor abundance 
Capital on ex-ante ~hoice of techniques 
. 1 . 
~ ~ 
· i 
Labour 1 w 
The seminal work in this field, Eckaus's (1955) article on 
factor proportions,showed that it is possible to have variable 
production coefficients at one output level, and fixed co-
efficients at another. With this as a base, he indicated 
that the persistence of under- and unemployment, and the co-
existence of labour-intensive and capital-intensive methods 
in the production of a single good may result from imperfections 
in the factor markets and from limited technological substitu-
tability of factors, i.e. fixed coefficients of production. 
The advantage of informal production methods is that they do 
allow variable production coefficients and therefore lead to 
the more efficient allocation of factors. In these terms, 
sectoral duality should contribute to full employment! 
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The small firm, by virtue of the direct relationship between 
ownership and control, and between work effort and rewards, 
may well be in a better position to avoid x-inefficiency than 
would its larger competitors. (X-efficiency being the case 
when costs are managerially minimised, given current informa-
tion and in the presence of the objectively appropriate tech-
nology. See Leibenstein, 1966.) 
In terms of the nee-classical growth models, the opinions on 
substitutability of factors of production have given rise to 
three basic divisions: putty-putty, putty-clay, clay-clay. 
("'putty' stands for capital in a 'malleable' 
state, which can be made into equipment re-
quiring capital/labour ratios of various 
magnitudes; 'clay' stands for capital in a 
'hardened' state, its use requiring one 
unique capital/labour ratio.") 
(Wan, 1971, p.148) 
Where capital is malleable, both ex-ante and ex-post, a putty-
putty model (e.g. early Solow's) is said to exist. Given the 
lesser specialisation of capital within the informal sector, 
this seems a more reasonable expectation from informal pro-
ducers than from formal ones. 
Ex-ante substitutability only, as postulated by Pack (1976), 
suggests a putty-clay model, such as Johansen's or Phelps's 
(see Wan, 1971), while non-substitutability (in any event) 
gives a clay-clay model. (For example, Solow et al, 1966). 
If, as Eckaus suggests (op.cit.), capital becomes less substitut-
able as output increases, then it seems reasohable to apply diff-
erent models within an economy operating in conditions of techno-
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logical dualism. Taking the idea of a technological dualism 
(manifested in distinctive production methods for the formal 
and the informal sectors) to its logical conclusion, the pro-
duction potential of each sector should be analysable in terms 
of the appropriate model. For this reason, one of the principal 
empirical aims of this study was to ascertain whether, in fact, 
the production methods used in the two sectors were significant-
ly different. (See Chapter V.) 
1.3 THE BENIGN/SUBORDINATION DEBATE 
The view of the informal sector presented thus far has followed 
essentially classical lines. The leading alternative to this 
approach has been presented by the neo-Marxist school and is 
based, appropriately, on a dialectical treatment·of the informal 
sector. Thus, while the question of the nee-classical economist 
is: does the informal economy have a role to play in the growth 
of the economy and in the provision of employment? the neo-
Marxist's central query concerns the nature of petty production's 
contribution to the class struggle. 
Tokrnan (1977) presented a summary of the theory pertaining to 
the informal economy in which he suggested that a polarisation 
of views had emerged in the literature, with an optimistic 
"benign" approach being countered by a pessimistic "subordina-
tion" view. While nee-Marxists were the sole contributors to 
the latter approach, there was nevertheless an element of 
Marxian thought amongst some of the "benign" school's members. 
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ToJanan's breakdown is not simply along lines of nee-classical 
vs. nee-Marxists thought, but rather in terms of the nature 
and effects on growth of intersectoral articulation. 
Benign relationships, in Tokman's · (1977) classification, have 
as their central feature the capacity for growth of the 
informal sector, irrespective of whether it is interacting 
with the formal economy (complementary), or is independent of 
it (dualism). The latter is evident where no formal enter-
prise exists and the demands of a burgeoning market are met 
by an expanding informal sector, such as the situation 
described in Lawson's Accra study (Lqwson, 1971). The former 
situation presumes the existence of a mutually advantageous 
intersectoral trade, i.e. a symbiotic relationship in which 
the informal entrepreneur expands formal markets by acting as 
a small-scale retailer of their products, or alternatively, 
lowers their costs by purchasing offcuts, rejects and scrap, 
which would not otherwise be sold. 
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with the informal 
sector lowering the costs of formal manufacturers. However, it 
has been held - particularly by the nee-Marxist development 
school - that this may result in no more than a rise in the 
rate of exploitation. Its origins seem to be jointly with 
the centre/periphery view of international trade (e.g. Prebisch), 
and the marginalisation theories of ·Quijano (1974) and Arrighi 
and Saul (1968), which perceived the rate of exploitation in 
industry as being raised by the development of a reserve army 
of urban labour. 
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The crucial point in the argument is that subordinate status 
may affect both the product and factor markets, and allow the 
appropriation of the informal producers' surpluses to the 
formal sector. 
A spectrum of opinion lies between Tokman's two poles. However, 
market-oriented economists have generally tended to the benign 
view. Thus the various ILO reports (1972, 1976, etc.) would 
be fitted into this category, as would the "small is beautiful• 
school, headed by Schumacher and those others whose prime con-
cern is the employment-generating capacity of the small scale 
enterprise (SSE) and hence, by implication, the capacity for 
development of the informal sector, in which lie the roots of 
the SSE. 
An important aspect of the benign approach is the general lack 
of intersectoral competition for markets based on the assumption 
that, although the products of the two sectors may offer similar 
services, they are nevertheless not identical in the utility 
packages they offer. Ceteris paribus, it will therefore be 
the structures of the respective demand schedules which will 
determine their market shares. This brings one back to the 
Eckaus (1955) argument, already referred to on p. 10, that the 
relationship between the conununity indifference map and the 
PPF will indicate whether the appropriate product mix involves 
,underemployment or not, and if so, whether such underemployment 
is likely to expand over time. 
If one were to take the basic point of the "benign" school and 
accept that employment in the informal sector will rise, despite 
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interaction with the formal sector, the problem of inter-
sectoral income disparities would still remain: does the 
1:righ degree of competitiveness between enterprises engaged 
in the informal retailing of formally produced goods prevent 
these enterprises obtaining more than the minimum subsistence 
wage? i.e. Can the informal operator obtain an economic rent 
in a labour surplus economy, with no barriers to entry? If 
he cannot, then complementary intersectoral relations will 
result in a failure to accumulate capital by informal enter-
prises and hence render any future expansion by them unlikely. 
The point at issue is whether or not the informal sector has 
the capacity to accumulate capital. If not, then its stimu-
lation in the context of a competitive labour surplus economy 
would be marked by an influx of new operators to the sector, 
competing down individual revenues to a subsistence level and 
therefore preventing saving and capital accumulation. 
There is little empirical reason to doubt that this scenario 
is, for the most part, representative of the informal retail-
ing of £oodstuffs and factory made goods. Significantly, 
however, petty retailing in Zimbabwe is rarely performed by 
the permanent male breadwinner of a household, but almost 
always by women and children, although a few of these are the 
sole providers for their families .. Although this group is 
large, it does not constitute the bulk of the informal se~tor. 
Indeed, Sr. Veronica (Brand, 1982) found tnat 25% of her 
respondents in Harare were engaged in informal activities only 
to supplement their families' incomes. 
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The observed difficulties experienced by petty retailers trying 
to accumulate capital are by no means insurmountable; a number 
: . - .... 
of storekeepers interviewed stated that they had begun their 
careers in precisely this way. They represent, however, an 
extremely small proportion of the total numbers who have been 
engaged in this occupation over the years. In terms of in-
formal retailing, therefore, there seems little justification 
for the total acceptance of the benign approach. 
On the other hand,. there is little reason to doubt that in 
informal · production, where barriers to entry in the forms of 
skill and capital requirements, and legislation, exist, 
levels of income above subsistence should be earned and sus-
tained. This need not refute the subordination argument 
since such a refutation would only be implied by an empirical 
observation that economic rents do not accrue to informal 
sector entrepreneurs in the long run. 
Skill and capital shortages are not the only limitations to 
entry. This is especially the case in Zimbabwean municipalities 
where market imperfection is introduced and maintained by a 
council ruling that small enterprises should not open in areas 
which are already (in council's opinion) adequately served. 
As a result of this exogenous constraint on the smallscale 
sector's expansion, many of those capable of entry into the 
informal:· sector, by virtue of entrepreneurial or technical 
skill, and possession of capital, being denied access to their 
markets, are unable to ?perate and,therefore,to accumulate 
further capital, expand their operations and increase their 
incomes over time. 
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The ability of informal sector entrepreneurs to maintain their 
viability in the face of apparently increased competition from 
new" entrants may also be explained by the high proportion of 
such new entrants to the sector who operate as employees rather 
than employers. That is to say, although some enter into com-
petition in their own rights, others become workers in a highly 
competitive labour market in which official minimum wage legis-
lation does not really apply. The wage is, therefore, competed 
down steadily, although imperfections,such as the observed pre-
ference for employment of family members, may prevent it dropping 
to the marginal product of labour. · 
New migrants will, therefore, decrease informal production costs, 
and increase the market facing the informal firm, unless they 
actually possess the capital and entrepreneurial skill to com-
pete in the product rather than the labour market. 
The "benign" view, taken in Nihan et al's various West African 
studies (1978, 1979, 1981) show that the informal sector 
operator generally does as well as, or better than, a formal 
sector employee with equivalent qualifications. They do make 
the point, however, that their figures are biased upwards by 
the use of family and apprentice labour. (This seems to suggest 
extended rather than immediate family). A more accurate esti-
mate of the position might be obtained, therefore, by taking 
into account family rather than personal incomes. 
The low wages of informal employees, and in particular of 
apprentices, need not imply high levels of exploitation. 
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Clearly, exploitation would not be implied if the workers were 
members of the operator's household, and need not, if an 
app·ren tice, regarded his training as part of the reward package 
for his services (although a surplus would still be accruing to 
the employer). The concepts of worker and sectoral exploit-
ation leads directly into the "subordination" or "dependency" 
approach to the informal secto~. 
The idea of sectoral exploitation is not a new one. Schmitz 
(1982) details Lenin's arguments on direct exploitation as a 
result of subcontracting to small-scale and home enterprises. 
Lenin held that official support of small-scale enterprises 
would have three adverse results: 
(i) the benefits would accrue to firms putting out work as 
a result of fierce competition amongst those trying to 
ob~ain contracts; 
(ii) it would preserve conditions in the contractee's work-
place worse than those in factories, and 
(iii) it would retard the development of industry and 
capitalism. (Schmitz, 1982, pp.22/23 and Arrighi and 
Saul, 1 9 7 3, pp. 1 7 I 1 8) • 
These are all forceful arguments, however, they may be countered 
by arguing that if subcontracting allows firms to cover costs 
and make a small profit with low risk (and be therefore 
especially sought after in slack periods), then there is no 
reason why it should be condemned. It reduces the risk of 
business failure, allows steady employment and enhances compe-
tition in an industry which might otherwise tend to extreme 
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concentration. The results of the questionnaire, which is to 
be discussed in Chapter IV, showed, however, that subcontract-
ing was alkost unknown amongst informal clothing producers, 
although it existed amongst the smaller and newer factories. 
In this respect, the Zimbabwean clothing industry differs sub-
stantially from, for example, that in Britain and the Far East, 
where putting-out is a fundamental feature of the productive 
system. 
Subcontracting and putting out are reflected in local formal 
clothing production by "cut, make and trim" (CMT) operations, 
a number of firms actually concentrating on this form of pro-
duction. In this system, the purchaser (generally a retail 
firm) commissions a factory to produce a line of garments for 
it and provides the materials required to do so. The costs of 
the producer are reduced,hence this system suits particularly 
undercapitalised new firms whose only alternative would be 
through factoring to cover costs. 
In terms of informal production, the closest equivalent i :$ be-
spoke tailoring; however, this may be changing. Where small-
scale enterprises in the Zimbabwean clothing industry have been 
producing to satisfy private sector contracts, these were, till 
recently, for the actual user rather than for resale, e.g. 
mission schools and hotels would contract an enterprise to pro-
vide them with uniforms. In the last year, however, a number of 
African-owned small-scale CMT operations have emerged, sponsored 
by existing factories attempting to diversify risks by broaden-
ing their spectrum of productive methods. (See Chapter II). 
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The Leninist argument leads to the question at the core of the 
subordination argument: Does sectoral exploitation necessarily 
imply tha~ the exploited industries have their growth constrained? 
Attempting to answer this question within the confines of the 
"subordination" approach, two arguments seem to have emerged: 
marginalisation and involution, the latter growing to a degree 
out of the former. 
Marginalisation theory suggests that the small enterprise is 
marginalised by the capital-intensive production methods of 
large firms within the Third World, i.e. such production 
methods not only reduce the labour/qutput ratio in the formal 
sector, but also reduce the viability of the informal sector, 
which cannot compete with cheap mass-produced goods. 
The effects of marginalisation would be worsened by the existence 
of a labour aristocracy, a concept which, it must be admitted, 
has been vigorously disputed, and, to a degree, withdrawn from 
circulation by its authors (see Peace, A., and Saul, J.S. in 
Sandbrook, R. & Cohen, R. (eds.) 1975). It would imply, in 
terms of Todaro's analysis, that the flow of rural migrants 
would rise with unionisation until it is perceived that the 
probability of employment has fallen. However, vested interest 
would harden the behaviour patterns of those already in formal 
employment, thus forcing down wages in the informal sector, 
which would then be supporting an additional population burden. 
The problem with the marginalisation thesis is well summarised 
by Mkandawire (1983) on the grounds that "subordination involves 
• 
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not marginalisation but 'exploitative integration'." Following 
Amin (1974), she comments that: 
·•. 
"While, historically, capitalism in the 
centre capitalist economies strove for 
and achieved dominance and exclusivity, 
in the periphery capitalism has managed 
to be dominant without being exclusive." 
The view that intersectoral articulation leads to exploitation 
rather than marginalisation has been taken by a number of pro-
minent writers on the informal sector in Africa, including 
Davies (1978), Leys (1975) and Gerry (1979). Presenting a cri-
tique of the ILO's Kenya Report, Leys argued that the informal 
and formal sectors were already articulated in that the exist-
ence of the former provided cheap goods and therefore allowed 
lower wages in the latter. In addition, he regarded the in-
formal sector as an employer of labour, rather than as a pro-
vider of self and family employment opportunities. These views 
led him to describe the informal sector as 
11 
••• a euphemism for the particularly intense 
form of exploitation to which the articula-
tion of the capitalist and peasant modes of 
production gave rise ••• a system of very in-
tense exploitation of labour with very low 
wages and often very long hours, underpinned 
by the constant pressure for work from the 
'reserve army' of job seekers." 
(Leys, 1975, p.167) 
By contrast, Sandbrook, in a statement developed from the ideas 
of Foster,Carter, Quijano, Godfrey and Roberts on the marginal-
isation of petty producers, has stressed involution as a cause 
of reduced informal viability. Claiming that the socio-political 
structure reflects "the 'hegemony' of the oligopolistic capital-
ist mode of production", he takes a political view of inter-
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sectoral relations and claims that 
n_ •.• the prospect for the informal sector 
is neither evolution into larger more 
productive enterprises nor even displace-
ment by large capitalist firms. It is 
instead involution, a situation in which 
more and more people share stagnant markets 
among themselves. Petty economic activities 
will continue to bear the cost of the failure 
of the labour force. Hence, more intensive 
competition, widespread underemployment ••• 
instability of employment and, in consequence, 
low and even declining, real incomes will be 
the lot of most of those consigned to marginal 
activities." 
(Sandbrook, 1982, pp.63/64) 
Viewed in these terms, the only escape for members of the petty 
economy is, therefore, through political changes which would 
remove the power base on which the "oligopolistic capitalists 
rest". The political approach to intersectoral relations, 
especially in states such as Zimbabwe,which have recently 
experienced radical changes in their political superstructures, 
therefore warrants further examination. (See Chapter III). 
The nature of the conflict between petty producers and oligo-
poly capital is naturally expected to alter after a change in 
government from a colonial or settler administration to inde-
pendent majority rule. 
Arrighi (Arrighi & Saul (eds.), 1973, pp.109-114) argues that 
in newly independent states there has been a move away from 
portfolio investment following the loss of capital and skills 
with the emigration of the settler population. Certainly there 
has been a marked outflow of skills, and despite exchange con-
trol, also of capital, from Zimbabwe, not merely since independ-· 
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ence, but antedating it by some three or four years from the 
peri_od when the combination of civil war and economic depress-
,.,. ...  
ion reduced the enthusiasm of the White Rhodesian public. 
Noticeably, however, there has been little movement of multi-
national capital into the country, with the exception of a 
major investment by the Heinz Group. This is important since 
the relationship between a srnall~scale African-owned enter-
prise and the foreign corporations is likely to differ sub-
stantially from that which it had with settler enterprises. 
In addition to the change in the structure of the business 
community, the emigration of "middle bourgeoisie" from the 
country has changed consumption patterns. The business corn-
rnunity is competing for the custom of African consumers at 
whom it is now gearing its marketing strategies. The informal 
sector has operated, by and large, in the African market and 
the switch in emphasis of formal marketing stra·t ·egies may have 
implications for the market facing petty producers. 
It has been mentioned that the products of the two sectors 
compete in terms of offering similar, but not homogeneous, 
services. An effective advertising campaign might reduce the 
apparent similarity of the utility packages offered by the 
products of the two sectors (since only those of the formal 
sector would presumably satisfy the wants created by an ad-
vertising campaign). Langdon (1975) pointed out that in Kenya 
mu ltinational corporations (and, by inference, the formal 
sector) attempt to transform tastes as well as to cater for 
i ndigenous demand; " ... redefining the need to drink into 
demand for Coke or Pepsi". 
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Similarly, Lebrun and Gerry (1975, p.16) showed that the "petty 
commodity producers" will be weakened by the changing of tastes 
~ ~ 
and fashions by capitalist enterprise, especially where this is 
towards goods which cannot be produced or serviced by petty 
producers and artisans. 
The brand name phenomenon allows for short-run monopoly profits 
as Chamberlin and Joan Robinson showed in the 1930s. In the 
small market of an LDC, where large-scale advertising is likely 
to be within the grasp of only a few, and where access to the 
market by foreign capital is limited by the lack of reliable 
information overseas, these profits may, however, persist in 
the long run. Marris (1968) showed that in Kenya small-scale 
African businessmen did not, however, tend to differentiate 
their products, their marketing strategy falling short of the 
enterprise they showed in other respects. 
Monopolistic competition and the associated marketing techniques 
may, however, lead to benefits through improvements in the range 
and quality of goods offered, benefits which, in Lancaster's 
(1979) view counterbalance the costs of deadweight loss. 
Within the context of an LDC, however, the idea that there is 
no loss of public welfare through formal sector imperfect com-
petition is countered by the associated blockage of informal 
operators' access to the product market. 
With this as a foundation, one can see the logic of Tokman's 
(1977) argument that part of the subordination of the informal 
sector lies in its inability to expand in the face of oligopoly 
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markets since the small-scale enterprise cannot increase in size 
beyond some critical point, without entering into direct compe-
tition with established big business. 
A further constraint on the long-term growth of the informal 
economy is the low income elasticity of demand for its goods. 
The inferior nature of .many informal sector products will prevent 
demand increasing as township populations become more affluent. 
To some extent, this may be alleviated by increased demand for the 
sector's products by newly urbanised migrants; however, the 
competitive nature of the informal economy might keep down the 
sizes of petty producers till the market has expanded sufficiently 
to warrant the entry of large firms. At this point, the entry of 
oligopoly capital will curtail development of the petty producers 
in the manner described by Tokman. However, the competitive 
nature of the informal economy might keep down the size of the 
enterprises in it until the level of demand is sufficient to 
warrant the existence of large firms, at which point one re-
enters the oligopoly situation described by Tokrnan. 
The inferior nature of the bulk of the informal sector's products 
tends to leave them with low income markets, while the large 
number of enterprises involved keeps turnover per firm low and 
profits are therefore severely curtailed. This has been pro-
pounded as an aspect of the exploitative results of informal 
sectorism. Schmitz (1982), however, contests this view on three 
grounds. First, empirically, he shows that the South American 
experience (at any rate) does not justify it, Then,on theoretical 
grounds, he continues: 
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' ••. if the "subsidy" (to the formal sector) is 
thought to be due to extra low levels of 
' remuneration of petty producers, one needs 
to know why this remuneration is so low. 
If it is forced on them by the greater efficiency 
of expanding capitalist production, then clearly 
there is no subsidy; the remuneration is low 
because ••• the amount of labour time is higher 
than socially necessary.' (pj8) 
Schmitz's third point is that if, by contrast, low informal 
wages are a result of high levels of competition, it must be 
asked whether the surplus is being channeled out of the sector 
or not. If it is going to intermediaries or to members of the 
rural subsistence economy, rather than directly in cheap goods to 
the workers from the formal sector, then the exploitation 
arguments of Leys, Davies and Gerry lose impact. 
A question to be answered, therefore, and one on which little 
Zimbabwean evidence seems available, is what proportion of 
informal output is sold to workers from the formal sector? 
Appearances indicate that much informal production is geared 
to the rural market, which is largely traditional and to other 
members of the informal sector. However, the sales of informally 
vended foodstuffs, etc., aimed at employees of formal commerce 
and industry, though not significantly cheaper than they would 
be if purchased through formal channels in the city centre, 
thrive because of the convenience and service they offer. Since 
1930/31, the operation of European or Asian businesses in the 
townships has been explicitly forbidden and competition con-
strained. Hence African vendors can buy goods in urban markets 
and resell them on the major routes in and out of the townships. 
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1.4 DISSENTING VIEWS 
A~tacit a~sumption which has been made thus far is that the . 
informal sector is clearly distinguishable through its character-
istics from the formal sector, i.e. that there is a distinct 
dualism within the urban economy. This view has been strongly 
contested on two major counts. Firstly, that it is inadequate: 
House (1984) contends that the "informal economy" is not a 
homogeneous unit and cannot be described as one. Rather, he 
holds that a disaggregation of it into at least two subsections 
is required to give the concept analytical relevance. The second 
count on which the concept of the informal sector has been 
challenged forms a complete contrast to the first, it being 
contended that there is no sectoral duality, but rather a unity 
of the poor, irrespective of the nature of their employment. 
Looking first at the objection propounded by House (1984): 
The 1977 survey of the Nairobi informal sector had shown that 
observed average montly - earnings in the sector varied from 
sh~58 (shoe repair) to sh.602 (vehicle repair), while the legal 
minimum wage was sh.350. This suggested heterogeneity of in-
comes, possibly based on skill and capital requirements within 
the subsections of the informal economy. House, however, went 
beyond this interpretation and distinguished between an "inter-
mediate" sector and the "community of the poor", the former 
being dynamic and vertically mobile, and the latter stagnant, 
performing menial tasks for a subsistence return to its labour. 
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In addition to disptaying a correlation between levels of school-
ing and business success,and mentioning that 45% of the in~er-
.... . 
mediate g'roup kept books, as opposed to 25% of the poor, House 
added the following table (which included a resrdual sample) to 
illustrate the differences: 
Table 1: Average levels . of various economic :i,ndicators for 
enterprises in subgroups of· the Informal Sector 
InteIItled.iate Residual Camtunity of the 
Sector Group Poor 
Initial Capital 72 44 51 
Current Capital 704 299 329 
Capital/output 0,2 0,5 1,4 
Capital/Labour 218 160 140 
Weekly Sales 78 27 16 
Additional Investment 483 212 180 
Total Nunl:er of Improvements 2,7 2,2 2, 1 
(House, 1984, p.293) 
Both capital and labour appear more productive in the inter-
mediate group, and it is clearly more dynamic, absolute growth 
in capital being over two and a half times that among the 
community of the poor, almost all of it, he says, being from 
retained earnings. Over and above the physical characteristics 
of the intermediate sector's operations, House claims that they 
may be recognised by the extent of their commitment to their 
enterprises (only 25% said they would move to formal employment 
at a monthly wage of sh.1 000~ while 61% of the poor were 
1. Approximately R135 at the exchange rates on 1/3/85, 
presuming purchasing power parity. 
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prepared to do so, reflecting the lack of prospects that this 
group see for themselves.) 
·•. 
Mkandawire (1983) criticized House for his failure to show why 
the success of the intermediate group should not stimulate an 
influx of rural migrants, each one competing away intermediate 
sector profits. House, however, seems safe on this point since 
the size of the intermediate group seems predicated by the 
levels of expertise, capital and entrepreneurial flair at its 
disposal, and all three elements are likely to be in short 
supply among the newly urbanised. 
The second objection to the concept of the informal sector was 
put succinctly by Leys (1975) who regarded the ILO's view of 
the situation as " ••. a misrepresentation of the modes of pro-
duction in Kenya, and their mutual articulation". His con-
tention is that there is exploitation of labour in the "in-
formal sector", the worker there standing in the same relation 
to his employer as he would do in formal employment. Extend-
ing government and formal sector contracts to the indigenous 
petty bourgeoisie would, therefore, only result in exploitation 
being "spread more evenly". This critique, therefore, en-
compasses both the concept of an informal sector, and the 
policy measure derived from it. 
1.5 THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The root of the nee-Marxist critiques of informal sector stimu-
lation seems to lie, not in the conviction that the sector has 
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no contribution to make to employment and growth, but rather in 
the belief that its fundamentally capitalist format will pre-
vent it from ever providing a complete solution. Indeed, by 
ameliorating the problems of the urban poor, the informal 
sector might delay that transition to socialism which could 
presumably solve these issues. 
A complete transition to socialism seems unlikely to occur in 
Zimbabwe's foreseeable future. Bearing this in mind, the output 
and employment-creating potentials of the informal economy re-
main issues of importance. For this reason, the constraints on 
them will be briefly summarised. 
The first of these constraints has been described as "blocked 
access" and falls under the subordination school's view of 
intersectoral relations. In terms of this, formal enterprises 
may slow the evolution of petty commodity producers by limit-
ing their access to both product markets, as already argued, 
and to factor markets. This has been described as a " ..• lack 
of stable access to basic resources of production", (Quijano, 
1974, p.404). 
In terms of Quijano's thesis, there is a difference in techno-
logy between the new and the indigenous productive groups. 
This technological discontinuity would theoretically result 
in product and factor markets biased in favour of the large 
corporations. Schmitz (1982, pp.5/6) suggests that, while 
internal constraints are not major handicaps, external ones, 
such as lack of access to raw materials, may force the small-
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scale enterprise into a subcontracting role with an attendant 
reduction in the returns to the firm's labour. In this context 
it must be remembered that House (1984) has shown that in Kenya 
1 a subcontracted informal operator earns sh.15 178 p.a. more, 
on average, than an operator who does not accept subcontracts! 
A factor which must be taken into consideration when appraising 
Quijano's thesis of technological discontinuity, is the existence 
of markets for imported secondhand capital in many third world 
states, a point which has been stressed by Schmitz (1982). 
Moreover, service activities in the informal sector have low 
ratios of capital to output. It must be accepted, however, that 
Zimbabwe's informal metal and woodworkers and clothing manufacturers 
have no access to the limited amount of truly high technology capital 
in the country. Zimbabwe, in common with much of the third world, 
suffers from foreign exchange shortages, and funds for the pur-
chase of foreign technology are scarce. The result is that 
whatever imported equipment there is, is concentrated in 
industries in which no local substitute for it is available. 
However, essential equipment is available to those in the 
informal sector who can use it, and items such as sewing machines 
suitable for use by informal producers, have been in local pro-
duction for some years. 
The result is that while there are doubtless areas from which 
the informal sector is precluded due to the required scale of 
operations and the indivisibilities of capital, there are 
1. Approximately R2 050 at the exchange rates on 1/3/85, 
assuming purchasing power parity. 
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many in which these indivisibilities do not occur. Indeed, if 
Eckaus's argument that the MRTS is greater for small than for 
large firms, then the informal sector may often be using a more 
appropriate technology, and be in a position to benefit directly 
from it. (See Chapters 4 and 5.) 
The centrality of capital accumulation to the development of 
small enterprise has been challenged by members of both of the 
two main streams of economic thought. Leys (in Fransman and 
King (eds.), 1984) asserts that Marx was incorrect in his belief 
that machinery had no class character, being a neutral force that 
only heightens labour's intensity when employed by capital. Follow-
ing Rossanda he holds that " ••• a given technology - including 
machinery - reflects or embodies the relations of production in 
which it develops". (p.175). In a similar vein, Gerry (1978) 
held that the informal sector was 
" ••• trapped in an involutionary impasse, 
able only to reproduce its conditions 
of existence, often at the expense of 
its own standard of living and labour 
remuneration." (p.154) 
Le Brun and Gerry (1975) made the point that the evolution from 
petty commodity production to small-scale capitalist enterprise 
was dependent on the entrepreneur's personal relations with those 
whom he employed and on his access to credit. On top of this was 
the problem of intersectoral relations.- This was explicit in 
their statement that -
"Internal growth is almost entirely 
involutionary, taking place against 
a backdrop of restrictions, constraints 
and distortions imposed by the dominant 
capitalist mode of production." (p.30) 
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It is true that the informal sector is in a weak position when 
bargaining for raw materials with monopolistic suppliers, and 
also that it is often dependent on supplies of scrap materials 
which are only suitable for use in a labour-intensive system. 
There are, however, other (and purely endogenous) constraints 
on the expansion of the sector as well as the exogenous in-
fluences mentioned thus far. 
1.6 CONSTRAINTS ON THE GROWTH OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Taking a more conservative approach, Solow (1957) held that 
only 12,5% of the observed productivity increase in the U.S.A. 
over the preceding 50 years was a result of capital accumulation 
(net investment). The remaining 87,5% was attributed to 
"technical change", both embodied and disembodied, i.e. the 
alleviation of internal and external constraints on growth, and 
improvements in the quality of capital. 
Staley and Morse (1965)'Wetl.tout of their way to emphasise t?at 
internal (as well as external) factors serve as major con-
straints on the growth of small firms. Education, book-keeping 
ability and entrepreneurial expertise are typical of the in-
ternal problems which may face the small-scale enterprise; 
equally important seem to be the social barriers described by 
Marris (1968), which also involve intersectoral behaviour, 
and entrepreneurial flair, a factor of production which is 
unquantifiable, although its effects are clearly tangible. 
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It is significant in this regard to note that in House's 
(1984) study of the income determinants of the informal sector 
in Nairobi the capital/output ratio had a negative coefficient, 
while the capital/labour ratio's coefficient was strongly posit-
ive, suggesting that entrepreneurship (viewed here as the ability 
to effectively combine factors of production) is of greater 
importance than the simple volume of capital possessed by an 
informal enterprise. 
Marris investigated the effectiveness of aid from Kenya's 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation to ~mergent 
entrepreneurs. In his interviews, he found that the most 
commonly voiced needs were for loan facilities 1 and managerial 
training. However, he noted that there seemed to be little 
correlation between the satisfaction of these needs and entre-
preneurial success · in. Kenya. 
Assuming a neo-Schumpeterian entrepreneur, Marris perceived two 
major internal constraints to business viability. The first 
was an ability to function within a social structure based on 
the extended family. The successful innovator is likely to be 
besieged by poorer relatives whom social mores oblige him to 
assist. (See also Iliffe, 1982). The second is the entre-
preneur's ability to differentiate self from firm and pay himself 
a specified amount rather than merely appropriate the revenues 
of the enterprise. This not only allows for corporate savings 
and hence further investment, but also assists in overcoming the 
1 . By contrast, Nihan and Jourdain ( 197 8) ·found that only 
40,5% of their informal sector interviewees in Nouakschott 
felt themselves constrained by a shortage of capital. 
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first constraint. 
The first important external constraint which he brings to 
light is social cueing, which is directly involved in inter-
sectoral articulation in economies where certain race groups are 
not well represented in the formal sector's managerial corps. 
The problem facing the emergent Black entrepreneurial is the mutual 
ignorance between him and the White, Asian and westernised 
African hierarchy of the formal commercial and financial 
worlds. The various parties lack the social cues necessary 
to form rapid evaluations of each other, a problem especially 
significant in the case of the small businessman with little 
collateral who is in search of a loan. To some extent, this 
situation has been ameliorated by the Africanisation of the 
Zimbabwean banking system. However, of major import is the 
recent decision to change the usury laws, potentially allow-
ing the wider development of small-scale private loan agencies 
better able to deal with the problems and needs of the individual. 
Other external limitations to the development of the small-scale 
entrepreneur noted by Marris included lack of knowledge of the 
mechanisms and structures underlying the market, and lack of 
business contacts. Marris's remedy was therefore to advocate 
the establishment of a marketing service (rather than further 
loan agencies), to reduce market imperfections by improving 
consumers' and producers' knowledge of each others' needs 
and products. Above all, to 
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" ••• find and develop points of contact, so 
that the opportunities of a wide ranging 
economic interdependence can be realised 
through a corresponding network of social 
familiarity. 11 (p.258) 
The non-social barriers to development of informal and small-
scale enterprises have long been recognised, but seem to have 
been most explicitly enumerated by Staley and Morse (1965) 
and Suttcliffe (1971). Staley and Morse gave eight factors 
whose existence they felt would lead to the predominance of 
small-scale enterprises over large ones: 
Locational: 
(i) Dispersed raw materials; 
(ii) a local market and high transfer costs; 
(iii) service industries~ 
Process: 
(iv) Separability of manufacturing operations; 
(v) craft or precision handwork; 
(vi) simplicity of the manufacturing process -
assembly or finishing operations; 
Market: 
-
uii) Small total markets; 
(viii) product differentiation with low-scale economies. 
It should be clear from these that improvements in the economic 
infrastructure of a state will reduce the advantages of small 
enterprises producing for the local market, since it will 
reduce the market aberrations and frictional costs which 
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allow them to survive. This has been especially evident in 
the newly industrialised countries of the Far East where non-
factory manufacturing employment has fallen sharply as the 
industrial base has broadened. Thus Ho (1980) shows that, 
between 1915 and 1940, it fell from 75% of the total in Taiwan 
to 25%, and Staley and Morse note that similar shifts have been 
evident in South Korea. They observed that, though small enter-
prise employment falls proportionally with the economic develop-
ment of an L.D.C., it does stabilize at some point. · 
There has recently been a surge in belief that in the developed 
world, small enterprise and the "grey" market will be the sources 
of future growth in employment. This belief in the continuing 
vitality of the system engendered by free entry of small-scale 
entrepreneurs has been advanced by figures as diverse as 
Schumacher and Schurnpeter. 
In recent years, widespread recognition of the informal sector 
by non-economic bodies has brought home the significance of 
intersectoral relations and of official attitudes. The dis-
tinction between the benign and subordination or dependency 
views is crucial, not for its academic relevance, but because 
policy decisions hinge directly on it. 
If the aim of development economics is the promotion of 
economic growth and public welfare, then a benign coexistence 
of the formal and informal sectors will suggest that the 
authorities can foster growth
1
without any adverse effect on 
the distribution of income, simply by stimulating the informal 
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economy. The potential benefits of informal sector stimula-
tion appear immense. Thus House (1984) made the following 
statement on the Kenyan economy: 
"If we apply Powell's estimates to the 
formal manufacturing sector and consider 
the relative changes in output and employment 
from an investment of K£10 000 in the two 
sectors we see that whereas annual output 
would rise by KE6 ·667 in the formal sector, 
the change in output from the informal sector 
would be KE10 000. In addition, and perhaps 
more important given Kenya's urban employment 
problem, whereas five new jobs would be 
created in the formal sector, that same 
investment in the informal sector would have 
brought about fifty five new employment 
opportunities. Of course, this assumes that 
the incremental capital to output and capital 
to labour ratios are equal to our estimated 
ratios." (p.185)1 
If, by contrast, the relationship between the two sectors in-
valved a subordinated petty commodity producing sector arti-
culating with a dominant formal capitalist one, then the 
benefits of any official stimulation of the informal sector 
would be appropriated by the dominant socio-economic group. 
Such a transfer of productive surplus could be through the 
informal sector's ability to lower the minimum cost of re-
production of the labour force, hence the wage rate and 
1. Testing the hypothesis that the technology employed in the 
informal sector reflects an LDC's resource endowments, 
House claimed that his expectations were borne out by the 
findings of Tobin and of Powell, the latter having found 
that the formal sector's capital/labour ratio was about 
seven times higher than that in the informal sector, while 
Tobin found capital/output ratios in the formal sector 
ranging between 2,5 and 1,1 as opposed to House's informal 
sector estimates of 1,0 for manufacturing in general, and 
1,6 for tailoring. 
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ultimately the rate of exploitation of labour in the formal 
sector. Alternatively, the transfer could be through the in-
formal economy's dependence on imported raw materials or formal 
sector manufactures to which it only has access through a market 
in which informal operators compete to purchase from monopolistic 
formal enterprises, whose market power allows them to make ab-
normal profits. 
The policy implications of such a scenario might be construed as 
opposition to the support of the informal sector as a relief 
measure. Pragmatic economists among those who hold with the 
dependency argument, recognise that the only alternative which 
does not involve the development of the capitalist economy is 
a total restructuring of the political and economic framework 
of the nation. This being the case does not necessarily suggest 
that the informal sector should go unassisted, unless the im-
plicit assumption is made that capitalism is so structurally 
unsatisfactory a doctrine that national welfare would be en-
hanced by the breakdown and subsequent restructuring of the 
economy along centrally planned lines. 
Marx held that, left unaided, the pre-capitalist forms of pro-
duction (i.e. those based on self-employment by artisans or the 
sale of excess products in a subsistence economy) would dis-
appear in the face of capitalism. (Capital, Vol.II). 
Clearly, this has not been the case in Zimbabwe. Certainly, 
there was a pre-capitalist economic structure (Beach, 1972; 
Arrighi, 1970; Malaba, 1980), and equally certainly one still 
exists, although very different in form. It is true that a few 
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occupations formerly widespread, are now absent, the artisans 
having been superseded by the factory producing a better, cheaper 
product. However, given that flexibility is one of the hall-
marks of the informal sector, this need not prevent individuals 
remaining in self-employment elsewhere in the informal sector. 
Zimbabwe is in an unusual position with regard to these policy 
issues. Its government propounds doctrinaire socialism, yet 
the bulk of the economy is operating on openly capitalist lines. 
Official interference in the functioning of the formal sector 
(exchange control, minimum wage and employment legislation, 
price controls, etc.) has served as one of the major stimuli to 
the informal sector, substantially enhancing its viability by 
diminishing both the competitiveness of the formal sector and 
its ability to absorb labour. 
The Zimbabwean government is in a position to exercise its 
authority in support of, or against, the informal sector as it 
attempts to impose a more egalitarian structure on the local 
society. The so-called "petty bourgeoisie", amongst whom in-
formal operators may be grouped, are regarded in socialist 
literature (and by party hardliners) as a conservative force. 
Sandbrook (1982) summarises the situation as follows: 
" .•• the exigencies of personal survival 
suggest that while the petty bourgeoisie 
may share and indeed foster urban populism, 
their hostility to the establishment will 
not debouch into a radical critique or 
movement. 11 (p. 154) 
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Since the petty bourgeois, as much as the fully-fledged 
capitalist, is threatened by wholesale political change in 
his already unstable economic niche, his conservatism is not 
surprising~ 
This chapter has undertaken to show that there is substantial 
disagreement on the informal sector, with alternative theories 
having been presented on its .origins, relations with the formal 
sector, development rOle and future prospects, but with no real 
synthesis having yet been effected. This research does not 
purport to provide such a theoretical synthesis. However, it 
will attempt to place these theories in a Zimbabwean context 
where each may be evaluated. The next two chapters in particular 
will attempt to cover the origins, sectoral relations and the 
status of the domestic informal economy in the face of a social-
ist, but pragmatic official ideology. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTERSECTORAL RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims at establishing the nature of the relation-
ship between the formal and informal economies in Zimbabwe, 
the analysis follCMing the theoretical issues raised in 
Chapter 1. The questions forming the foundation of the 
chapter are -
(i) whether the relationship is exploitative of the informal 
sector, symbiotic, or hostile, and 
(ii) the status of the urban informal sector, vis-a-vis the 
rural market. 
To answer these, the chapter has been split into four sections. 
II.1 Historical relations (pre-1930) 
II.2 Township enterprise post-1930 (a resume) 
II.3 Sectoral linkages and subcontrating 
II.4 Urban-rural linkages 
Although it tries to demonstrate the potential economic benefits 
of a viable informal sector, this chapter does not approach the 
problem of intersectoral resource allocation, which will be 
treated in Chapter v. 
II.1 HISTORICAL RELATIONS - THE ECONOMY BEFORE 1930 
Following Arrighi (1967), the history of the labour surplus 
economy in Zimbabwe may be traced back to the actions of the 
Charter Company, as it tried to safeguard the status of its 
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equity between 1890 and 1923, the period of its administration 
of the infant state. In terms of his thesis, the White settlers 
(all of whom had to be "skilled" and/or capitalised to the tune 
of at least £700 before being allowed into the country) found 
it in their interests to perpetuate a system in which there 
would be no surplus of skilled labour (Black or White). 
The reserve army of labour was to be strictly unskilled and 
Black. Arrighi contended that in this the settler community 
opposed the interests of international capital. His view may, 
however, be contested on this point, since the multinational 
involvement was almost exclusively in a primary sector whose 
concern was with cheap and unskilled labour. 
Malaba (1980) added to Arrighi's thesis, contending that the 
capitalist sector, not content with the alienation of the 
Black population from the land, also tried to restrict'compe-
tition from Black capital, ensuring that the indigenous popu-
lation's sole means of support outside the reserves would be 
the sale of its labour. The point at issue here is that both 
writers agreed that there had been sufficient time for the 
Black population near the major centres to accumulate the 
equipment to establish petty enterprises. Indigenous entre-
preneurship is, therefore, neither new nor culturally alien to 
Zimbabwe's indigenous population; 
ly as it did elsewhere in Africa. 
it emerged there as natural-
(See, e.g., Iliffe, 1983). 
Malaba's central assertion, however, is that the suppression of 
indigenous enterprise was a deliberate act on the part of White 
capital to reduce the entire Black population to the status of a 
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pool of unskilled labour. It was not a result of competition 
for a limited local product market, or for factors of product-
ions between different production sectors. Rather, it consti-
tuted an attempt by the White settlers to subordinate the 
Black population to their needs and to appropriate their land 
following a pattern set by conquering and occupying forces 
through history. To find evidence of intersectoral relations 
between the (Black) informal and the (largely White) formal 
economies, one must look at more recent time periods. More-
over, with the progress of time, the racial nature of these 
<-:,Y>, ... J 
relationships has become blurred. Increasingly, African 
entrepreneurs have entered the formal sector and often proved 
vocal in their objection to informal competition in the town-
ships. 
It must be stressed that an assertion like Theresa Chimombe's 
(1983) that 
"Due to colonialism in the country's 
past, industry remained a structure 
designed for the needs of a white 
minority. " (p. 1 ) 
cannot be substantiated except, perhaps, when discussing the 
very earliest days of White settlement. As soon as the African 
population entered the cash economy, they created a market for 
industrially produced goods. The purchasing power of the 
country's Black population has long been sufficient to justify 
the existence of enterprises catering almost solely for their 
needs. The question should rather be asked whether the produce 
of the formal sector was adequate for the needs of the local 
African population. 
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Mkandawire (1983) has asserted that, 
" ••• historically the Zimbabwe economy 
was so devised as to make the informal 
sector virtually non-existent by 
encouraging provision of goods and 
services entering the wage basket by the 
formal sector itself. Whatever emerged 
of the informal sector was therefore 
marginal to the accumulation process in 
the formal sector." (p.19) 
The implication of this statement is that White capital strove 
to underdevelop an extant informal sector, and to prevent the 
emergence onto the market of informally produced commodities. 
To attribute such intentions to the country's early capitalist 
economy would seem rather far-fetched. 
That it was organised capital which dominated the country's 
economy (and continues to do so) is beyond dis~ute. The formal 
sector constituted the centre of the economy while the informal 
sector, in terms of output and employment provision, was a mere 
ancillary. It seems doubtful, though, that the informal sector 
was ever "virtually non existent", or that any aspect of the 
nation's economic structure should have rendered it so. Amongst 
the interviewees in the Makokoba survey, a number indicated that 
they had been operating since the 1920s, while a substantial 
group had inherited their enterprises from, or been trained by, 
parents who had been in business between the Wars. Certainly 
the Jackson Commission of 1930 recognised that after 37 years 
of White settlement in Bulawayo, there was aLready a foundation 
of indigenous entrepreneurship which could be encouraged. 
(See Ndubiwa, 1974, 1 pp. 1 9-24) . 
1. A similar enquiry into "conditions affecting the Native 
Locations in Salisbury and Gatooma" was convened under the 
chairmanship of H.M.G. Jackson in 1934. 
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What this amounts to is an assertion that formalised indigenous 
non-agricultural enterprise has never been effectively curtailed. 
Arrighi and others have suggested that access to the market was 
limited. However, this was in specifically agricultural lines 
and the objective of the early administration seems to have 
been increasing the land holdings of the settler community 
rather than any reduction in the competition facing European 
entrepreneurs in the provision of goods and services. 
I.2 TOWNSHIP ENTERPRISE - POST 1930s 
The cut-off point for discussion of the "modern" period has been 
taken as 1930, this having been the year in which the Jackson 
Commission presented its findings. The significance of the 
Commission lay in its implicit recognition of the benefits of 
self-employment. With this as a background, they reconunended 
the exclusion of all non-African traders from the townships in 
order to open avenues for the satisfaction of indigenous 
economic aspirations. 
While the Jackson findings are in line with my belief that the 
authorities did not have the suppression of indigenous enter-
prise as a direct aim, the informal economy was nevertheless 
subjected to official constraints. Those impinging directly 
on it will be covered in the next chapter. However, indirect 
influences via the official curbs on township accommodation 
must be noted at this point. 
The authorities have long frowned on squatting, successive 
medical officers of health and since independence, central 
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government,having tried to curb landlords' overcrowding of rooms 
with rent-paying new migrants. Official controls proved much 
more difficult to enforce in home ownership areas than in those 
suburbs where all accommodation was rented from the municipality 
- which had the power to refuse renewal of leases if dissatis-
fied with a tenant. 
The result was the concentration of informal activities which 
had substantial negative ~xternalities into the home ownership 
suburbs such as Luveve (which was opened in 1935, and only in-
corporated into the Greater Bulawayo area in 1971). Those informal 
activities which did not involve substantial negative externalities, 
and were therefore not prejudiced by municipal checks and controls 
tended to accumulate in the older suburbs such as Makokoba, which 
was the sole township in the municipal area until 1942. 
Eight new townships were developed between 1950 and 1963, largely 
to cater for the industrial expansion which took place during the 
Federal period (1953-63). The accompanying inflow of new mig-
rants, attracted by the prospect of urban life as an alternative 
to low status work in agriculture and mining, resulted in an 
increase in demand for goods easily supplied by informal operat-
ors. This was enhanced by two factors. The first was the 
municipal insistence that only African entrepreneurs be allowed 
to trade in the Western townships, resulting in a situation 
where monopoly profits could be made by those given licences 
to trade in these areas (premises were owned by the council and 
allocated by tender). The second factor has been the establish-
ment of four markets, the largest being in Makokoba with 149 
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registered stalls. The visible profitability of these enter-
prises, and the status accorded to successful entrepreneurs 
(Murphree et al, 1975) must have acted as a substantial in-
ducement to enter into commercial activity, although recent 
developments may have made these conclusions questionable. 
(See Chapter I"II) • 
Dorsey (Murphr~e.e et ~l, 1975) showed that six months after 
leaving school students with four years of senior schooling 
tended to be employed according to expediency rather than pre-
J 
ference, due to the shorta~e of openings in the formal economy. 
This "'surplus of unskilled - p ut not necessarily uneducated 
manpower" together with the visible leadership role adopted by 
traders in the townships, may well have been one of the roots 
of the informal enterprises in the townships. Enterprise 
appears, therefore, a natural consequence of a crisis of expect-
ations generated by education in the face of unemployment. 
II.3 LINKAGES 
The 1972 ILO Report on Kenya includes an input-output model 
describing the relationship between the informal and the formal 
economy. Their recommendations are geared at -
(1) increasing the sizes of the direct and inverse input/ 
output coefficients, and 
(2) shifting the composition of .future increases in demand 
towards the sectors where the coefficients are highest. 
(See ILO, 1972, pp.507/8). 
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There seems little possibility of accurately estimating such 
input/output coefficients in Zimbabwe. However, some idea of 
the extent of intersectoral linkages can be achieved by ob-
servation. 
The ILO looked at informal linkages with government, the formal 
private sector and agriculture. They noted that there was almost 
nothing with regard to the first mentioned, and the Zimbabwean 
experience seems no different in this regard. The remainder of 
this chapter will, therefore, deal with linkages to the private 
sector, and to the rural areas including agriculture. 
The urban informal sector can be disaggregated in a number of 
ways. For the purposes of this section, two groups will be 
identified: firstly, operators who informally retail goods 
made by others (often factory made), and secondly, those whose 
labour time is spent directly in the informal manufacture of 
goods, or the provision of services. 
The backward linkages from the formal sector to the first men-
tioned group are direct. Goods are purchased by vendors for 
re-sale in the township. Generally, the trade is in high turn-
over, low-priced items such as foodstuffs purchased in bulk 
from the markets and then divided into smaller units. In 
addition, items such as r~ject garments and second-hand goods 
from auctions and door-to-door purchasing are handled. A 
further, and not inconsiderable traffic, is that in stolen goods. 
While pilfering by workers for their personal use affects the 
profitability of formal enterprises, the widespread organised 
theft of raw materials and finished goods, which are passed 
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from workers to accomplices outside the factory or shop, consti-
tutes a direct linkage to the informal sector. A number of the 
factory owners interviewed mentioned the problem, adding that 
their difficulties were compounded by the employment legisla-
tion currently in force which, while allowing dismissal for 
such activities, involves a substantial administrative burden. 
This situation will be amplified later in this chapter. 
While the informal economy's backward linkages are clearly 
visible, its forward relations to the formal sector are less 
obvious. Certainly, formal businessmen do not buy from the 
townships' petty retailers, but their workers do. Thus, al-
though a ·number of -factories have built canteens for their 
employees, others still have workers cooking over open fires 
at midday • . The result is a market for the food?tuffs hawked 
in the streets of the industrial sites every day. Whilst this 
is easily perceived, the two following points are less clear: 
(a) To what extent do inform~l retailers keep the lower 
income group's cost of living, and hence the minimum 
wage rate, down? 
{b) Are the petty retailers largely members of families of 
formal sector employees, i.e., is an inadequate family 
income (where only the breadwinner is in formal employment) 
being eked out by recourse to the informal sector, which 
raises incomes through employment provision (as well as 
increasing real income by offering goodsat lower prices)? 
The former question is the easier to clarify: Zimbabwe may be 
a labour surplus economy. However, salaries are not set by 
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market forces exclusively. Lowering the cost of reproduction 
of the workforce will, therefore, have a limited effect on 
nominal wages. 
In order to evaluate the significance of the second question, 
however, some estimate must be made of . the number of women in 
the informal economy who are not family heads, and the nature 
of their involvement. Unfortunately, there is a built-in down-
ward bias in many surveys of the economic activities of females 
and minors. Although the current government has expended con-
siderable effort on improving the status of Zimbabwean women, 
their primary occupation remains domestic. Petty production 
and retailing by women are frequently only spare time activit-
ies, often unlicensed, low profile and hence understated in 
the surveys. With this caveat in mind, the following figures 
remain illustrative: 
Table II.3.1 Percentage Distribution of Repondents 
by Sex and Mar_ital Status. 
(Informal operators, Mazaba, Harare, 1982) 
-
' 
Male Ferra.le Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Single 20 15,0 2 3,9 22 12,0 
Married 98 73,7 17 33,3 115 61,5 
Widc,t,ai 8 6,0 26 51,0 34 18,5 
Divorced 7 5,3 6 11,8 I 13 7 I 1 
Total: 133• 100,0 51 100,0 184 100,0 
Source: Brand, 1982, p.5. 
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In the cases of both sexes, it can be ' seen that family bread-
winners were in the majority: 74% of male respondents were 
married, while 63% of women were widows or divorcees and hence 
remained family breadwinners. The group with whom we are con-
cerned at the moment, however, are the 33,3% of female respond-
ents whose activities will generally have remained subordinate 
to the husbands as a result of the dominant status of the male 
in Zimbabwe's African society. 
Sr. Veronica's figures suggest that informal supplementation of 
family incomes by women is a feature of the local economy, al-
though the table does not give details of spouses' occupations. 
Similarly, the Bulawayo data,evaluated in Chapter IV, showed a 
substantial level of female informal activity. (See also 
Chapter V, Appendix I). It was, however, apparent that rela-
tively few women engaged in clothing manufacture entered the 
"intermediate" economy. Bespoke tailoring, for example, 
seems a largely male preserve, with those women involved being 
frequently former teachers, nurses or shop assistants, who have 
been liberated from traditional social patterns by a more 
affluent and westernised lifestyle. 
The apparent tendency for women and children to operate in the 
highly competitive retailing activities of the urban informal 
economy, or in low capital handicrafts such as crochet work, 
may be attributed to capital shortages. These are to some 
extent explained by sociological factors, in particular patri-
archal control over family earnings. The immediacy of the 
working wife's. awareness of family needs, and her husband's 
ostensible control over her earnings, encourages a tendency 
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to spend her income on goods for current consumption as soon 
as it accrues. Savings, and therefore capital accumulation 
propensities, are thereby lessened and women are largely con-
fined to low capital, low profit informal retailing. By con-
trast, male participants in informal retailing benefit from 
socially enhanced access to capital, and are often able to 
acquire handcarts and barrows which allow scale economies by 
decreasing the travelling time per unit sold; allowing bulk 
buying and larger turnovers. 
The use of child labour in production and retailing, while less 
obvious, is also a feature of the informal economy. In Zimbabwe 
its use is largely within the home or in petty retailing, and 
concern is only expressed when children retail food and cigar-
ettes in the township beergardens. Observation suggests that 
women and minors do make up at least a substantial portion of 
the petty retailing sector. Certainly, many of the women in it 
are breadwinners, although the general impression remains that 
1 this form of activity is primarily an income supplement. 
In summary, while there are substantial direct linkages back-
wards from the formal sector to informal retailing, there is no 
related reciprocal linkage. However, petty commodity retailers 
could have an indirect effect on the availability of labour at 
prevailing wage rates. Given that there is a shortage of 
commercial and industrial employment opportunities at the 
1. In this connection, see Gadzanwa, R.B. "The Policy Implica-
tions of Women's involvement in the informal sector in 
Zimbabwe", and the Draft Paper, "The role of women in the 
informal sector", both presented at the Informal Sector 
Study Seminar, Harare, 1983. 
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prescribed minimum wage, the current economic impact of such 
an effect may be wholly discounted. Rather, one can regard 
the informal retailer as the provider of a · us·eful service 
adding efficiency to the distributive function of the market. 
It has till now been assumed that informal sector retailing of 
foodstuffs would result in only subsistence incomes, due to 
the highly competitive nature of this activity within the con-
text of a labour surplus economy. The assumption seems justi-
fied, despite the existence of an apparent imperfection in in-
formal price fixing. The existence of price collusion (or at 
the least of a general two-part tariff} was suggested in an 
interview with Dr Eric Gargett, then of the Bulawayo Department 
of Housing and Community Services, and was later confirmed by 
observation. Prices in any single vending area were held at 
relatively constant levels till late afternoon, when the flow 
of returning workers was over. At this point, the apparent 
supply curve steepened and prices fell sharply. It is note-
worthy that this was less distinct at those vending sites which 
offered storage facilities. 
In the sphere of manufacturing, intersectoral linkages take a 
noticeably different form. Leaving aside intersectoral compe-
tition which will be treated later, the relationships are both 
more extensive and more bilateral. 
The conspicuous feature of the linkages is that they extend 
beyond the boundaries of the country. The raw materials of both · 
sectors frequently have an imported component. In the past, it 
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was practice to allow foreign currency allocations first to pro-
duce manufacturing for export. The remaining foreign exchange 
was then distributed largely on the basis of the allocations of 
the preceding year. The system's prime flaws were twofold: 
{a) Enterprises needing foreign exchange to obtain the raw 
materials to allow entry into foreign markets were fre-
quently unable to obtain it. Moreover, replacement of 
capital was often delayed past the optimum period by the 
necessity to use all available foreign currency to purchase 
raw inputs for immediate processing and re-export, thereby 
generally lowering the long-run efficiency of the product-
ive process. 
{b) Foreign exchange could only be made available to registered 
enterprises after they had applied to the Reserve Bank via 
their own commercial banks. It was found that the bulk of 
informal interviewees did not have accounts with commercial 
banks. No matter how limited their needs, informal operators 
were therefore constrained to purchasing whatever imported 
materials they required at the inflated prices prevailing 
within the country. {While mark-up controls on imports 
have existed for some time, they were not adequate in this 
regard.) 
The result of the system has been an unnecessarily labour-intens-
ive production process for reasons which will be elaborated later. 
The post-independence government changed the system markedly in 
· an attempt to establish new African owned enterprises. The results 
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however, were frequently unsatisfactory. Exporting manufacturers 
found themselves short of the wherewithal to continue competing 
overseas, and despite the lifting of sanctions, foreign aid, 
record tobacco crops and the end of the civil war in the country, 
the economy appeared increasingly short of foreign currency. 
It seems fair to say that there was a tendency for the new 
owners of foreign exchange allocations to try to profit out of 
them with the minimum of effort. The result was the importation 
of finished consumer goods, or the sale of the allocation, with 
a suitable mark-up, to a manufacturer with export orders to meet. 
These practices reduced the viability of domestic industry and 
seem to have been a major factor in the fall in business expect-
ations and sentiments post-1981. The informal sector, however, 
did not benefit at all from the new system of foreign exchange 
allocation, the application of exchange controls having been no 
less rigorous on it than on the formal economy. 
A well-known example is that of African crochet workers. The 
crochet hooks used are available locally, the cotton produced 
by the Zimbabwean spinning companies is of a high standard. 
There is, therefore, a simple forward linkage from the formal 
to the informal sector. The sales of the items produced to a 
degree are local; however, it was soon found that a substantial 
' 
demand for high quality handicrafts of this sort existed in 
South Africa. As a result, a substantial informal export trade 
emerged. Reject items are purchased from factories and shops, 
unravelled by children or new apprentices, and then reworked. 
Initially, as will be described in the chapter on government and 
the informal sector, exporting took the form of informal operators 
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transporting their wares by bus to South Africa, selling them 
there, and using the resulting revenues to purchase any inputs 
needed for their next production run, as well as easily resale-
able consumer goods with a high value/weight ratio to be smuggled 
back to Zimbabwe for sale at a profit. Following the government's 
intervention, and the rigorous clampdown on this sort of activity, 
the only outlets other than the limited local market were visit-
ing tourists (few in number since 1981) and formal sector agents. 
It is the relationship with this latter group that constitutes 
the major forward link between informal handicraft producers 
and the domestic formal sector. 
The effects of the entry of middlemen into a market are twofold: 
they achieve scale economies in marketing, while allowing the 
produce they handle to reach a wider market, potentially boost-
ing effective demand. On the other hand, however, they may re-
duce the direct and indirect returns to labour in that informal 
producers no longer have the additional income derived from 
smuggling operations. 
Moreover, despite the advantages intermediaries can offer to 
particularly skilled craftsmen's access to markets and the 
Reserve Bank, and frequently also higher and guaranteed prices, 
the very notion of such a practice is anathema in a socialist 
system. For this reason, co-operative marketing is thought to 
be a solution to the official dilemma. 
The potential benefits of a co-operative marketing structure 
seem clear, the co-op being a participant in the formal economy, 
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but acting on behalf of its members. There are, unfortunately, 
a number of flaws in such a solution, principally the members' 
requirement for immediate returns, the difficulty in finding 
office bearers (since the opportunity costs of administration 
are high), and the too frequently observed dishonesty of such 
administrators as are found. (The most dramatic instance of 
this was the alleged misappropriation of Z$150 000 by officers 
of the Hawkers and Vendors Co-operative Society between 1981 
and the beginning of 1984. The· Herald, April 16, 1984.) 
The functions and problems of the co-operative system will be 
treated in greater detail in Chapter III. 
The potential of informal production, especially in the export 
sector, has not gone unrecognised. However, at the moment is 
is largely confined to export via intermediaries, as described 
. above, and to the sale of handicrafts as curios in the tourist 
market. There is, however, scope for a formalisation of this 
position which would also enhance the level of sectoral inter-
dependence. 
II.3.2 SUB-CONTRACTING 
Barring the formation of co-operatives, the simple mechanism 
for the development of intersectoral linkages would be the 
evolution of a putting out .system (such as that mentioned 
earlier in connection with Lenin's views on direct exploitation). 
Such a system might overcome some of the problems which industry 
has faced since 1981. 
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The formal sector's viabilitf has been constrained by the 
employment legislation of the past few years, and even though 
the inflation rate has resulted in the real minimum industrial 
wage being only marginally above that prevailing at the be-
ginning of 1980, the benefits of this have not filtered through 
to producers whose prices have been curbed by additional con-
trols. 
Putting out · , as currently practised in England and the Far 
East, would mitigate some of the difficulties mentioned above. 
It is a system which could be particularly appropriate to the 
clothing and crochet industries. While it has the advantage, 
in Marxian terms, of not alienating the worker from the product 
of his labour to the same degree as factory work does, the al-
ready cited Leninist counter-arguments may well count higher 
in official esteem than the profits of industrialists. 
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that this practice is being 
employed on a minor scale, although not openly acknowledged by 
the authorities. 
The central issue in a putting out system is quality control, 
and by implication, the ability of the home operator to pro-
duce the goods required. The informal clothing producers inter-
. viewed were most frequently using manual or treadle-operated 
Singer or Harrison machines, the latter brand being locally 
produced. Whilst both durable and cheap, they are limited in 
the range of functions they perform. Until such time as the 
national foreign exchange situation resolves itself to the 
extent that more advanced machines are generally (and more 
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cheaply) available, the ·putting out system in the clothing 
industry seems unlikely to extend beyond the production of 
goods aimed at the bottom end of the market. Production 
methods similar in scale and quality to those in Europe and 
the Far East, do not yet seem likely. 
A totally different relationship, and one with no connotations 
of exploitation, is that which has been observed in a clothing 
factory running on short time due to depressed demand for its 
specialised products. Workers were given access to their 
machines during the remainder of the week in order to produce, 
on their own behalf, for the informal market. 
A further variation in production methods has come with the 
emergence of entrepreneurs who have been buying up job lots 
of fabric and having them made up by ex-factory workers on a 
CMT basis. These workers have not yet organised themselves to 
a significant degree and are therefore unable to buy fabric etc. 
on their own account at reasonable prices, or to produce lines 
of goods and market them efficiently. They are, moreover, 
generally short of business expertise. A few of them have 
been organised by retailers on a CMT basis and seem to be 
prospering. Given greater independence, a grouping of such 
workers, with machines purchased from insolvent factories, 
could undercut establishments operating more conventionally, 
since they have more direct incentives and lower overheads. 
The caveat attached to this is that they would ultimately have 
to break free of CMT operations, producing and marketing their 
own goods in the same way as other firms. (The difficulties 
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attendant on such transactions have been widely discussed. 
See, e.g., Kirkpatrick et al, 1984, pp.129-142; Hoselitz, 
1959; Anderson, 1982.) 
Although capital constraint is one of the major reasons for 
the non-viability of any putting-out system in Zimbabwe, a 
less tangible, but still significant factor is the social 
climate of the country. To succeed, putting-out requires 
high levels of organisation, strict quality control and 
rigorous costing. Moreover, the worker must be willing to 
subordinate himself to these requirements. Currently neither 
formal sector factory owners, nor clothing workers in the two 
sectors, satisfy these prerequisites in sufficient numbers to 
justify a change in the organisation of production. 
Inter-firm sub-contracting is, perhaps, the most visible 
linkage between the sectors,. and with the exception of the CMT 
operations just mentioned, is conspicuously absent between 
large-scale producers and their small-scale and informal 
counterparts. This is easily accounted for by the already 
mentioned shortage of the required capital in small-scale 
enterprises. However, it does appear to a degree between 
individuals in the formal sector and artisans with specific 
skills who are informally based. These are few in number, but 
specific instances are the building trade, which sub-contracts 
work to stonemasons and thatchers, both jobs requiring skills 
relatively rarely used, hence it is not in the interests of a 
contractor . to keep such workmen in fulltime employ, unless they 
have alternative and more frequently-used skills. 1 Township 
1. A similar experience is reported for Lesotho, see Setai, B.P. 
"Technology and Small Scale Enterprise in Lesotho", Paper 
delivered to Informal Sector Seminar, Harare, 1983. 
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welders occasionally provide door frames and burglar bars to 
order for contractors, and specialist workmen are sometimes 
found with the "building brigades", although this is not 
strictly a form of intersectoral sub-contracting. 
Small-scale enterprises operating on a formal basis make regular 
use of the services provided by some of the intermediate sector 
operators in the townships. Backyard mechanics and panelbeaters 
are a case in point. However, these services are rarely demanded 
by European-run businesses, the lack of adequate market knowledge 
being a major contributory factor. Information on the quality of 
work, prices, and the honesty of the workmen is not generally 
available to the businessman, who lacks experience of the town-
ships. In addition to this, the social cues mentioned in 
Chapter I, are lacking. The businessman's non-usage of these 
facilities is, therefore, rational and hence unlikely to change 
until the circumstances alter. 
More indirect indices of sectoral interaction are sources of 
raw materials and skill formation. It should be clear from 
previous discussion that informal manufacturers in Zimbabwe, 
contrary to the ILO's Kenya findings, do not rely primarily on 
indigenous resources. Furthermore, skill formation is largely 
in the formal sector from which workers shift, with their skills, 
into informal enterprise. (Contrary to ILO findings in West 
Central Africa, (Nihan et al, 1978, 1979; Demol, 1982)). 
Intersectoral relationships in Zimbabwe extend beyond the back-
ward and forward linkages alr.eady discussed, and the competition 
64 
for limited urban markets between major enterprises and informal 
producers. There is a major, and vigorously pursued, conflict 
between emergent licensed business and illegal vendors of 
similar goods and services. This conflict is neither new, nor 
confined to Zimbabwe; Garlick (1971) observed that, 
" ••• in Ghana ••• for many commodities 
competition was severe for most of 
the time •••• The small trader in store 
premises, with rent, telephone and 
watchman co"sts, often regarded the 
hawker with no overheads as his 
competitor." {p. 73) 
The rent-paying stallholders at the Lobengula bus terminus, for 
example, make monopoly profits when ZRP action keeps illegal 
vendors away. A letter, dated 3/4/84, from the office of the 
Director of Housing and Community Services to the Acting City 
Treasurer of Bulawayo, gave the following responses at inter-
views with six stallholders: 
Table II.3.3: The effects of police control of illegal 
vending on legal vendors' profits 
Interviewee Estimated daily profit Estimated daily profit 
with police {ZRP) patrols without ZRP patrols 
(Z$) {Z$) 
1 10 3 
2 6 0 {estimates a loss) 
3 11 4 
4 5 1 
5 10 4 
6 10 5 
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Even taking into account probable bias in the results, it shou~d 
be clear that vested interests are at stake here and, since the 
shopkeepers and stallholders of the townships have tradition-
ally provided the bulk of the high density suburbs representa-
tion on local government bodies, this seems unlikely to change. 
The reaction of registered taxi drivers to the informal sector 
gives a further indication of the forms competition may take. 
In a letter to the Town Clerk, quoted in the Minutes of the 
Engineering Services Committee meeting of 19/3/84, they ob-
jected, not to direct competition from emergency taxis, but to 
the indirect competition provided by handcart pushers offering 
a service related to that provided by taxis. The letter began 
by repeating a request first expressed in 1980, that Council 
ban handcarts from the Renkini country bus terminus, on the 
grounds that they disrupted normal taxi operations. They 
complained that 
"As legitimate operators we need protection 
against these aggressive people who will 
stop at nothing to get a cent into their 
pockets." 
There followed a list of alleged practices by the informal 
operators, ranging from misrepresentation of taxi fares to 
plain coercion of potential taxi customers. They concluded: 
"We believe that there has to be an end 
to this practice in order that our 
operations remain viable ...• We pay 
sales tax to the Government while these 
people pay nothing at all." 
In general, competition seems a far more widespread characteristic 
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of the relations between illegal vendors and small-scale legi-
timate enterprises than it does of the more tenuous connections 
between large-scale conunerce and industry and their informal 
counterparts, (even though these may be substantial in specific 
instances, e.g. the bus services and the emergency taxis). 
Thus The Bulawayo Chronicle (12/1/85) reported the chairman of 
the Fruit and Vegetable Association as saying that unless 
illegal vending were curbed, it would be impossible for legal 
vendors to pay their rents on time. The report added that at 
Luveve market, only eight of a previous twenty-eight vendors 
were left paying rent for stalls. A representative of those 
remaining attributed the success of illegal vending to its 
flexibility of access to the public; not being confined to a 
stall, illegal vendors can sell at bus stops, beerhalls and on 
the roadside, following their buying public rather than wait-
ing for them. 
There are obvious elements of vested interest in stallholders' 
demands that competitors, especially those with no licence or 
rental expenses, should be controlled by the authorities. 
These generalisations, however, cannot be applied throughout 
the small-scale sector. This is clear if one looks at the 
clothing and footwear producers in the townships. Bespoke 
tailors and informal producers are catering to very different 
markets, the bespoke tailor feeling the effects of competition 
from the factories far more acutely than competition from 
informal operators, largely producing for a rural clientele. 
Similarly, competition is insignificant between the factories 
and the great majority of informal producers. 
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Two factors contribute to lowering the degree of competition 
between large-scale enterprise and petty producers in the 
clothing industry. The first has been implied already, namely 
that they often produce for different markets. Goods intended 
for sale in the urban market have, of necessity, to achieve 
levels of quality not required of rurally marketed goods. 
Excluding bespoke tailoring and, to a degree, the production 
of children's wear, the informal sector cannot seriously com-
pete with the formal, since it does not generally provide the 
level of finish required by increasingly sophisticated urban 
consumers. Overlocking of seams, for example, is mandatory, 
if garments are to be sold in urban markets. Essentially, it 
is therefore the non-homogeneity of outputs and the separation 
of markets that prevents clashes of sectoral interests. 
The second point is the protected nature of the industry. If 
every worker feeds 2,6 dependants (See Chapter III.1), the 
social implications of widespread factory closures would be 
substantial, especially in an industry such as clothing, in 
which single factories employing over five hundred workers are 
not uncommon. Official awareness of the sensitivity of the 
industry in a period of depressed demand has grown recently, 
and untoward worker behaviour has been increasingly curbed by 
ministerial action. 
Foreign competition on the domestic market has been precluded 
by stringent exchange control, the only competition remaining 
on the domestic market being from emergent producers and the 
informal sector. 
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In the case of emergent producers, both the industry and the 
authorities have been willing to assist workers left redundant 
by retrenchment or closure. The ownership of factories closing 
down have, on occasions, been transferred nominally to still 
viable firms to facilitate showing a short-term tax loss, thus 
improving the cash flow. However, the machinery etc. is 
generally auctioned and typically bought up by ex-employees 
who have then entered the market. 
The relationship of these workers with the remaining firms in 
the · industry is an interesting one and still in a state of 
flux, as was described earlier in this chapter (p. 61). 
At present, it appears that the only direct competition between 
large-scale formal enterprise and informal operators is gener-
ated by the sale of stolen goods. The incidence of theft of 
finished goods and fabrics from the industry has already been 
mentioned. It is worth noting, however, that the industrial-
ists' losses are not merely in terms of the goods stolen or 
the delays in payment of insurance claims, but also include 
the difficulty of competing with their own stolen (and there-
fore discounted) items on sale at low prices on the market. 
Stolen goods are sold at discount and therefore contract the 
market in the legitimate product. This is of particular rele-
vance since one of the major problems which have afflicted 
industry since 1982 has been the low level of real domestic 
demand. The opinion of the producers interviewed was that 
this sort of problem had increased in magnitude in the four 
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years since independence. They indicated that this was not 
a result of falling police standards (a view put forward fre-
quently in the Western Townships) but rather of a change in 
social ethics and of the increasing rates of urbanisation and 
decreasing per capita employment of the urban population. 
The series of major clothing industry failures in 1983/84 
brought about a number of changes in the retail and production 
aspects of the industry, including the first steps to a "putting-
out" system, as already mentioned. A further significant change 
has been the introduction of factory shops. Producers have en-
gaged in both direct marketing of their goods to the public and 
in wholesaling. The products of these enterprises seem aimed 
largely at the low-priced urban market. This is not to say, 
however, that they are necessarily competing with informal pro-
ducers. The townships' residents cannot simply be dismissed as 
the target group for low-priced commodities. They are increas-
ingly discerning consumers who frequently pay high prices for 
high quality products. Low priced informally made garments 
seem aimed at the rural market, into which the factory shop 
can only penetrate through the inadequate mechanism of country 
stores. 
_I.4 URBAN/RURAL LINKAGES 
By contrast with bespoke tailoring, the informal production of 
low priced clothing for women and children, often from fabric 
offcuts, while an urban occupation, is aimed at a rural market. 
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There is an established demand throughout the country for cheap 
garments; this market was the first catered for by the formal 
sector, the country's factories having been almost wholly geared 
to the production of cheap cotton goods until the 1950s. Since 
then the range of tastes and incomes catered for by the formal 
sector has expanded substantially. In addition to low distri-
bution costs in the urban areas, factory-made products have had 
the advantages of status and often quality on their side. 
In recent years, the urban demand for low priced goods has, 
therefore, been largely satisfied without the involvement of 
informal manufacturerers, although a small market remains for 
informally produced children's wear. 
There are, however, inefficiencies in the urban retailing of 
factory-made clothing, which provide a limited opening for in-
formal involvement. The purchase, repair and resale of second-
hand clothing is a labour-intensive and relatively remunerative 
example, the retailing being performed by both mobile hawkers 
and by vendors with stands at the various townships markets. 
By contrast, when selling in the rural areas, the informal 
urban-based manufacturer of clothing experiences little compe-
tition from the factories. Retailing in rural areas is confined 
to farm stores, mine concessions and privately-run shops selling 
a wide range of products, often including fabric and ready made 
garments. The bush war in the late 1970s left many of these 
stores in ruins, both physically and financially. The result 
was the expansion of an already sizeable market for low priced 
goods produced by the urban informal sector. 
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In the past, many rural traders employed or commissioned a 
tailor whose function was the manufacture of clothing for . 
customers purchasing fabric in the store. This custom seems 
to be fading, even where shops have been unaffected by the pre-
and post-independence disorders. The rural market is instead 
being catered for by largely female informal operators, working 
in town and entering the rural areas purely to sell. They are, 
in other words, extending the market to serve a group with no 
normal access to these goods. 
The case of the informal clothing manufacturer should not be 
regarded as unique; there are significant commercial links be-
tween the townships and the communal lands. The urban informal 
producers of goods in iron, steel and galvanised metal, supply 
a largely rural based demand, as do the suppliers of scotch 
carts, water carriers, and reconditioned packaging. 
The return flow of agricultural produce to the township markets 
is sizeable, although there are indications that farmers in the 
former tribal trust and African purchase areas are increasingly 
growing maize etc. for the control boards and entering the formal 
cash economy. Palmer's belief that there has been " •.• an almost 
complete cessation of inter-African trade" (in Palmer and Parson, 
(eds.) 1977, Chapter 9), does not stand up to empirical observa-
tion. Indeed, Beach, in a study of the Shona economy presented 
in the same volume, summarised the position by stating that 
"The establishment of a capitalist 
economy .•• has led to great changes 
in the 'traditional' economy, but 
has not destroyed it." 
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Modern marketing and transport systems have provided the solution 
to the storage problem faced by traditional farmers. Surpluses 
can be, and are sold, as the output of the African farming com-
munity in the drought season of 1983/84 showed. As a result, 
the traditional economy of the rural areas is providing higher 
levels of demand which are being catered for by urban-based 
informal manufacturers who thus link the rural subsistence 
sector to the remainder of the economy. 
The relevance of two-way informal sector linkages between rural 
and urban areas in Zimbabwe becomes clearer by reference to 
Lawson's findings in Ghana (Lawson, 1971). She found that, even 
in the face of rapid population growth, the supply of retail 
services kept up apace in the cities, and as a result the rate 
of increase in prices was moderated. (These retail services 
included hawking and vending). By contrast, rural prices rose 
significantly faster than urban ones over the same period. She 
concluded that where there was no capital constraint, the supply 
of urban marketing services was perfectly elastic, a situation 
likely to continue for as long as labour-intensive (i.e. informal) 
means of retailing were acceptable. The greater level of im-
perfection in marketing and the scarcity of entrepreneurship, in 
the rural areas, means that although there may have been signi-
ficant underemployment in the countryside, the elasticity of 
supply of marketing services there was finite, leading to the 
higher observed rate of rural inflation. 
The mobility of city-based entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe should, 
therefore, be a factor in keeping the rate of increase in rural 
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prices under control, although a premium to allow for transport 
and other expenses would still exist. 
The level of imperfection in the Zimbabwean rural market is, 
however, only reduced, not eliminated, by the current relations 
between town and country. Two factors seem primarily responsi-
ble for this: 
(a) the requirement of local authorities, especially in the 
Lowveld and in mining areas, for hawking permits which 
have to be paid for, and 
(b) the existence of family links giving informal operators 
preference in their home areas, acting as barriers to 
entry o f others and therefore allowing for some degree 
of monopoly profit. 
The mobility of the urban-based entrepreneurs with a rural 
market is likely to increase markedly as the rural road net-
work improves and the unrest in the Western portion of the 
country subsides. The Government's programme of decentralisation 
and the escalation of output from African agriculture are likely 
to increase disposable real incomes in the countryside. Once 
these have risen beyond a critical minimum, the rural areas will 
constitute viable markets for the formal sector and the relative 
importance of informal operators in the distributive process 
will decline. This point seems,at the moment, a long way off 
and its arrival will be predicated on the official effort to 
develop the rural infrastructure. As the next chapter will 
attempt to illustrate, however, Government has other, and more 
74 
fundamental, relationships with the informal sector • 
. In essence, this . chapter has attempted to illustrate the relation-
ship pertaining between the sectors, and between the urban and 
rural informal economies. I hope I have demonstrated my belief 
that, illegitimate activity excluded, intersectoral articulation 
is symbiotic rather than exploitative, since the effect of the 
informal sector on the cost of living is not manifested as an 
increased surplus value. Both parties derive benefit from 
informal activities: the total market is expanded, distribution 
is rendered more efficient, linkages are extended and amplified, 
and National Income is increased. 
Doubt remains, however, as to the future of the informal sector. 
The examples of Europe and the U.S.A., which have extensive 
informal components to their economies, suggest that it will 
not disappear. However, its role, especially vis-a-vis the 




GOVERNMENT AND· THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
The official view of informal activities is bedevilled by a 
primary problem, the inconsistency between the government's 
espoused opposition to the petty bourgeoisie, and its prag-
matic recognition that small-scale enterprises may provide a 
solution to the country's economic ills. After a general 
statement of the problem, this.chapter will describe the economic 
contribution of the informal sector to Zimbabwe, the government 
and party political reaction to it, its interaction with local 
authorities and the theory and reality of the aid available to 
it. 
In essence, the benefits of the informal sector may be presented 
under three headings: employment, output and manpower training. 
Counterbalancing these, are five negative features, familiar 
from Chapter I, most of them being doctrinal. 
1. Informal entrepreneurs may become (if they are not already) 
members of the "petty bourgeoisie", a group vilified in 
Marxist rhetoric. 
2. Informal activities may increase capitalist profits by 
decreasing the minimllln cost of reproduction of the labour 
force. 
3. The informal sector may prove a super-exploitative employer 
of labour. 
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4. Being capitalist in form, the informal sector can only 
provide short-term relief for unemployment. 
5. Certain informal activities impose negative externalities 
on the public (and on the authorities). 
III. 1 THE INFORMAL SECTOR'S ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION 
Any government's treatment of a sector within its economy de-
pends, to a large extent, on that sector's lobbying power, its 
size, contribution to national product, and capacity for future 
employment creation. Since the problem of greatest moment fac-
ing the current Zimbabwean economy is the creation of employment, 
it seems appropriate to begin by looking at some of the esti-
mates of the numbers of individuals involved in the urban in-
formal economy. 
In his 1973 study of Hartley (Chegutu), Davies found only 75 
informal operations in a population of . 10 000 (Davies, 1978, 
p.10); projecting this into the Zimbabwean population of the 
time, an informal sector of only 6 000 would have been esti-
mated. He concludes that this 
" ••• clearly understate(s) the overall size 
of the sector in the urban areas for a number 
of obvious reasons. First, the survey did 
not locate any members of two informal activi-
ties which are known to be important, at least 
in larger towns: pirate taxi operators and 
shebeen operators. Their exclusion means that 
not only is the size of the sector understated, 
but the average earnings are considerably 
underestimated. Second, it is incorrect to 
assume that the proportionate size of the sector 
directly relates to th~ size of the town. In 
other words, although the sector comprises only 
0,75 per cent of Hartley's Black population, one 
would expect to find that Salisbury's informal 
sector constitutes a larger proportion of its 
Black population." 
(Davies, 1978, p.11) 
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Davies goes on to infer from the Kenyan figures, a possible 
estimate for the Zimbabwean informal sector. He quotes the 
I.L.O. finding (I.L.O. 1972, p.225) that between. 28 and 33 per 
cent of African urban employment in Kenya is provided informal-
ly. He goes on to say: 
'Applying these figures to Rhodesia would 
give an urban informal sector of approximately 
150 000. Considering the extent of rural 
unemployment, one could conservatively estimate 
·chat at least twice that number work in in-
formal employment in the rural areas. This 
would mean that the informal sector offers greater 
employment opportunities than any other single 
sector.' (p.12) 
Davies thought that the more stringent official controls in 
Rhodesia would keep informal employment levels proportion-
ately lower than in Kenya; he predicted, however, that with 
the repeal of 'racially-specific laws relating to the urban 
area', there would be a considerable influx into the cities, 
and a corresponding surge in informal activity. This has 
proved to be the case with urbanisation proceeding apace, 
despite the repeal in January 1979 of the Land Tenure Act, 
the injunctions of government that people should remain in 
rural areas, and policy enforcement by strinqent anti-squatter 
action in urban areas. 
A comparison of the 1982 census returns with those of the 
previous population survey in 1969, shows that the population 
of the country's seven major centres (excluding Hwange 
(Wankie)) rose by 69,3% in the intervening 12 years, while 
formal employment rose by 49%. The disparity may be seen more 
clearly if it is recognised that in 1969 an urban population 
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of 792 100 in these seven cities and towns, was being supported 
by 340 600 wage earners (2,32 dependants per worker), while in 
1982 a population of 1 341 100 was being supported by 508 000 
workers (2,64 dependants per worker). 
Unfortunately, the o_fficial figures regarding unemployment are 
of little real value. As pointed out by Hawkins (1972), only 
those defined as active workseekers unable to obtain employment 
were regarded as unemployed. The definition of an active work-
seeker being the extremely restrictive one of someone ' ••• who 
actively sought work in the week before Census enumeration.' 
Low domestic unemployment was a stated belief of government 
and also apparently of Dr C.A.L. Myburgh, the then Director 
of the Central Statistics Office. 
Using this assumption, the c.s.o. estimated total African 
unemployment in 1969 at 30 330. Hawkins's estimate was 
59 960 unemployed African males, approximately double the 
official estimate. 
Clarke (1977), using official figures, made the following 
estimates the past and future male workforces: 
African adult males: population estimates 
1969 1975 1982 1985 
Stock of 16-60 year 
males, excluding 1 162 733 1 388 954 1 788 328 1 995 391 
emigration 
Source: Clarke, 1977, Tables 3 & 4, pp.23,27. 
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Given these figures, it is possible to estimate the number of 
adult African men not in informal employment: 
1969 1975 1982 1985 
(' OOOs) ( 'OOOs) ( 'OOOs) ( 'OOOs) 
a) Stcx::k of 16-60 African 1 162 1 389 1 788 1 995 
males 
b) African males in fonral 651 . 780* 785* 790* 
anployment 
a-b) African males out of 512 609 1 003 1 205 
* 
fo:cmal anployment 
Figures marked(*) are personal estimates based on figures 
in the Q·uarterly D.igests of statistics, and in Brand, 1981, 
Table 1 J 
Sister Veronica (Brand, 1981) found that between 1969 and 1979 
there had been a 61% increase in the number of African adult men 
not in formal employment. She went on to say: 
"In view of the fact that the tribal areas 
were already heavily overpopulated in 1969, 
and that by 1977 they were carrying some 2! 
times the number of cultivators recommended 
in terms of the Agro-Ecological survey, it is 
not unreasonable to estimate that the majority 
of these additional 300 000 men were either 
drawn into the informal sector or remained 
' unemployed' • " 
These estimates have taken no account of women, juveniles or 
of men above the age of 60 who are still economically active • 
.lf the figure were adjusted to include these, then the total 
number of people engaged in informal employment may well be in 
excess of the 450 000 suggested by Davies. 
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The figures put forward thus far indicate that a substantial 
portion of those workers deemed 'informally employed' must be 
in the rural areas. The concern of this thesis is, however, 
primarily with the urban informal sector. 
Zimbabwean cities lack the extensive shanty towns which surround 
so many third world cities, and which have provided the focus 
of so much literature on the subject. Moreover, the option of 
return to the rural subsistence economy, limited though it is, 
has not been lost to the urbanised black population. Those con-
trols which remain in force to curb the rate of urbanisation, 
together with the rural option, indicate that the genesis of the 
Zimbabwean urban informal economy has lain, not in absolute 
poverty, but in the desire to supplement incomes and to provide 
stability of incomes for those in unstable employment. Thus 
Sister Veronica (Brand, 1982) found that 25% of the respondents 
to her survey entered the informal economy to supplement family 
earnings, while 57% entered after failing to secure formal sector 
work, i.e. as an alternative to a return to the rural areas. 
The informal economy's contribution to the national product 
presents even more difficulties in estimation than does its 
contribution to employment. At best, the following generalisa-
tion seems valid: the contribution of informal activity to 
the GDP, while perhaps substantial, is less than proportional 
to the employment it provides, i.e. the average product of 
informal labour is less than that of formal labour. The reasons 
are multiple but outstanding amongst them are, a generally lower 
capital/labour ratio, limited markets, inferior raw materials 
and lack of managerial skills, resulting in a low value added 
per capita. 
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The informal contribution to the national product is not, however, 
merely an aggregate of goods and services produced. Indirectly, 
by deyelopingtechnical and managerial skills it affects the pro-
ductivity of all factors and hence the national product over 
time. The training role of the informal sector is, therefore, 
of significance to the authorities. 
B.J. Dorsey (Murphree et al, 1975) pointed out that in Zimbabwe, 
" ••• there is a surplus of unskilled - but not necessarily un-
educated - manpower". In the past this state of affairs, largely 
a result of official discriminatory practice, was opposed by 
industry. S~nce the late 1970's, however, the rate of African 
apprenticeship has risen partially as a result of the apprentice 
bonding system which has made training in the trades less attract-
ive to White Zimbabweans. With increased vacancies for Blacks 
in formal apprenticeships, the significance of the informal 
sector in the provision of skills has, to some extent, fallen. 
Despite the increase in the training of artisans through formal 
education and apprenticeship, there has been a fall, through 
emigration, in the number of experienced tradesmen capable of 
giving useful on-the-job training to apprentices. The informal 
sector does therefore still serve a function, although its 
significance is distorted by the following: 
a) The refusal, after training, of many informally trained 
artisans to take on formal employment for religious reasons. 
(The M'Apostoli). 
b) Under-utilisation of training skills. Artisans qualified 
to work and train others formally in their own vocation, 
leave formal employment in favour of the independence and 
high returns of independent production where the facilities 
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and official recognition for training accorded in the 
formal sector are absent. 
c) Government action: The authorities have spent much effort 
on reducing the status of the petty bourgeois class, although 
still providing a substantial amount of practical support for 
it. It is, therefore, quite probable that a re-evaluation of 
Dorsey's tests on work hopes of Black schoolchildren (Murphree 
et al, 1975, pp.69-71) would place ownership of a business 
lower down in the "prestige" ratings. · She had found that 
businessmen were regarded as being on a par with politicians, 
and were inferior in status only to doctors and lawyers. 
Even then, however, business ownership was only placed 
eighth in order of preference amongst potential careers, and 
fifteenth in order of actual aspirations. With the present 
education system and the public media currently espousing a 
strongly socialist ideology, there can be no doubt that the 
status of entrepreneurs is waning. In terms of the inculca-
tion of managerial skills, official propaganda must, there-
fore, act to the detriment of the informal sector's contri-
bution. 
The training capabilities of the informal sector were strongly 
emphasised by Nihan and Jourdain in their study of "The Modern 
Informal Sector in Nouakchott" (Nihan et al, 1978) and by Nihan, 
Demel & Jondoh, in the parallel study of Lome (Nihan et al, 1979). 
They made the point that the informal sector provides a cheap and 
effective way of imparting skills, especially to workers with 
little formal education who would otherwise be condemned to 
employment as unskilled labourers. Despite the· points raised in 
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the three preceding paragraphs, this argument should hold some 
weight in Zimbabwe, especially in the light of the limited 
success of the adult literacy campaign. 
The confusion attached to the training rOle of the informal 
sector, and in particular the response of the authorities to 
emergent entrepreneurs, becomesparticularly relevant in the 
light of Sutcliffe's comments (Sutcliffe, 1971) on the entre-
preneur as a creator of employment. The commentaries on the 
dualistic economy models generated by Lewis and his successors, 
pointed out that unlimited labour is not necessarily a valid 
basis for industrial growth, since most capital requires a given 
allocation of skilled labour, for which unskilled rural migrants 
may not be substituted. (See also, e.g. Eckaus, 1955, and 
Pack, 1976, who point out the non-substitutability of factors, 
once capital equipment has been installed.) 
By contrast, Sutcliffe warns (Sutcliffe, 1971, p.125) that in-
dustrialisation may lead to a decline in the demand for skilled 
labour, since the machine operator requires less skill than the 
craftsman making the same product with inferior tools. He 
further suggests that skilled labour should be treated as a 
separate factor of production, whose absence will restrict out-
put, and follows Baer & Herve (1967) in separating it into two 
categories: labour skilled in the use of capital, and labour 
skilled in the use of other labour. 
• 
The long-term development function of informal and small-scale 
enterprises is thus an aspect of a much broader process of 
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economic natural selection. The economy evolves as those entre-
preneurs that successfully handle both capital and labour, 
graduate to the status of petty bourgeoisie. 
How might government react so as to derive the maximum benefit 
from the small-scale African entrepreneur? Sutcliffe holds that 
direct aid (in the IDC/DFC manner - see the first Appendix to 
this chapter) can only be successful if there is a stock of 
viable entrepreneurs looking for capital. He quotes (Sutcliffe, 
1971, p.133) the example of Nigeria where despite 82% of 
applicants being screened out, "the number of successful projects 
is approximately balanced by the number of unsuccessful projects." 
From a development perspective, the shortage is therefore of 
managerial talent rather than of capital. That this pertains 
in Zimbabwe is shown in Chapter V by the comparison of sectoral 
production functions. The significance of these observations 
should be appreciated after these figures are substituted into 
Equation 8 of Appendix I to this chapter. 
The Zimbabwean authorities seem aware of this issue. Speaking 
to a group of emergent businessmen, Sedco's senior project 
analyst insisted that 
"Business people should come to us for 
advice, general business information 
and counselling." 
(Chronicle, 17/8/84) 
At the moment, the Zimbabwean small business faces much the 
same problems as did the African entrepreneur in Kenya after 
independence (Marris, P., 1968), on top of which must be added 
varying and contradictory levels of official support and 
hostility. 
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In his Kenyan survey, Marris found the two most frequently 
enunciated needs among small-scale entrepreneurs were for 
capital and knowledge. He pointed out, however, that supplying· 
these had not served as a stimulus anywhere else in the world, 
and that where they did exist in Kenya, there seemed little 
correlation between them and business success. Rather success 
seemed to be predicated on an ability to separate self from firm, 
the entrepreneur paying himself a salary rather than living off 
profits. This approach is a logical by-product of organised 
accounting. There seems little doubt that Marris's observations 
are also valid for Zimbabwe, the problem being that small enter-
prises often provide too little return to allow it to be divided 
into distributed and retained earnings. Moreover, the observation 
does not necessarily indicate a flow of causality; teaching 
book-keeping need not lead to increased viability. 
Marris found that emergent businessmen's major problem was a 
lack of social cues in their dealings with members of the European 
and Asian controlled economy, and even with the Westernised African 
sector. In addition, they lacked business contacts, knowledge 
of the market mechanism, and a viable sales policy. His suggested 
r6le for the authorities would therefore be: 
11 To find and develop points of contact, 
so that the opportunities for a wide-ranging 
economic interdependence can be realised 
through a corresponding network of social 
familiarity.'' 
This would be manifested in the establishment of a marketing 
service - not an agency! - to relate consumer and producer needs, 
and provide an advertising mechanism for small-scale entrepreneurs. 
Clearly, the Zimbabwean official reaction to the informal and 
86 
small-scale entrepreneur is far from this, although the activit-
ies of Sedco may amend this to a degree. (See Appendix I to 
this chapter). 
I.2 PARTY POLITICS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The magnitude and potential power of the informal sector as a 
political force, should it ever be organised, explains a certain 
amount of the government's concern with it. At the same time, 
however, the official commitment to a Marxist ideology, rather 
than a simple short-run basic needs approach, provides a rationale 
for the apparently negative response to petty production that is 
increasingly being evinced. There is no doubt that asubstantial 
body of thought exists amongst leftwing economists and socio-
logists, particularly of the dependency school, which is opposed 
to the informal sector. (See, e.g., Gerry, Leys, Davies, Sand-
brook, Quijano, etc.) 
The ideas of such students of the African informal sector as Leys 
(Kenya) and Davies (Zimbabwe) seem to have been especially in-
fluential. Both have opposed "informal sectorism"; the notion 
that the economy can be split into two sectors which may be 
treated separately. In particular, they opposed the I.L.O.'s 
1972 recommendation that the Kenyan government should support 
the informal sector by purchasing directly from it. 
A central problem for members of the informal sector is the 
instability of the official view of them. Originally, the 
informal sector was a major feature of party rhetoric, as was 
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subsistence agriculture. These two areas of the economy contain 
the bulk of the electorate, and any successful government subject 
(for a time at least) to the rigours of a national ballot every 
five years, must take its proletariat into account. 
From an economic perspective, the problem was recognised 
inunediately. The Riddell Commission insisted that ' ••• as 
soon as possible a comprehensive study of the informal sector 
be undertaken." It took government two years to heed the 
advice, and the results are still (April 1985) unavaiJable 'to the 
public although the full report was compiled and printed in the 
first half of 1984. 
Soon after independence, government began officially to stress 
the so-called ''self-help" approach to development concentrating 
much of its attention on the rural areas, but laying a certain 
emphasis on the urban informal sector. It is significant, 
however, that Sister Veronica's Magaha study (Brand, 1982) 
showed only 4,9% of respondents giving the desire to engage 
in the self-help effort as a reason for embarking on their 
current activities. 
Certainly, the major opposition party was aware of the voting 
power of the informal sector from the early days of independence. 
Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party almost immediately engaged the 
services of an Harare architect to design a "Peoples Market". 
The required funds, estimated at ZS 15m were available, and 
permission was sought from the Bulawayo Municipality for a 
sui table site in Entumbanetownship. 
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The market was to be run as an economic proposition administ-
ered by a co-operative holding company; producers of informal 
manufactures and suppliers of agricultural produce were to sell 
their output to the market, which would then retail it, operat-
ing as a central marketing system. 
Before anything further could be done, the discovery of arms 
caches on ZAPU farms resulted in many of the party's assets 
being confiscated by the government, leaving it unable to con-
tinue with the original project. ZAPU's second suggestion -
the use of co-operatively purchased vehicles as mobile food 
vending platforms in an effort to "lift the people out of the 
dust", was also prevented by official action, this time by the 
city health authorities, who were not prepared to grant official 
sanction to an activity which was then frowned upon. Since 1982, 
the parlous state of ZAPU finances, and the more immediate pro-
blems it has had to face, have effectively kept the party out of 
the informal sector. 
In ideological terms, the informal sector presents a real pro-
blem to the government, even though it seems to satisfy the re-
quirements of a basic needs approach to unemployment. However, 
as was stated at the 1983 informal sector seminar convened by 
the Minister of Labour and Social Services: 
"It is equally clear that an equally large 
number of informal sector participants 
must properly be regarded as petty 
capitalists. The dilemma is this: how 
does one provide support to the sector so 
as to utilise fully its capacity to sustain 
people without in the long run supporting 
the rise of an indigenous capitalist class 
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which will constitute an obstacle to 
the government's stated aim of 
achieving socialism?" 
And further, 
" .•• The inability of the formal sector 
to provide adequate employment is, in 
our view, primarily a consequence of 
its capitalist character. Promoting 
capitalism in the informal sector might 
speed up job creation in the short run, 
but in the longer run, once the sector 
moves from petty to full capitalism, 
the unemployment problem will still 
be here." 
{"Policy towards the Informal Sec.tor in 
the Transition to Socialism". )1 
The policy which emerges hinges on the formation of informal 
co-operatives. A second recommendation is that, where co-opera-
tisation is not feasible, the government should avoid giving 
aid 
11 
••• in forms which can be privately 
appropriated. The intention of assistance 
is to help the participants in the sector 
collectively not individually.•• 
Despite the ideological appeal of the co-operative movement, its 
weaknesses in the local context have been recognised. Thus the 
authors of the paper, "Policy towards the Informal Sector in 
1 
the Transition to Socialism" wrote: . 
''We have already mentioned that there is a 
substantial amount of ignorance as to what 
co-operatives are. In most cases they are 
seen as being organisational structures 
which will help to raise individual returns. 
1. Presented at the Informal Sector Seminar, Harare, 1983, 
which was convened under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Services. 
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Co-operation is seen as good when it 
helps me to appropriate a higher 
income, not when I am expected to 
share that higher income with those 
who helped to make it possible. 
We have to come to terms with the 
reality that there is in fact little 
desire to see co-operatives as an 
alternative form of social organisa-
tion as opposed to a different type 
of joint stock company." (p.3) 
On top of this, the failure of the Harare-based Hawkers' and 
Vendors' Co-operative Society has brought home the potential 
weakness of the system when the bulk of participants are in-
genuous and easily defrauded. (Herald, 26/4/84). In practical 
terms, the weakness O·f the co-operative movement in Zimbabwe 
has a three-fold foundation: 
a) The potential it provides for a dishonest hierarchy to 
defraud the rank and file membership; 
b) the general lack of administrative competence of those 
running new co-operatives; 
c) where the hierarchy are both honest and competent, the 
clash of interests which exists between that hierarchy 
(socialist) and the members (accumulative), the former 
aiming at the reinvestment of proceeds, while the latter 
seek the distribution of profits. 
It seems that the government has been aware of these problems 
for some time. The dilemma of the official stance has been 
visible in both the passage of , legislation and in official pro-
nouncements about the informal sector and emergent businessmen. 
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In terms of central (as opposed to local) government legisla-
tion, four Acts reflect the official viewpoint. 
i) No.43 of 1981, the amendment of the Shop Licences Act (1976) 
This followed an earlier amendment (no.34, 1977) which had im-
posed a minimum fee of $20 for a "Licence restricted to the 
sale of specified goods only, upon issue or renewal". The 
licence was ostensibly for one area only, as denoted under 
either the Rural Councils Act (Ch.211) or the Urban Councils 
Act (Ch.214) and gave the authorities considerable powers over 
"hawkers and street vendors". 
Until 1981, these powere were not vigorously enforced, and 
many vendors went from area to area, with only one licence, 
often issued in their home town. Certain areas, notably 
Triangle and Hippo Valley, took advantage of the legislation 
to prevent non-resident vendors competing with stores estab-
lished on the sugar estates. However, these seem to have been 
exceptions. 
With the 1981 amendments, however, the local authorities began 
to increase their policing of vendors' licences, and the price 
of such a licence rose to $120. The result was a sharp decrease 
in the viability of the informal sector operations by city-based 
vendors selling in rural areas. These changes certainly re-
stricted the viability of the informal sector, but they gave the 
co-operative movement an advantage in that a co-op. with many 
producing members, nevertheless now paid the same licence fees 
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as a sole trader. Average fixed costs were, therefore, corres-
pondingly less for members of co-operatives than for members of 
the private informal sector. 
Other recent pieces of legislation seem to have concentrated on 
the small or emergent businessman, rather than the informal 
sector, although they have generally added suitable socialist 
statements as riders. 
ii) The Zimbabwe Institute· of Development Studies Act, No.12 (1984) 
1. "To serve ••• as a leading instrument for the socialist trans-
formation of Zimbabwe" (Part II, para.14). There is no 
reference to the stimulation of enterprise with the inforrna-
tion gathered, the closest being a general warrant: 
" ••• to study and conduct research into:-
(i) the process of the establishment and 
development of a socialist society 
in Zimbabwe; 
(ii) the problems of development and under-
development." 
Nevertheless, government legislated into existence the Small 
Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) No.16 of 1983, 
(See Appendix I to this chapter) and the Zimbabwe Development 
Bank, Nos.7 and 38 of 1983. The following extract from the 




Functions of Corporation 
18. Subject to the provisions of this Act the functions 
of the corporation shall be-
a) to encourage and assist in the establishment of 
co-operatives and small commercial or industrial 
enterprises; 
b) to provide assistance, whether in the form of 
financial assistance, management counselling 
and training, information, advice or otherwise, 
to co-operatives and small commercial or indus-
trial enterprises;" 
Thus far, all is as one would expect to find it. However the 
Act continues shortly thereafter: 
"20(i) The Corporation shall -
a) when granting assistance to co-operatives and 
enterprises, give priority and preference to 
co-operatives and enterprises established by 
or under the authority of the State or 
statutory bodies; 
b) ensure that all applications. and proposals put 
before it are considered and dealt with 






• • • I 
conduct its business on sound commercial prin-
ciples having due regard, however, to Socialist 
principles; 
generally direct its activities towards imple-
menting. government policy in the fields of 
commerce, industry, construction and development." 
It is significant that the co-operative movement, which operates 
within a capitalist framework, is seen here as contributing to 
the partial solution of the Government's dilemma ; Also signifi-
cant is the focus of this sort of legislation. None of it is 
intended to foster the private informal enterprise, or to promote 
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its development into organised small-scale operations. Thus 
the Zimbabwe Development Bank is only empowered 
"a) to mobilize internal and external resources 
for economic development and to finance 
development projects in all sectors of the 
economy; 
b) to provide capital which is needed for the 
expansion or modernisation of existing 
enterprises or the creation of new enter-
prises; 
c) to engage, alone or with other persons or 
institutions, in financing loans or bonds, 
whether medium or long term, guaranteeing 
loans, underwriting and related activities." 
(Part III, Nos.17~38, 1983, Zimbabwean Development 
Bank Act and Amendment, as amended.) 
As may be seen, there is an ambivalence in official attitudes 
to informal operations, with some of the negative reactions 
traceable back to an official desire to develop the co-operative 
movement rather than encourage the emergence of a petty bour-
geois class. Much actual policy, however, is derived from the 
substantial body of legislation curbing informal activities 
which was inherited from previous administrations. Its 
principal components may be summarised as follows: 







the Transitional (Muzorewa) Government in 1979, 
although its influence is still apparent in patterns 
of land ownership.) 
Shop Licences Act, 1976. 
The Co-operative Societies Act, Ch. 19 3. 
The Control of Goods Act, Ch. 180. 
The Factory and Works Act, Ch.283. 
The Liquor Act, Ch.289. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act, Ch. 16 7 . 
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In addition to which may be added those also mentioned before, i.e. 
8. The Urban Councils Act, Ch.214. 
9. The Rural Councils Act, Ch.211. 
10. The Companies Act, 1973. 
The last-mentioned of these Acts prescribes the limitations on 
partnerships and limited liability companies and has been 
included despite its significance for the informal sector being 
open to dispute. For example, Makamure comments that, 
"The partnership, although on the face of 
it, possible for members of the informal 
sector, is essentially a device requiring 
the setting up of a formal business in the 
first place; in practice, it requires 
considerable capital outlays on both the 
partners. In addition, it is a formal 
business arrangement which is not the 
normal way people in the informal sector 
usually get involved in business activity. 
For them, it is usually a way of earning 
enough money to subsist, and not to 
accumulate in the normal business sense." 
(Makamure, Conference Paper No.5, p.6, 1982) 
Makamure's argument is based on the concept of partnership as 
a physical entity; by contrast a standard text on Zimbabwean 
company law makes it clear that this is not the case, 
" ••• the word 'partnership' cannot be used to 
describe a legal entity or persona, because 
there is no such animal; ••• The word can 
therefore be used only to describe the 
relationship between partners, or perhaps 
the contrast between them." 
(Christie, pp.180/81) 
In other words, if a written contract is not necessary to the 
formation of a partnership, then this form of enterprise can 
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come into its own within the informal sector. The frequency 
with which joint operation of enterprises was seen to exist, 
especially where high (by the standards of the informal 
sector) minimum capital expenditures were required, is at odds 
with Makamure's comments. The Companies Act in no way prevents 
two individuals from raising capital by entering into an informal 
partnership agreement; rather it clarifies the common law situa-
tion should one partner institute litigation against another. 
The ambivalence of official attitudes to the informal sector 
has been primarily expressed thus far in ideological terms of 
the contradiction between socialism and the emergence of a 
petty bourgeois class. This ambivalence has extended itself 
to the level of local. as well as central government. The 
underlying sources of conflict at a municipal level are, in 
general, less ideological than pragmatic. The relationships 
prevailing at this level are of particular note since the re-
lationships of petty entrepreneurs with the authorities are far 
more often in the sphere of local than of central government, 
although the two tiers of administration are operating in 
parallel to an increasing degree. 
[[[.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
[tis clear that the relationship between the central authorities 
and the informal sector are at best ambivalent. This situation 
seems to prevail amongst certain local authorities as well, 
_(notably the Harare City Council), while others, including 
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Bulawayo, are maintaining a more open relationship with informal 
enterprise. 
The bye-laws governing the informal sector are rooted in two 
chapters of the old Rhodesian Statutes: the Rural Councils 
Act, Ch.211, and the Urban Councils Act, Ch.214. The follow-
ing extract from the former has its parallels in Ch.214 (see 
particularly, Sections 149 and 180). 
"Ch.211, Section 87, Schedule III. 
Purposes for which Council make make byelaws: 
18(1) For registering, restricting, regulating and 
supervising hawkers, pedlars and street vendors, 
whether licensed or required to be licensed or 
not, and for imposing different restrictions on 
different types of hawkers, pedlars and street 
vendors. 
(2) For prohibiting the carrying on of business by 
hawkers, pedlars and street vendors otherwise 
than in specified areas or at fixed places or 
allocated stands or at speciried times and for 
providing that where fixed places or stands 
are allotted at which s.uch business may be 
carried on to the exclusion of other places 
or stands that shall be sufficient notice if 
notices are put up in such places or stands." 
Clearly, wide-ranging and potentially restrictive powers were 
vested in the local authorities by this sort of legislation. 
The response of these authorities, in the shape of byelaws 
promulgated, and their interpretation, therefore, reflects the 
level of official sanction accorded to the informal sector. 
In the context of Bulawayo, the following are of especial note: 
Rhodesia Government Novice 668 of 1977, RGN 902 cf 1976 and RGN 
95 3 of 1978. 
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The first of these specifies that hawking and vending are 
prohibited 
a) "within a radius of 100 metres of any premises 
licens~d in terms of the Shop Licences Act 1976";* 
and b) "in a denoted area of 1 400 hectares covering much 
of the suburbs and the central city." 
RGN 902 of 1976 gives the byelaws in terms of Chapter 214 of 
the Statutes. Amongst the points of particular note were the 
requirements that: 
"Any person who, whether as the holder of a 
licence himself or as the agent or servant 
of another, wishes to carry on the business 
of selling food as a hawker or street 
vendor, shall obtain a certificate from a 
medical practitioner or the medical officer 
of health, certifying that, at the date of 
certification, he was examined and found 
not to be suffering from any contagious 
and infectious disease." 
. 
Secondly, and more significantly, the power of the Council to 
* 
"a) restrict the applicant to dealing in 
goods listed in his application; 
b) restrict the applicant to dealing in 
certain goods, whether listed in his 
application or not, if, in its 
opinion, not to make such rera-triction 
would -
(i) adversely affect any existing trade 
or business carried on in the area 
of jurisdiction of the council; 
or 
(ii) be undesirable in the interests of public 
health, public safety or public morality." 
The corresponding distance in Harare is 10 metres. 
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It is added later in the notice that the Council may refuse to 
grant or renew a licence if, in its opinion 
11 (iv) there are sufficient hawkers or street 
vendors dealing in the goods in respect 
of which the applicant requires the 
licence." 
The byelaws also detail the licence requirements affecting 
employers of hawkers and vendors, a group whose sta.tus will 
be appraised in more detail in the chapter on intersectoral 
relations. 
The provision of facilities for use by vendors is severely 
curtailed by a shortage of funds and the strains of other 
commitments. Thus the Bulawayo Municipality is committed to 
certain major expenditures, (e.g. housing), through government 
pressure. It also has recurrent commitments to meet and is 
facing declines in the real value of its revenue from rates and 
taxes. Despite the weak condition of the economy, there are 
free funds available, excess liquid assets having been held by 
all branches of the monetary/banking sector since before 
independence. However, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has placed 
major restrictions on municipal borrowing from the public. 
As a result of these financial limitations, the Bulawayo 
Municipality has become increasingly constrained in its pro-
vision of assistance to the informal sector. Thus, in 1981 
the Bulawayo Municipality allocated 54 sites for development 
into vending locations; all were close to established shopping 
centres, and all new shopping centres since then have included 
100 
such sites. However, lack of funds has precluded the develop-
ment of these sites. The policy implications are revealed in 
a letter from the office of the Medical Officer of Health to 
the Department of Housing and Community Services, dated 18/5/84, 
in which the M.O.H. insisted that, while recognising the fin-
ancial problems the Council faces in 1984/85, the 54 sites 
selected in 1981 remain undeveloped and that 
" ••. some start should be· made in the very 
needy places ••• 
The present illegal vending sites consist 
of a bare patch of dusty ground so any 
improvement, concrete slab, concrete tub 
with water connection, reasonable 
weather protection would be a big step 
in the right direction." 
This approach has replaced the earlier strict adherence to the 
regulations governing public health which typified the policy 
of earlier M.O.H.'s in their dealing with the informal sector. 
This new flexibility in municipal dealings with the informal 
s~ctor is even more clearly enunciated in a letter of 11/5/82 
from the City Engineer to the Director of Housing and Community 
Services, in which he writes: 
·~~ocal Development Plan no.1 permits service 
industrial uses at the discretion of the 
council, within zoned commercial and residential 
areas, i.~. not_on residential stands but on new 
plan~ed s~~es /my italics?. Service industrial 
~se is ~efined as any light industrial use which 
is required to meet the day to day domestic needs 
of persons resident in the locality. 
The ~ajo~ity of concerns should be classified as 
servi~e industry and I believe we should permit a 
certa~n degr~e .of flexibility in the definition 
a~ these act~v~t~es have a local service function 
/my italics?. · 
However, certain manu~acturing processes including 
the use of heavy machinery should be confined to 
light industrial areas, •.. •· 
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Despite the new latitude in the official approach to petty 
producers and retailers, there have been recent prosecutions 
for illegal trading from residential premises, although the 
normal practice is to issue a warning first, unless there is 
a direct threat to public health. 
The criterion which the authorities claim to use is whether or 
not the public weal is adversely affected. This, in particular, 
applies to backyard brazing and arc welding, where there are 
frequent complaints that these activities are draining current 
and preventing local residents from receiving adequate power. 
Members of the Department of Housing and Community Services 
expressed the opinion that informal operators could not be 
forced away from their localities into organised ren'ted pre-
mises. It was felt, however, that success might be obtained 
with the building of a roofed and fenced open market along the 
lines of the present Makokoba ·farmers' market, at which stands 
or floor space could be rented either privately or co-operatively. 
Indeed, some progress in this line has been made with the opening 
of a market on Lobengula Street, on the boundary of the Western 
township and the city proper. There is also pressure for allo-
cation of stands suitable for informal operators at the current-
ly under-utilised market facilities in Tshabalala. The extent 
of the demand for this sort of facility may be judged by the 168 
responses submitted to Council when 23 stands at the Lobengula 
Vendors' Hall were put out to tender. A point which must, 
however, be borne in mind is the extensive competition stall-
holders face from pavement-based vendors. (See Chapter II.) 
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Where an informal service seems inevitable, but unacceptable 
in an uncontrolled form, the authorities have occasionally 
intervened directly in the provision of the service. Thus the 
Council beer gardens naturally call forth an informal response 
in the sale of single cigarettes, matches and foodstuffs. 
The former has presented a social problem, many of the sales 
being conducted by young children. However, the sale of cooked 
food was regarded more seriously as being a potentially serious 
health hazard. The result has been the institutionalization of 
food sales with the vending of sadza (stiff maize porridge) 
and relish being performed by female welfare cases under the 
supervision of the Department of Housing and Community 
Services. 
The beerhalls are of further significance in that their profits 
provide a major portion of municipal revenue in the township 
areas. However, the existence of shebeens, and of unlicensed 
brewers of opaque beer, in urban and peri-urban areas, poses 
a real threat to municipal revenues. Official reactions may 
be seen in the agreement between the Gweru Council and the 
rural council of the surrounding areas, to try to impose 
strict controls on illegal brewing and selling of beer. 
(Financial Gazette, 4/5/84). 
It must be argued that the official response to the informal 
sector is, to some extent, not purely based on maximisation of 
the public welfare, but rather on the preservation of benefits 
accruing to certain interest groups. This has been particularly 
evident since the extension of the municipal voters' roll to 
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include residents of the Western Townships. (See Section 
III.4.3 below). The significance of this was increased after 
1980 with the introduction of party politics into the sphere of 
local government. Opposing parties alleged that town councils, 
dominated by their rivals, were engaged in unethical practices 
to maintain or reward political support. 
III.4 CONCLUSION 
The areas of conflict between the Zimbabwean authorities (at all 
levels) and the informal economy may be divided between doc-
trinal opposition and pragmatic considerations. The former 
was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the latter 
are essentially fivefold: 
1. Government, both local and central, has the maintenance 
of public weal as one of its prime concerns. It may, 
therefore, oppose the existence of an informal enterprise 
purely on grounds of public welfare. 
The examples which seem most appropriate to the Zimbabwean 
experience are those related to public health: factory 
conditions, foodstuffs and public transport are typically 
subject to official controls. The Zimbabwean Factory Act 
only applies to enterprises employing over five workers, 
hence there is little check on injurious work practices 
in small enterprises. This is particularly apparent 
when watching informal metalsmiths at work with welding 
tools, but wearing neither mask nor gloves; and tailors' 
employees sewing in poorly lit rooms. 
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By contrast, strict controls, extending to the informal 
sector, do apply to the marketing of foodstuffs and to 
transport. This raises the questions: Is public welfare 
raised or lowered by such legislation? Is the welfare 
gain provided by these services greater or less than the 
welfare loss that might be caused by accidents or disease? 
If one could assume full public knowledge of the non-
pecuniary costs of dealing with informal operators, then 
a Pareto optimal solution could only be achieved by allow-
ing freedom of choice. The prices of informally provided 
goods and services would be discounted by the appropriate 
risk factor, till the marginal consumer was indifferent 
with which ·sector - formal or informal - he dealt. In the 
Zimbabwean situation, however, where even moderate notions 
of 'transport safety and of prophylaxis and hygiene are 
rare, one can see that the authorities might have justifi-
cation in attempting to exercise control over potentially 
hazardous informal sector transactions with the public. 
In terms of food sales and public health, this naturally 
puts the best possible construction on the behaviour of the 
authorities, but one which the behaviour of the various 
M.O.H.s would seem to warrant. However, an alternative 
interpretation could be applied to the behaviour pattern 
of other officials. It can be argued that the object of 
I 
a municipal official is to achieve promotion, or sufficient 
status to justify transfer to a similar post in a larger 
centre. Given that the public have little actual say in 
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the rise or fall of officials, their votes being only 
for council members, the officials engaged in public 
health will be more concerned with prevention of visible 
disease - their ostensible concern - than with raising 
more remote and less dramatic benefits such as levels of 
nutrition, especially under conditions which might lead 
to epidemic disease. 
One would expect, in terms of this logic, to find stringent 
municipal clamps on sales of fruit and vegetables, cooked 
foods and unpasteurised milk. The current reality re-
fleets these e~pectations, although to a lesser degree 
today than was the case under previous administrations. 
2. The informal sector may be regarded by those newly-
appointed to authority, as an embarrassing indication of 
poverty. Thus, when an Harare city councillor, John 
Chiweshe, announced a clampdown on sales of maize cobs 
and sadza at the Mbare Musika bus terminus, two primary 
reasons were given: 
Firstly, 
" ••• there are no strict hygienic conditions 
in the preparation of these things •.•• It 
(Government) is doing this to ensure that 
people do not kill themselves for the need 
of money." 
and secondly, 
"The continued existence of the open cooking 
sites 'is bringing down the standard of 
living' and, therefore, places Zimbabwe 
in a shameful position." 
(The Herald, Thursday, 17/11/82) 
106 
Councillor Chiweshe went on to develop a political theme, 
insisting that operators of hotdog stands should come 
together in groups of four or five and establish co-
operative "corner shops". "In about a year's time, the 
Government does not want to see any hotdog stands in the 
city." 
Clearly, the City Council has been concerned with its 
appearance, both as an "enlightened" administration and -
before Central Government - as a suitably socialist body. 
3. A third reason for the controls over the informal sector 
exerted by local government may lie in the uneven allo-
cation of lobbying power affecting Council decisions. 
The reasons for this are threefold: historical, 
electoral and financial. 
a) Historical: 
The City Councils of Zimbabwe have only had Black 
representation since 1979. Prior to that, it was 
the White population, whose links were strongly with 
the formal economy, that elected the Council. Local 
government, like central government aimed -at the 
satisfaction of the needs of the formal economy. 
b) Electoral: 
The distribution of votes in Zimbabwean cities is 
skewed in favour of owners of commercial property, 
hence this interest group is particularly strongly 




Rates, rents and municipal taxes are largely ·paid by 
formal enterprises. The informal operators' sole 
contribution to municipal revenues lies in nominal 
payments for licences. Formal commerce and industry, 
therefore, have a louder voice in municipal debate 
than do their informal counterparts. (The financial 
relationship between the authorities and the formal 
sector was touched on in the chapter devoted to 
intersectoral relations.) 
4. Control of rural/urban drift: One of the points strongly 
made by central government since 1980, is the need for the 
population to remain "on the land". Faced with three years 
of drought, and with political conflict in the Western half 
of the country, the rural population has increasingly been 
driven to urban areas. Official responses, especially in 
Harare, have been brutally direct. Squatter settlements 
have been promptly bulldozed. It seems, however, to have 
been recognised that for as long as earning expectations 
are greater in urban than rural areas, the drift will 
continue. Part of the solution lies in the development of 
employment opportunities in rural areas. Meanwhile, formal 
sector employment in the cities is static, with few firms 
taking on replacements for workers lost to · natural attrition 
(a result of official wage and employment legislation ,and 
the depressed state of the economy). The sole legal 
alternative is therefore the informal sector. Stringent 
controls, including police action against unlicensed 
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operators, serve to make this an increasingly insecure 
source of employment. Strict enforcement of anti-informal 
sector legislation, especially when this enforcement is 
well advertised (as in the anti-prostitution drive in 1983) 
will therefore reduce expectations of higher urban incomes, 
but at the same time it will remove the buffer to unemploy-
ment which informal operations could provide. It should, 
therefore, operate as a curb on the current trend to urban-
isation. 
5. Conflict with Government's own financial interests: To an 
increasing extent, the central authorities in Zimbabwe are 
obtaining a majority holding of the equity in public com-
panies. Where the interests of such companies are in con-
flict with those of the informal sector, the result has 
been direct action against informal competitors. The most 
clearcut example has been the status of "emergency taxis" 
in the period following the official takeover of the Zimbabwe 
Omnibus Company. In the period prior to independence, the 
efficiency of the Western Townships' transport system was 
enhanced by the existence of "pirate taxis", privately owned 
vehicles which cruised rather than waited at ranks. They 
were a definite feature of the informal economy, and suffered 
sev~rely at the hands of the police, prosecution being based 
on the conveyance of passengers for gain, 
(a) without a permit, 
(b) in a vehicle not checked for roadworthiness as a source 
of public transport, and 
(c) in an overcrowded vehicle. 
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Despite these controls, the pirate taxis were recognised 
as performing a public service, and the prosecution tended 
to come in bouts. Moreover, with the burden of proof rest-
ing on the State, it was difficult to obtain convictions 
without the evidence of the passengers that the driver was 
being paid for the service. Post-independence, the pirate 
taxis were formalised in status, as "emergency taxis". 
However, shortly after the Government's take-over of 
Zimbabwe Omnibus, which controls all the urban · 'buses in the 
two main centres, the· Deputy Minister of Roads and Traffic 
announced that, 
"Emergency taxis were not meant to be a 
business venture and the Government is 
determined to curb their operations so 
that they don't disrupt regular transport 
in urban areas." 
(The Chronicle, 9/12/83) 
He further added that, when the authorities felt there was 
adequate urban transport, "We will completely phase out 
emergency taxis." 
The emergency taxis are still functioning. However, the 
following curbs have been placed on their operation: each 
car must be owner-driven (precluding expansion into fleets), 
and undergo vehicle inspection every six months. Licences 
to run emergency taxis are valid for six months, renewable 
to a year, and require a Z$50 revenue stamp. Operators of 
the taxis are liable for both sales tax on fares and income 
tax on profits. Each taxi may run on a single designated 
route only, the pick-up and terminal points being designated. 
Finally, operation in rural areas is prohibited. In addition 
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to these restraints, emergency taxi operators are function-
ing in an atmosphere of uncertainty about official atti-
tudes, an uncertainty which may preclude them from realis-
ing their full potential. 
Looking at the vacillation in official policies regarding the 
informal economy, two major points have emerged: firstly, it 
makes a considerable contribution to employment, output and 
training in the country, albeit that the full extent of these 
contributions are not easily computed. Secondly, the negative 
aspects of the informal sector, perceived by the authorities 
are multifold, ideology and negative externalities being the 
two central ones. 
Thus far, the official constraints on the informal sector have 
been central to the presentation. However, support for the 
sector is provided by both the public and private sectors. 
The following appendix provides a brief overview of the general 
theory underlying such aid, and of the actual structures and 
organisations involved. 
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APPENDIX I 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ,FINANCING OF SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES 
Since the mid 1970s, a number of organisations have become in-
volved in the financing of informal and small-scale enterprises, 
funding particularly their expansion, but on occasions concen-
trating on their establishment - e.g., Christian Care, Zimbabwe 
Projects, and World Vision. The involvement of the government 
in this sort of activity has been increasingly evident, although 
the point has already been made that the official standpoint is 
far from consistent. 
The increasing amount of funding being directed at small enter-
prises requires some analysis of the effects on the rate of 
return of the costs of industrial expansion and of business 
failure rates, i.e. how the use of objectives other than the 
traditional maximization of returns practised by conunercial 
banks affects the loaning agencies. In addition, there must 
also be developed some theory of official intervention in the 
capital market. 
Given N firms within an industry which receive financial aid, 1 
if the average increase in their revenue is R, and in their 
variable costs is C, the net benefits of the assistance will 
then be 
1. This analysis is based on that used by Anderson & Kharnbata, 
(1981), pp.60-75. 
112 
N (R - C) ( 1 ) 
Provided that there is no loss due to closures, the present 
value of such aid at some point in the future (t) is found 
by simply discounting Equation (1) by the rate of interest 
(r) 
N (R - C) 
(1 + r)t 
However, a certain proportion (A) may be expected to 
fail every year and not res\.U'Ile operations. Given the 
nature of the informal sector, it is unlikely that many 
entrepreneurs will withdraw permanently, although the 
small-scale entrepreneur might find it more difficult to 
return to his previous position after bankpruptcy. After 
adjustment for the "propensity to fail" (A), the present 
value of aid in year t would then be: 
(2) 
N (R - C) (3) 
(1 + r + A)t 
The net present value of the flow of benefits until year t 
would therefore be: 
N (R - C) j 1 - (r + A) -t I 
(r + A) 
The total expenditure on aid by government is given as: 
N (1 + e) K 
where K is Average Total Cost, and e is the proportion 




Equating (4) and (5) the rate of return (r) is found to 
be: 
r = (R - C) 
(1 +e) K..:._l_A 
t 
Of this, (R - C) represents · returns without depreciation 
(1 + e) K - · l being depreciation 
t 
and A being losses due to closures 
If there are no closures and no extension costs, the value 
of r will be (r*) 
r* = (R - C) 
1 
K - t 
i.e. The effect of extension costs and closures can be 
shown by: 
r = r* r* 
( 6) 
(7) 
(1 + e) - A - e ( 1 + e) - A 
(1 + e)t 
Arrow and Lind (1970) showed that in the evaluation of risky 
investment opportunities with a view to subsidisation, 
" .•• where costs are borne publicly and 
benefits accrue privately, this procedure 
will qualify fewer projects than the 
procedure of using a higher rate to 
discount both benef·its and costs." 
This view originates from their conclusion that where the 
returns on an investment are independent of the remainder of 
(8) 
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national income, then its present value will be the sum of 
expected returns discounted at a rate appropriate for invest-
ments yielding that rate. They make it clear that this result 
presupposes that risks are perfectly evaluated and discounted, 
i.e. there is a Pareto optimal distribution of risks and in-
vestment patterns. The existence of uncertainty means, however, 
that reality is likely to be sub-optimal. 
By contrast, Hirshleifer's original proposition (1966) had been 
that the market rate of discount was the most appropriate for 
the evaluation of public investments. 
Alternatively, it had been hypothesized that since government 
can cater for risk better than the private sector, the same 
criteria should not be used for both. Arrow and Lind quote 
Samuelson and Vickrey's argument that government should ignore 
risk and evaluate investments purely in terms of expected net 
returns discounted at the appropriate private rate. 
Mayshar (1977) follows ·Arrow and Lind's reasoning, but arrives 
at a conclusion close to Hirshleifer's. Like Arrow and Lind, 
he appears to implicitly use the Kaldor-Hicks principle of 
potential compensation to evaluate alternative courses of 
action. He adds, however, that where the opportunity exists 
for government to aid a firm via subsidised loans, it should 
do so provided the firm pays company tax. In this situation, 
it is in the authorities' best interests to see that the firm 
acts optimally since the Treasury is, in effect, a partner in 
the enterprise. In this situation, paying tax is acting as a 
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form of insurance: if the scheme succeeds, both parties benefit, 
and if it fails, losses will be written off against tax. He 
holds, therefore, that 
" ••• subsidisation of private risky projects 
is a justified, even necessary, practice, 
given two conditions: that the capital 
markets are incomplete and that income 
taxation exists." (p.21) 
Given that one of the preconditions for official assistance for 
small-scale enterprises is an analysis of the firm's books, it 
seems likely that enterprises thus aided are thereafter liable 
to income tax and that Mayshar's conditions are therefore 
satisfied. 
The background _to this Appendix lies in the Schumpeterian dis-
tinction between the entrepreneur and the capitalist. The 
latter provides funds, while the former directs them. Thus, 
while nee-classical theory stresses the role of individual 
and corporate savings in the expansion of capital, Schumpetarian 
theory extends it to venture capital obtained via the credit-
creating banking system. 
National poverty may suggest inefficient utilisation rather than 
absolute shortage of factors of production. LDCs have a typical-
ly lower proportion of their populations engaged in entrepreneur-
ial activity than do developed states. As a result, the stimu-
lation of entrepreneurial activity seems a logical approach in 
the attempt to reduce underemployment of all factors. 
One of the problems attached to the stimulation of entrepreneur-
ship is the establishment of a method which will minimize any 
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ensuing misallocation of resources, and distortion in the in-
ternal terms of trade, especially between agriculture and the 
manufacturing and distributive sectors. Thus, Meier and 
Baldwin (1984) contend that the prerequisites for .growth 
include: 
An indigenous base for development 
Minimisation of market imperfections, especially the 
reduction of monopoly practices and the expansion of 
the money market so as to facilitate the efficient 
allocation of factors of production 
Capital accumulation through: 
(a) increases in real savings 
(b) redevelopment of the credit system, and 
(c) investment in the production of capital goods 
A further point to note in Marsden's (1984) contention that loan 
facilities offered by State agencies would not be priced at a 
lower rate than those offered by private enterprise and recipients may 
well lack the skills and motivation to be efficient, thus 
imposing costs on society. One should also take into account 
Marris's (1968) observation that loan agencies can be counter-
productive in that, trying to secure their investments, they may 
curtail the flexibility of operation of recipient firms, in-
sisting that funds be strictly applied to the use for which 
they were initially intended, a use which may not be optimal 
if the economic environment changes. 
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SMALL ENTERPRISE FINANCE IN ZIMBABWE 
Despite being under-banked, Zimbabwe has a well developed finan-
cial infrastructure which gives the authorities a solid founda-
tion upon which to expand the current programme of assistance 
to small-scale enterprise, should it be desired. Two of the 
five banks in the country (Zimbank and the Zimbabwe Development 
Bank) are Government-controlled. They compete for funds with 
the Post Office Savings Bank (also Government-controlled), the 
various privately run banks, building socieities, other 
financial institutions, and with informal saving systems, such 
as the revolving credit associations (R.C.A.s) found in the 
informal sector. Money lending is not a common feature of the 
Zimbabwean township economy, but R.C.A.s certainly are. There 
is the potential for them to play a far greater role in the 
financing of emergent enterprises, provided the authorities do 
not regard them as a hindrance to the functioning of the formal 
financial sector. (A fairly extensive discussion of R.C.A.s 
in practical -terms, was presented in The Financial Gazette, 
10.2.84). 
The theoretical foundations of the linkages between those 
demanding credit, and the various institutions supplying it, 
were analysed by Akerlof in his well-known article on "The 
market for .lemons" (1970). Basing his argument on the extent 
and accuracy of the market's knowledge about would-be borrowers 
and lenders of funds, he observed that: 
1. Where credit facilities are provided by communal groups, 
outsiders may be "bilked". A reputation for honesty there-
fore allows a loan agent to make a monopoly profit. 
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2. A local money lender has greater knowledge of his clients ·': 
ability to repay loans than has a commercial bank. By 
charging a premium over the rates charged by commercial 
banks he is therefore acting paradoxically. The paradox is 
resolved, however, if one takes into account the possibility 
that the recipients of his loans would not be likely to 
obtain bank credit at all, i.e. the premium is accounted for 
by the absence of a collaterial requirement. 
3. Banks operate with a foundation of imperfect knowledge, and 
the only way to ensure the efficient allocation of loanable 
funds is to allow onto the market small lenders who rely on 
their greater client knowledge to survive. 
By implication, a money lender's more exact knowledge of the 
risks attached to each loan enables him to determine an appro-
priate interest rate accurately. Where a relatively ignorant 
party (such as a development bank) enters the market, it will 
naturally attract the "lemons", i.e. those borrowers who are 
intrinsically flawed, lacking the collateral to borrow from 
commercial banks, and the project viability to borrow from 
money lenders. 
In practical terms, the structure of the Zimbabwean official aid 
network concerned with informal and emergent business is con-
fused. Excluding overseas and church-based associations, int-
erest focuses on three models: direct financial aid, assistance 
via the commercial banking sector, and technical aid. These are 
represented, respectively, by the Development Finance Corporation 
(DFC), and the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO), 
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the Finance Trust for Emergent Businessmen (FEBCO), and the 
Zimbabwe Industrial Advisory Service (ZIAS) (formerly SIAS -
the Small Industries Advisory Service). 
The DFC, and more recently SEDCO which took over its responsi-
bilities, have both been organisations with a reservoir of 
funds to be made available to applicants in the form of 
direct loans, particularly in the rural areas. The reserva-
tions about this sort of scheme, expressed by Sutcliffe, have 
already been mentioned (see p.84 ). Their weaknesses in the 
specific context of Zimbabwe seem threefold: 
a) Their ability to evaluate loan recipients was necessarily 
doubtful, the applicants being gauged in terms which may 
be alien to them, (Marris's "social cues" may be lacking). 
The applicant is also judged by the situation represented 
by his books, as he would be if applying through a 
commercial bank. One advantage of this sort of system, 
however, is that it allows benefits to accrue to enter-
prises on the basis of linkage effects as well as simple 
cash flows. (e.g. the Industrial Development Corpora-
tion Act insists that recipient schemes should not only 
be viable, but also contribute to the expansion of the 
national economy (Chimombe, 1983, p.9). 
b) The activities of this sort of institution are constrained 
by finance. (Thus the DFC, with a capital of $1m 
received applications , for $61,6m from Harare alone in 
1 9 81 . ( Chimombe , 1 9 8 3 , p . 1 0 ) • ) 
c) The lack of private sector involvement in direct aid 
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schemes does little to enhance future relations between 
private financial institutions and emergent business. 
By contrast, the FEBCO system is centred on the development of 
links between commercial banks and entrepreneurs who would 
otherwise not be considered for loans. 
The system dates back to the Wilshere Committee Report 
(October 1977) whose terms of reference were, 
"To examine the current provision of financial 
and related assistance to small-scale entre-
preneurs who would not otherwise qualify for 
Bank credit, and to make recommendations as 
to how the Banking sector, including business-
men, particularly in Commerce and Industry 
would qualify for loan facilities and 
related service." 
Amongst its findings, the Wilshere Report noted the resentment 
among African businessmen at apparently discriminatory lending 
practices by commercial banks. (Private African time and 
demand deposits at commercial banks came to $28,Sm, while 
lending to them stood at $1,Sm (5,4%), deposits by private 
European customers were $115m against which $31m were on 
loan ( 2 7 % ) ) • 
The rationale presented by the banks for this policy was 
based on the following major points: 
a) Lack of reasonable collateral1 
b) Emergent businessmen tended to apply for funds for capital 
projects, i.e. larger sums and longer repayment periods 
than the banks' typically short-term lending policy 
allowed for; 
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c) Poor preparation of projects; 
d) Weak financial controls and management; 
e) Unsound pricing; 
f) Propensity to overstock in lines with slow turnover; and 
g) Propensity to take too much out of the business -
subsistence management. 
These remain the observed weaknesses of many small-scale 
enterprises in Zimbabwe. In response to these, the FEBCO 
scheme was inaugurated in 1978 as a trust, comprising repre-
sentatives of the Reserve Bank and the (then) four commercial 
banks. It aims to guarantee loans by commercial banks to 
emergent businessmen, the loans being made at a rate of prime 
plus one per cent, repayable over up to 36 months. Although 
the scheme guarantees half the loan (the rest of any unrepaid 
debt being met by the lending bank), the borrower is still 
required to provide some collateral, the reason being that 
this provides a punitive motivation to the borrower as well 
as the usual profit incentive. The criteria for loan advance, 
may be found in the following Appendix. 
In practical terms, the most significant recent development 
in government relations with small-scale enterprises has been 
the formation in April 1984 of the Small Enterprises Develop-
ment Corporation (SEDCO), whose ostensible aim was to "en-
courage and help in the establishment of co-operatives and 
small commercial and industrial enterprises". (Chronicle, 
17/8/84). The organisation employs development officers who 
122 
offer management training courses and advice, as a supplement 
to loan provision which is its primary function. Signifi-
cantly, while loan provision is at competitive interest 
rates, it depends on the estimated viability of the project 
rather than on the collateral offered. (Herald, 3/5/84; 
Financial Gazette, 207/84; Chronicle, 13/7/84). As with the 
commercial banks, however, one can anticipate that the great-
est difficulty which will surround the loans side of SEDCO 
will be the selection of viable projects from the mass of 
applications. 
ZIAS (SIAS) provides an advisory service to entrepreneurs 
requesting aid. This is not necessarily a free service, 
although some of the organisation's activities are provided 
without charge. Unlike FEBCO, whose officers only provide 
advice to recipients of loans, ZIAS's services are available 
to all small enterprises, and to the authorities for whom 
they provide reports. (e.g., their five year programme for 
small industry centres. (The· Herald, 14/5/82)). 
Private aid agencies do not suffer from the same problems as 
the official projects, primarily because their assistance is 
not in the form of repayable loans, but of training and 
capital donations. Moreover, the value of the assistance 
provided to individual small-scale enterprises by these groups 
tends to be limited. Thus, in 1982, Christian Care was pro-
viding one new hand-operated Harrison sewing machine, ·Z$100 
worth of fabric and-where required - instruction in dress-
making, to ex-political detainees and widows of war victims. 
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With over 75% of the group's funds being foreign in origin, 
there has been a tendency to aid co-operative groups, thus 
satisfying overseas pressures and remaining in line with 
official ideology. 
The bulk of private aid seems to be going into capital pro-
jects in the rural areas. A potentially significant except-
ion is "Zimbabwe Project", a welfare organisation funded 
primarily by the business community and offering managerial 
expertise in a similar vein to that provided by SEDCO. The 
central role of the entrepreneur in any such project makes 
its evaluation too complex for treatment here. 
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APPENDIX II 
FEBCO Criteria for Loan Advance (1982) 
"Given the fact that an individual qualified as 
an emergent businessman and wishes to borrow funds 
for use in agreed types of business and given the 
readiness of a Bank Manager to accommodate such a 
client, the criteria for loan advance are as 
follows: 
i) Project viability and profitability within 
the shortest period of loan advance. 
ii) The amount in demand. 
Advances Conunittee is currently free to 
approve loans of up to $15 000 maximum, 
any larger sum requires the endorsement of 
the Board of Trustees. 
iii) Period of repayment. 
This ranges from four to thirty six months. 
Periods of over three years may only be 
sanctioned by the Trustees. 
ivl Projects' viability and profitability. 
The project in question must be able to 
generate enough cash to meet monthly loan 
repayment requirements within the first 
month of operation. 
v) Borrower contribution. 
The borrower must be seen to be making a 
considerable financial contribution to his 
project or to have done so in the past 
instead of relying on a Bank for the 
entire capital. 
vi) Freedom from indebtedness. 
In any consideration of loan applications, 
the applicant must be free of crippling prior 
indebtedness. 
vii) Trade references. 
Credit rating of an applicant running business 
must be good, so must be that of borrower 
operating a current account if he already has 
bank account as this indicates degree of sound 
financial control. Business past performance 
represented by balance sheets. 
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viii) Management. 
The appropriate experience of the applicant 
in his chosen line of business or the 
availability of an employable individual 
with required track records in running of 
the enterprise. The applicant or his 
Manager must be a person with actual or 
potential ability to business operate. 
He must be an individual of character and 
integrity. 
ix) Security. 
Readiness to provide acceptable collateral 
to ensure the loan in the following forms: 
Bond over loans, swelling or business premises; 
cession of trade bills, marketable securities, 
permanent building society shares, Fixed Deposit 
receipts issued by registered financial institutions, 
Life Insurance Policies preferably with appropriate 
surrender value, guarantees from third parties plus 
notarial general covering bond over machinery and 
other business assets. 
Security requirements is about the most common 
element subject to attack by emergent businessmen 
who feel this should be dispensed with altogether • 
. We do not concur with this attitude for two 
reasons. First, borrowers who have been most 
problematic under the Scheme are those who had not 
pledged any of their property to secure loan 
advances. 
Secondly, we see the security condition as generating 
negative as well as positive effects which induce the 
borrower to endeavour to meet repayments. The 
borrower endeavours to satisfy loan advance conditions 
for fear of losing any property pledged; at the same 
time he strives to make his business successful both 
in order to repay the loan and to realise increased 
profits from borrowed funds. 
We see the security requirements as having punitive 
and incentive effects - punitive in the sense that 
the borrower compels himself to hit target for fear 
of losing pledged collateral - incentive in the sense 
that the borrower seeks funds in order to realise 
increased profits from existing or new enterprise to 
be established. We have therefore decided to call 
all factors associated with the possible effects of 
security stipulations, as PUNICENTIVE, to cover 
efforts to succeed generated by fear as well as 






The remainder of this thesis comprises the details of 
collection, analysis and interpretation of a survey con-
ducted into the formal and informal sectors of the post 
independence clothing and footwear industry (both formal and 
informal) in Zimbabwe. The object was twofold. 
(i) the collection of descriptive data on informal 
production, and 
(ii) collection of information which could be used to 
determine the natures of the production methods in 
the two sectors and hence to ascertain whether or not 
a sectoral reallocation of scarce resources within the 
industry studied would serve any economic purpose. 
Two points must be cleared at this stage with regard to the 
micro-economic foundations of this study. The first is the 
justification for the use of a single industry cross-
sectional production function. To generalise about an entire 
sector, it might be held that an aggregate function should be 
used, with data being provided by representative firms from 
all branches of the sector. While this approach was still 
popular in the late 1950s, it has fallen from favour in more 
recent years with the recognition that non-homogeneity of 
inputs (and outputs) is too great a problem for the results 
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of the analysis to be worthwhile. Data has, therefore, to be 
collected from a single industry where this problem is less 
conspicuousw In this case the clothing industry was chosen, 
being extensive in size, and involving both production and 
marketing. This has naturally restricted the generality of 
the result, although observations of other informal activities 
were made in order to provide some basis for comparison and 
evaluation. 
This leads to the second problem, the assumption of symmetry. 
The acknowledged heterogeneity of the enterprises which pro-
vided the data, albeit within one industry, renders this 
assumption particularly suspect. This constitutes a caveat 
which has to be borne in mind before any of the results of 
this research are extended to any particular firm or situation. 
Why select the clothing industry? The reasons are, first, 
that it is one of the major contributors to manufacturing 
output and employment in Zimbabwe. This is confirmed by the 
figures in the Census of Production, which show that in the 
first year of independence the clothing and footwear indus-
tries (excluding textiles, carpeting, etc.) provided 6,42% 
of gross manufacturing output, 8,3% of wages and salaries and 
11,93% of employment in manufacturing. (These figures re-
flect only the contributions of the formal sector.) In 
addition, it has a substantial informal sector involved in 
manufacture and retailing as well as a measure of illegal 
activity. It is, therefore, a substantial and, insofar as 
this is possible, a representative example of Zimbabwean 
manufacturing. 
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A copy of the questionnaire used in the fieldwork may be 
found in the first Appendix to Chapter V. It will be seen 
that it aimed at establishing 
a) The economic characteristics and trading practices 
of the enterprises in the survey. 
b) The role of the informal sector in cushioning temporary 
unemployment among retrenched workers and the newly 
urbanised. 
c) The potential of the informal sector interviewees to 
expand into formal production - by using ex post data 
from those who had already done so. 
d) The details of production required for a production 
function based comparison of the formal and informal 
sectors. 
A summary of the responses to the questionnaire may also be 
found in the first Appendix to Chapter V. 
IV.1 DATA COLLECTION AND APPRAISAL 
I n order to minimize the possible extraneous variables in the 
data, all collection was done by personal interview, the 
questionnaire being completed by the interviewer rather than 
the interviewee. Where necessary, use was made of an inter-
preter provided by the Bulawayo City Council's Department of 
Housing and Community Services. 
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The same questionnaire formed the foundation of interviews with 
both sectors (see p.186), the information being recorded with 
further details, and where possible interviewee comments. 
While the responses from the formal sector can therefore be re-
garded as reasonably representative, some doubt may be attached 
to the representativeness of the informal sector sample in that 
the only operations covered were those of which the township 
administration were aware, or which were renting market space 
when the survey was conducted. It must be stressed, however, 
that in neither sector was the survey affected by an outright 
refusal to provide information, although a system of internal 
data checks via the sales dollar breakdown dideliminate certain 
infonnation as unreliable. 
Where data from an enterprise has proved consistent, the 
production and costing details concerned have not been used in 
the analysis. Other details concerning the operation, e.g. 
the existence of bank accounts or the keeping of books, to which 
a simple yes/no answer was adequate, have nevertheless been 
utilised. This problem is reflected in the use of only 91 of 
the 103 obtained for the analyses performed in Chapter Five. 
IV.2 
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The choice of enterprises from which to collect data was on 
the basis of random selection from a list of formal sector 
enterprises provided by the Clothing Council. Since all 
enterprises in the industry employing more than fifteen 
workers are mandatorily members of the Council, the only 
potential source of bias lay in the refusal of a small number 
of those approached to provide all the data required. The 
informal sector has no co-ordinating body which could offer a 
service like that provided by the Clothing Council. The 
administrators of the high density suburbs covered in the 
survey were nevertheless able to provide abundant information, 
including the names of all individuals renting commercial 
stands in the townships from which to run tailoring enter-
prises, while the municipal staff in the townships organised 
access to informal enterprises run from individuals' own 
homes. 
CHARACTERISTICS AND TRADING PRACTICES OF INFORMAL SECTOR ENTERPRISES 
This section describes the details of informal sector management 
and production, as observed, and provides a basis against which 
Hart's (1973) view of the function of the sector might be 
judged. The following aspects will be covered: credit, 
savings, management, raw materials, previous work experience, 
ages of enterprises and their owners, employment, social 
factors. 
One of the most conspicuous problems facing the informal sector 
appeared to be the unavaiJability of credit. While established 
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formal and frequently also emergent businessmen, were 
generally offered thirty days for payment on fabric, etc., 
with discounts for payment in under seven days, the informal 
entrepreneur generally had to pay cash. Moreover, in 45% of 
the responses, he or she purchased the fabric from retail out-
lets at a correspondingly high price. (See Table IV.2.3). 
Two solutions to this problem are available: 
i) Bespoke tailoring. This is the informal sector's equi-
valent of "cut, make and trim" (C.M.T.) The tailor is, 
in effect, selling his labour and the use of his capital, 
to a customer who provides fabric, etc., thereby reduc-
ing the expenses of the tailor by the cost of the 
materials. 
ii) Formalisation and expansion (entry to the intermediate 
sector). The home clothing producer who requests credit 
on his own recognisances has little hope of success. 
Once he rents a property from the municipality for the 
explicit purpose of manufacture and trade, and is regis-
tered by them as a trader, his official status enhances 
his credit-worthiness. 
Not only in terms of credit, but also of loan finance, the 
registered emergent businessman seems to be i ·n a far stronger 
position than his informal counterpart. However, the Small 
Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) recently stressed 
that actual title to property is not a prerequisite for loan 
funds (Financial Gazette, 2/7/84), loan extension being based 
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instead on 
" ..• employment creation, skiJ.l formation 
and development, promotion of national 
savings, foreign currency earnings or 
saving~ utilisation of domestic resources 
and provision of necessities to under-
developed areas." 
(Herald, 3/5/84) 
Despite the vagueness of these criteria, one point is clear. 
Few funds will be forthcoming to the applicant whose organisa-
tion is informally run, since it is far more difficult for the 
informal operator to indicate how he can fulfil the loan cri-
teria than it is for his formal counterpart whose records are 
subjected to annual audit. 
The cash basis of all purchases by the informal entrepreneur 
makes expansion difficult. CMT operations offer a partial 
solution, but many operators wishing to expand have preferred 
to do so by offering customer credit instead, trying to capture 
or maintain a market share in extremely competitive conditions. 
The questionnaire yielded the following figures for credit 
received and offered by informal producers: 
Table IV.2.1: Credit received by informal interviewees 
Days of credit Number of % of total 
received enterprises enterprises 
N = 69 
0 62 90 
30 2 2,9 
60 1 1,5 
90 1 1 , 5 
inc. CMT 14 20,3 
(partial or carplete) 
_/ l 
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Table IV.2.2: Credit offered by informal interviewees 
I 
Days of credit Number of % of total 
offered enterprises enterprises 
(N=6 9) 
0 29 42 
7 · 1 1 I 5 
30 30 43,5 
60 5 7,5 
90 3 4,5 
180 1 1,5 
The second table is, to some extent, misleading. Many clothing 
producers aim at a wholly rural market, travelling from town to 
a selected mine or tribal area, where goods are sold on a cash 
basis. The figure are, therefore, not representative of con-
ditions facing petty producers operating in the urban market. 
Where output is intended for urban sale, the degree of market 
competition is greater, both between the informal enterprises, 
and between. the products of formal and informal producers. 
Sale on credit seems a widespread feature of the urban though 
not the rural informal markets for such consumer semi-durables 
as clothing. It is not a feature of the sale of foodstuffs, 
although credit is reportedly available at shebeens. For many 
of the interviewees, illiteracy was a major restriction on 
expansion by granting credit since lists of creditors could 
not be drawn up. 
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Bad debt was mentioned by a few as a problem, but by and large 
small-scale operators seemed selective about offering custom-
ers credit. One of the advantages of a strictly localised 
operation is the operator's personal knowledge of his custom-
ers' financial circumstances. In addition, most interviewees 
who provided credit extended it no further than the end of 
the month, alhhough 13% offered sixty days or more. These 
individuals often suf~ered extreme cashflow difficulties. 
Formalisation of production is not an option open to all, hence 
a consequence of the credit problem facing the. informal operator 
is a need to accept lower rates of profit in exchange for re-
duced initial costs. This may be achieved in two ways: the 
first, already mentioned, is bespoke tailoring; the second, 
is the use of factory offcuts and reject materials. With the 
adoption of this method, the production process becomes far 
more labour intensive, i.e. the proportion of final value 
added by labour input rises significantly. 
Some of the operators obtained their offcuts direct from 
factories in which they were already holding down fulltime 
jobs, while others established an agreement with management 
for the purchase of offcuts. By and large, however, offcuts 
were purchased by wholesalers who sorted them into approxi-
mately equal packages by weight and fabric, although not by 
colour. These were then offered for sale to the informal 
sector. Operators purchased them principally for the manu-
facture of cushions and children's garments, although low-
priced women's wear was also involved. Such clothing is 
135 
primarily sold in rural areas, the urban buyer being more 
conscious of appearance, and urban prices of new garments 
manufactured from whole fabric being far lower than they are 
in rural areas. 
Table IV.2.3: Sources of fabric used liy the informal sector 
Fabric source Number Percentage* 
Factory-bolts 9 13,05 
Wholesale - offcuts 28 40,55 
Customer - CMT 29 42,00 
Imported 1 1,45 
Retail & ) whole fabric 31 44,95 Wholesale) 
(* Many operators had more than one source 
of fabric.) 
Related to the problem of credit is that of savings. Zimbabwean 
banks are unwilling to extend finance to the applicants who do 
not bank with the~. The informal operator is distinguished 
from his formal counterpart in two respects here: 
Firstly, he rarely differentiates his personal assets from 
those of his enterprise. This is a business failing which 
frustrates expansion to a significant extent, especially when 
combined with inadequate bookkeeping. 
Secondly, many savings tend to be in the P.O. Savings Bank 
or a building society, neither of which offers a loan facility. 
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Bank accounts, where they existed, were savings rather than 
current accounts. The significance of this lies in its 
effects on the operation of the development agencies. Thus 
the Finance Trust for Emergent Businessmen (FEBCO) operates 
by providing collateral for approved projects, thereby per-
mitting the applicant to receive a commercial bank loan. 
Before anything can happen though, the individual has to 
approach his own bank, who refers him to FEBCO, and submit 
his accounts for their perusal. Such an organisation clearly 
cannot cater for the needs of the informal operator, nor even 
those of many emergent businessmen. The average loan value of 
applications passed by commercial banks as suitable for FEBCO 
scrutiny, was approximately Z$836 in the first four years of 
operation. (September '78 - June '82). Clearly, this was 
beyond the scope of the average small enterprise. 
The full breakdown is as follows: 
Table IV.2.4: Details of savings and other accounts kept 
by a number of firms (N=69) 
Separate accounts for 
owner and firm 2 2,9% 
Single account 
(bank savings) 18 26,2% 
Single account 
(building soc. or 
P.O. savings bank) 18 26,2% 
No account 31 44,7% 
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The problems presented by the absence of the concept of 
separate corporate identity extend beyond inability to ob-
tain loan finance; the operator who makes no distinction 
between money in his pocket and his enterprise's assets will 
not regard as a personal debt money taken from his business. 
There is, therefore, a propensity for this sort of enterprise 
to fail, due to liquidity problems. 
The concept of the informal sector as a root stock from which 
vigorous emergent entrepreneurs can shoot, is further disturbed 
by the nature of the records kept in it. The illiterate indi-
divual can keep control of a small operation without difficulty, 
but with expansion comes the need for records, not merely to 
satisfy the formal requirements of the authorities, but to 
permit access to credit, since any credit-granting institution 
will require an insight into, at least, the cashflow position 
of a potential debtor. 
Amongst those operators who were trying to expand, there was 
a definite awareness of these problems, and a number of those 
using double entry were doing so with the aid of a bookkeeper. 
Also conspicuous was the number who had learnt to keep a ledger 
or cashbook during their formal schooling. A bookkeeping system 
is naturally not a prerequisite for an informal enterprise 
running on a cash basis. However, as soon as credit sales are 
entered into with a view to expanding urban turnover, the 
operator has to have some measure of his financial situation. 
The emerg~ntbusinessmen's awareness of this is reflected in 
their support of schemes organised through groups like the 
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Small Industries Advisory Service (SIAS, now ZIAS), which aim 
at teaching the entrepreneur the elements of bookkeeping. 
Among the younger participants interviewed during the survey, 
most were literate and kept at least a list of creditors. 
However, as Table IV •. 2.5 shows, 48% of interviewees kept no 
·records whatever, although some of these made a point of keep-
ing receipts and invoices in case of future problems. 
Table IV.2.5: Business records of informal sector interviewees 
Bookkeeping method Numbe·r Percentage 
(N=6 9) 
Double entry 6 8,7 
Single entry 6 8,7 
Cashbook, ledger, 
memos, etc. 24 34,8 
None 33 47,8 
Despite the high proportion of interviewees keeping no records, 
the bulk were still able to analyse their production costs. 
Asked to break down their sales dollar, 80% (55) were able 
to do so accurately, while only 13% (9) could not do so at 
all. Costing and pricing of production were clearly subjects 
to which the majority paid some attention, even though not all 
kept records. 1 Thcseworking on a pure cash basis were able 
1. The results of each individual's claimed sales dollar break-
down were checked by computing a similar breakdown, using 
the individual cost components of production obtained from 
the questionnaire_. 
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to keep their mark-up constant in the face of regular changes 
in input prices. 
One of the hallmarks of the informal sector was that operators 
did not ascribe a value to their own labour in their sales 
dollar, treating it as synonymous with profit; whereas the 
small-scale entrepreneurs within the formal sector often dis-
tinguished themselves sufficiently from their enterprises to 
be able to isolate a wage from a corporate profit figure. 
One of the reasons for this may well have been the employment 
of non-family members in these businesses, and hence an aware-
ness of wages as a production cost. The ability of an entre-
preneur to distinguish between himself and his enterprise 
seems to lie at the heart of the division between truly in-
formal production and the intermediate sector, as found in 
Zimbabwe. 
The hazards of attempted expansion in the absence of either 
business experience or acumen were made apparent by interviews 
with a number of informal operators who, following Independence 
in 1980, shifted their operations from the townships to the 
business area of the city. High rents, limited cl~entele and 
absence of books were combined with sales dollar breakdowns 
that suggested imminent bankruptcy. ~y contrast, bespoke 
tailors of more experience chose sites close to or on the two 
axis roads serving the northern portion of the townships (6th 
and 3rd Streets) where rentals were lower than in .the city 
centre but where business was brisk. They were not poorly 
capitalised, generally employed bookkeepers, and as a rule had 
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experience in the formal sector, not always in the clothing 
industry, but often as storekeepers, schoolteachers and 
nurses. 
A further notable characteristic of this group - those in the 
transition between informal and formal enterprise - was their 
age. Most were over 40, the few younger exceptions being 
generally individuals with qualifications and experience from 
the formal sector and the schooling system, but with a con-
fessed penchant for entrepreneurship which took them into 
self-employment. It was in this group that one typically 
found such diversely qualified individuals as sewing machine 
technicians, state registered nurses, schoolteachers and 
storekeepers. Few had training in clothing manufacture, but 
many had taken on employees with extensive experience, their 
own contributions being largely entrepreneurial. If there is 
to be inter-sectoral movement, it seems likely that this is 
the area in which it will take place. 
Among the informal clothing producers, the ages of on~or two-
man enterprises and their owner operators clearly indicated 
that this was not a buffer occupation adopted during periods 
of frictional unemployment as suggested by Hart (1973), al-
though this may well be the case for food sellers, cigarette 
vendors, etc., whose initial endowments of skill and capital 
can be lower, and whose transactions, being purely cash, bring 
in an immediate income. The result in Bulawayo seems to 
correspond with that of Schmitz (1982) in Brazil, 
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" ..• characterising employment in the small-
scale sector in terms of workers unable 
to find a job in a large enterprise or 
'in terms of the source of employment or 
the urban poor' (Sethuraman, 1976, p.75) 
would be very misleading." (p.255) 
Table IV.2.6: Ages of informal· enterprises employing 
under five workers 
Age of firm Number Percentage 
N=fi9 
< 5 years 21 30,4 
5-10 years 15 21,8 
10-15 years 11 15,9 
15-25 years 6 8,7 
> 25 years 16 23,2 
! 
Table IV.2.7: Ages of informal sector operators interviewed 
Age of operators Number Percentage 
N=69 
< 25 years 2 2,9 
25-30 years 5 6,75 
30-40 years 16 23,2 
40"."50 years 20 29,0 -
50-60 years 18 26,1 
> 60 years 7 20 I 15 
Unknown 1 1.45 
Table IV.2.7 shows that only 9,5% of interviewees were under 
30 years of age. By contrast, Sister Veronica (Brand, 1982) 
found that 26,1% of respondents in her survey of informal 
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operators in Magaba, Harare, were under 30 years of age, with 
54,9% being between 30 and 50 years of age. This generally 
younger distribution may be attributed to the broader focus 
of the Magaba study, including vendors as well as informal 
manufacturers and processors. Even given the possibility of 
hire-purchase, the need for capital investment in a sewing 
machine is a significant exclusion factor, which keeps unem-
ployed youth out of clothing manufacture. No such barriers 
exist in the vending of raw foods, etc., hence a lower age dis-
tribution may be reasonably expected. 
I 
It has been suggested (Fields, 1975) that the informal sector pro-
vides an avenue of employment for new migrants as well as the 
fractionally u:n.e:m{'J.oyec. Tr-e - former group · constituted ·only a 
small component of the total number employed in informal manu-
facturing of clothing and footwear. Those interviewed who were 
tailors in rural stores, or had attended sewing classes in 
town. The implication is that this sort of informal activity 
is not immediately available to the bulk of newly arrived urban 
residents. In this, petty manufacturers seem to differ from 
vendors, many of whom, especially near the Makokoba market, 
have rural connections. 
Although few operators were new immigrants, a number employed 
trainees, in particular newly urbar~ised family members. This 
system of informal apprenticeship seems to escape the minimum 
wage legislation covering established industry, and provides a 
refuge for migrants, albeit at extremely low wages. Such wages 
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ranged from zero, with board and lodging provided, to $15 
per month. In addition, a few operators used to put out 
work to ot~er members of the informal economy, the going rate 
in 1982 being $2.00-$3.50 per garment. This was pure piece-
work, the worker providing his labour and his own machine, 
but all materials being provided by the employer. 
Where operators had expanded into formal tailoring, they were 
not subject to the wage prescriptions of the industry, which 
are above the national minimum, until they employed fifteen 
workers. The result was that few machinists employed by 
emergent tailors, were paid the Clothing Council's official 
wage, but ~ather the government minimum for industrial 
workers. 
It has become clear from the frequent press reports on the 
subject that the wages paid by African employers are more 
often below the prescribed minima than is the case with 
European employers. This could be ascribed to the Europeans' 
awareness of the delicacy of their political position in the 
country. Observation amongst the small businessmen in the 
townships suggested that the wages paid were often below the 
legal minimum. In addition, the shortage of employment 
opportunities in the cities puts the employer in a strong 
position, should he wish to force wages to the lowest possible 
level. 
Sister Veronica (Brand, 1982) found that 77,7% of respondents 
in her Magaba survey had previous informal sector experience; 
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86,5% of the men having been involved in it, although only 
54,9% of women claimed previous formal sector experience. 
The figures seem surprisingly high, as she noted. However, 
included in the category of formal sector experience were 
both domestic and farm employment, the former contributing 26,5% 
of positive responses. Excluding those with only domestic ex-
perience, the figure would have been a joint 57,1% with formal 
experience. This is virtually identical to the result found in 
the Bulawayo survey, where domestic service was disregarded. 
Table IV.2.8: Formal sector experience among informal 
sector employees 
Formal sector No. % In % 
employment experience clothing 
Other % 
Yes 44 63,8 32 46,4 23 33,4 
No , 25 36,2 37 53,6 
Total . 69 100. 0 69 noo.o 
(A number of interviewees had formal sector 
experience in clothing and~ther employment, 
hence the apparent overlap when adding across 
Tab le IV. 2 • 8) 
46 
69 




study) had no formal sector experience, they had often had some 
training in the informal ' sector, generally with their parents. 
A further group had been taught basic skills by friends or at 
handicrafts centres and in women's groups organised by the City 
Council's Departme~t of Housing and Amenities. These individuals 
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were largely involved in crochet work and manufacture of 
cushions and canvas bags. 
The larger crocheted goods presented for sale locally (and those 
taken for sale in South Africa) were not generally made by one 
worker alone. They tended to be manufactured by women supple-
menting their family incomes, the more skilled amongst them 
making the central patterns, while the filling· and joining was 
done by children and others learning the skills. This system 
of manufacture leads to variations in quality within items 
which seem to detract from their marketability when offered for 
sale to a European clientele. While it seems certain that 
better prices would be achieved with lower output and higher 
quality, this does not imply that the current system fails to 
maximize the returns to skilled labour. 
Specialisation within the informal manufacture of crocheted 
goods, whilst lowering prices, need not reduce profits to the 
group involved. The same cannot be said of the informal pro-
duction of knitwear. 
There has been a shortage of imported knitting yarns for all the 
post independence period; this deficiency has been partially 
remedied by the purchase of reject items from the factories. 
These are unravalled and the wool reused. Unravelling, while 
uneconomic in the formal sector with its high minimum wages, is 
; 
feasible for informal enterprises in which the opportunity cost 
of labour is relatively low. By and large, children do the un-
ravelling while actual knitting is done by adults using a 
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domestic knitting machine. The result is a more labour-intensive 
product which, however, has a lower mark-up potential than the 
factory-made item. 
Two social factors seem to particularly affect informal sector 
operators - their religion · and their sex. The religious factor 
was apparent in the type of manufacturing performed. Almost 
all the small-scale producers of zinc buckets and tins and of 
iron cowbells and other smithed goods were male members of the 
Apostolic faith (M'Apostoli) whose members do not allow them-
selves to take work under an employer, and are therefore 
largely confined to the informal sector. The manufacture of 
canvas bags and satchels, etc., was similarly the virtual 
preserve of M'Apostoli women. Since this sect forms a signi-
ficant portion of Bulawayo's informal sector, and since they 
have acquired their skills in the informal sector, they skew 
downwards the number of informal operators with formal sector 
experience. 
Looking at the sample group, there were roughly the same pro-
portions of men and women running informal clothing and foot-
wear operations (41,7% male, 46,7% female and 11,7% mixed). 
A disparity did exist in that, by and large (although not 
universally), women were working to supplement family income 
rather than acting as the major breadwinner. This aspect has, 




Some further insight into the individuals involved in the in-
formal manufacture of clothing may be gleaned from the 
following case studies: 
1 . The interviewee is a male of SO, who comes originally from 
the Tjolotjo area where he has left his children and 
cattle. He works alone, using a treadle-operated Singer 
purchased secondhand for $50. He estimated his turnover 
in the previous year at $960, all of it in repairs and 
alterations which are his speciality. For this reason, 
only 25% of his turnover is estimated by him as going to 
expenses - primarily zips, buttons and thread. He pays 
no rent for a workplace, as he places his machine daily 
under a tree on 3rd Avenue Extension, close to his room. 
Working on a purely cash basis, he finds that he has no 
need for books, and does not keep a savings account of 
any sort. He opened up in 1979, when the war pushed him 
into town, and he finds that he is doing better there than 
he had done as a store tailor in Tjolotjo, or as a 
machinist in town, both of which were one-time occupations 
of his, although he had no other formal sector experience. 
He added that self-employment provides greater job satis-
faction than formal employment, should it be available, as 
well as a better income. In spite of subsequent increases 
in minimum wages, this may still be the case, as real 
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earnings have not shown substantial rises. Furthermore, 
with the raised prices of new garments, a repair enter-
prise like his may do commensurately better. 
2. This enterprise is run to supplement family incomes, al-
though the head of the household and two of his sons are 
employed in the formal clothing industry - at the time of 
writing, the firm for which they work has gone into 
liquidation, but no follow-up has been possible. At the 
moment, the enterprise is run by the mother of the family, 
who does all the selling, and her three sons, who make up 
garments at home, sharing their one machine (a treadle-
operated Singer) in four-hour shifts. The machine is over 
• 
30 years old, but is still run 12 hours a day for a 6-day 
week, without problems. Current production is between $40-
$50 worth per day, fabricated from offcuts bought from the 
factory in which members of the family work. The estimated 
profit on any item was 23%, suggesting an annual profit of 
between $2 760 and $3 450. The bulk of sales are made 
locally and in an area within a radius of 30 miles from 
Bulawayo; although on occasion, goods are taken as far 
afield as Shangani. Although some credit is offered in 
local sales, where the client is known, the enterprise 
keeps no books, nor is there a savings account. The 
enterprise has now been established for 23 years, and the 
mother of the household is 57 years old. Aside from the 
family members, who are currently working in the clothing 
industry, none has any formal sector experience, though 
the family was spending money on the education of those 
sons still at high school. 
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3. The interviewee rents one of the Council shops at the back 
of the Makokoba Market, rental at the time of the inter-
view was $22.50 per month. He is 62 years of age and in 
failing health, but his son is helping with the work. He 
has two machines, one electric and one treadle, purchased 
for E52 and E32.10s. respectively, in 1961, following the 
destruction of all his equipment in the inter-party riots 
of that year. He buys his fabric from a local European 
wholesaler who, when interviewed, knew him as a regular 
client of many years' standing. He also operates as a be-
spoke tailor. All dealings are in cash and although he 
keeps notes of customers, fabric and of income, there is 
no formal book-keeping, nor does he keep any savings account 
in his, or his enterprise's name. He has been self-employed 
for 44 years now, and has also worked as a machinist in the 
formal sector, as a storekeeper and as a government messenger. 
In the past, he used to sell his products in the Plumtree and 
South Nata T.T.L.'s, but has not done so since the beginning 
of the war in that area of Matabeleland (1976). He makes up 
both men's and women's clothing, but finds the latter more 
lucrative, the respective returns on his work being 15% and 
40%. The value of total output last year was $7 200, 
suggesting an approximate profit of $2 000. 
4. The interviewee runs the most highly capitalised informal 
operation in the survey. He and his wife comprise the 
entire labour force, but they have four electric machines, 
one of which is an overlock and one a heavy duty. 
Originally from Malawi, where he worked as a fishmonger, 
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he came to Rhodesia and worked as a machinist. Ten years 
ago, he went into self-employment and is now 40 years old. 
He does a large amount of bespoke work, but prefers to 
take on orders, particularly for school uniforms which he 
turns out in bulk for mission schools. Despite the nature 
of his work, he and his wife operate in their own home, 
a two-room flat in Makokoba. Fabric is obtained either 
from customers or retail outlets and he operates wholly 
on a cash basis. He has neither savings accounts nor 
records of any sort and has paid off his machines, which 
were bought on hire-purchase. He estimates his total 
revenue at $2 600 per annum, much of which is clear profit 
on bespoke operations; rent constitutes 20% of his ex-
penses, and thread, buttons, etc., the remainder. This 
gives an approximate profit of $1 950 per annum, after 
paying the rent. 
5. The interviewee is a married woman with children, but does 
all the production and selling of goods herself. Her 
machine is a hand-operated Singer, which she purchased 
for $145. Montnly output fluctuates markedly from a low 
of approximately $80 in January/February, to a high of 
approximately $500 in November/December. (There are two 
peaks - mid-year, i.e. winter, and pre-Christmas.) 
She buys fabric . etc. retail, paying cash, and expects 
payment in cash, although occasionally extending credit 
up to 30 days. Her sales are split about evenly between 
Bulawayo and Gweru, and she has not noticed any difference 
in demand for her products in the past five years (despite 
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the immediate surge in general levels of demand after 
independence). She keeps a bank savings account and a set 
of double-entry books, having learnt book-keeping from her 
father who was a storekeeper. Aged 37, she has been self-
employed in this way since she was 17, although she had a 
brief spell in a clothing factory (not as a trainee or 
machinist), and has no other formal sector experience. 
She concurs with operators producing for rural markets in 
disliking cotton as a fabric, but for different reasons. 
The rural demand is specifically for crimplene and poly-
esters, which although less comfortable are durable and 
easy to wash. The interviewee serves an urban clientele, 
but objects to the local fibre as the fabric comes in 36 
inch bolts, which are narrower than the bolts of synthetic 
fabrics. The result is a greater proportion of wastage. 
She estimates her return on labour at 53%, including a 
deduction for household rent which she meets. This gives 
an estimated annual profit of $1 200 per annum. 
6. The interviewee and her sister have been in business pro-
ducing low-priced dresses and knitted goods for 12 years. 
She is 38 years old and neither she nor her sister has 
formal sector experience of any sort. Their operating 
capital comprises an old treadle Singer, purchased for 
£158 and a second-hand knitting machine, purchased for 
$200. The fabric used is, to a large extent, offcuts 
-
purchased in bags from wholesalers. Where whole fabric 
is used, it is purchased retail. In addition, they are 
prepared to make up goods on a bespoke basis, where the 
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customer provides the fabric. They pay cash for all inputs, 
but offer up to 3 months' credit, although they prefer cash 
payment. They operate a single bank account and, although 
there is no formal book-keeping system, they do keep notes 
detailing purchases, sales and credit. Sales of dresses 
occur largely in the Kadoma (Gatooma) area (estimated value 
;2 400 per annum), while jerseys are sold in Bulawayo 
(estimated value $840 per annum). Returns on labour vary 
between 40% and 50%, according to the fabric used, giving 
a profit of approximately $1 450 per annum. 
The first points of note in these six studies are the diversities 
apparent in production methods applied, in markets catered for, 
and in skills used. What the six appear to have in common is 
the flexibility to cater for the public's diverse needs, as 
they appear, adapting their own ailowances of human and 
physical capital to allow for the efficient satisfaction of 
public wants. They have an advantage over formal enterprise 
in that they are closer to the market. Its immediacy, com-
bined with their lack of bureaucracy, allows new trends in 
demand to be satisfied speedily. In addition, much of their 
work is performed on a bespoke basis, thereby reducing cash-
flow problems. 
The production methods used varied sharply in terms of capital/ 
labour ratios, and in the quality and nature of each producer's 
output. There was, however, little sign of an active urban 
marketing strategy, despite the competitive conditions within 
the township. 
153 
Other features were the voluntary nature of participation in 
the sector, and also the role it plays, given the absence of 
a generalised social security system. This latter point has 
been raised with regard to the problems of income maldistri-
bution which might follow the introduction of a social 
security scheme that did not take cognizance of workers in 
subsistence agriculture and the informal sector. (Brand, 
1981, p.8). 
Thus far, this thesis has been concerned with the operation of 
the informal sector, its relations with the public and private 
sectors and the manner in which it could (and does) contribute 
to the development of the economy. A fundamental question 
remains, however: granted that the informal economy should be 
encouraged (and I have tried to show that this is not accepted 
in all development circles, either internationally or domestic-
ally) should such stimulation be passive - the lifting of the 
burden of legislation which the sector currently bears - , or 
active through the investment of scarce resources in it? 
In an attempt to answer this question, the survey data giving 
details of production, factor inputs and outputs, was subjected 
to a production function analysis. 
The following chapter presents a synopsis of the theory involved 
(which may be omitted without loss by those already au-fait with 






It has already been mentioned that one of the problems in the 
analysis of intersectoral articulation is ascertaining whether, 
in fact, there is a formal/informal duality at all. Writers 
such as Leys and Gerry have held that there is only one system 
of production, leaving as the sole dichotomy that between 
worker and capitalist, or perhaps more appropriately, wage 
labourer and profit earner. The intricacies of this approach 
have already been described in Chapter I, but no clearcut 
response can be provided without recourse to empirical 
observations. 
With this in mind, a survey of one hundred and three enterprises 
engaged in the clothing and footwear industry was conducted, just 
over half .being from the informal sector. A synopsis of the 
results is given in the tables in Appendix I of this chapter. 
(See also p.129-130). 
The crucial points at issue in the debate are: 
a) the production method - are the factors of production com-
bined in the same way in large- and small-scale enterprises? 
b) the role of the owner of capital - to what extent is the 
owner (i.e. the informal sector operator) an employer of 
wage labour? 
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c) is the productivity of factors of production a function of 
enterprise size? 
The first and third of these points may be determined in theory, 
by the use of production functions. There are, however, numer-
ous practical problems in such an analysis. This chapter is 
largely an attempt to resolve the difficulties of a production 
function approach, evaluate the validity of its use, and 
provide an acceptable treatment of the data collected. To 
this end, the chapter is broken down into the following 
sections: 
V.1 Data selection problems 
V.2 Production function theory 
V.3 Results of data manipulation 
V.4 Conclusions 
Section V.1 and V.2 cover the problems attendant on production 
function analysis and the principles underlying it. They have 
been placed in the body of the text for the sake of continuity. 
However, the reader who is aware of the issues and theory in-
volved may treat them as appendices. 
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V.1 DATA SELECTION PROBLEMS 
Numerous caveats exist governing the data fit for use in a 
regression analysis intended to determine the parameters 
of a production function. The bulk of these revolve around 
the assumption of factor homogeneity which is implicit in the 
notion of the production function. Thus, in an ideal situation, 
one could either use the number of units of capital, or their 
market value, since in a perfectly competitive profit-maximis-
ing environment, the market price of new or second-hand capital 
will equal that capital's marginal° product. 
A second problem is that of Leibenstein X inefficiency (see 
Leibenstein, 1966; · Lecraw, 1979). Lack of information and 
poor control give rise to "inert areas" within a firm, i.e. 
sub-optimality and use of inappropriate technolo:gy. These 
bias the production parameters and may prevent any estimation 
of the elasticity of technical substitution, since the use of 
regression analysis for this purpose requires a variety of 
strong assumptions, including profit maximization and the 
equality of marginal productivity and factor price ratios. 
Clearly, not all units of capital are homogeneous and there 
are sufficient imperfections in the market over and above 
managerial inefficiency,to ensure that price and marginal 
product are not equal. The Zimbabwean economy is suffering 
presently from foreign exchange shortages and the after-
effects of sanctions, while further distortions have been 
introduced by Government regulation of mark-ups on imports 
and prices of second-hand capital. 
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Ward (1976, pp.207-221) pointed out that over and above these 
difficulties, the capital stock was not strictly the correct 
variable to use. If one is trying to explain growth, he said, 
concern should ~ather be with the flow of capital services. 
One frequently mooted escape from these difficulties is the 
use of surrogate valuations, the most obvious being use of 
electric current, a method which additionally accounts for 
variations in the intensity of capital utilisation. 
Unfortunately, application of this method proved impossible in 
the context of the Zimbabwean clothing industry, many of the 
machines in use by the smaller operators being manual or 
treadle-operated, or electrified, but drawing on only the 
normal 220 volt household current. The result is that an 
estimate of capital usage, based on electricity consumption, 
, 
would be difficult, as there is no way to separate the 
various components of a household's aggregate power account. 
Additional sources of difficulty are the varying inter-area 
tariffs and peak loading, i.e. variation in tariffs according 
to time of day, in an effort to level the rates of electricity 
consumption. 
The use of capital surrogates being impossible, it was felt 
that direct valuation was the next best alternative. In 
order to escape some of the caveats pertaining to capital, 
three valuations were used for the informal sector's 
machinery: purchase price, current second-hand valuation 
and current replacement price in South Africa. 
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The rationale behind the latter two was as follows: In a 
competitive market, the price of any factor will be deter-
mined by its marginal product. The prices of second-hand 
machinery would, therefore, be related to its productivity. 
The effects of artificial capital scarcity are not taken into 
account in such an analysis, however. Thus, although Harrison 
manual and treadle machines are assembled in Zimbabwe, the 
prices differ sharply from those in South Africa, where 
restrictions on imports are less stringent. The following 
table of prices quoted by Berzack Brothers; the major agents 
for these machines, gives some idea of the distortions in 
the market. 
Table V.1.1: Current, second-hand and shadow prices 
of sewing machines in common use by 
informal producers 1 
Machine Z~ (Z$) RSA RSA 
New Seoond-hand New (R) New (Z$) * 
10 years old 
Manual 134 80-90 85 78.25 
Portable 
Treadle 177 120-130 180 166 
Treadle 
:!:160 · & Motor 217 215 198 
* Assuming Z$ 1.0 = R1,085 
1. Unpublished interview with Berzacks, Bulawayo, January 1983. 
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On top of these price differentials, one must add the dis-
crepancy in sales tax rates in Zimbabwe, which currently (1984) 
stand at 18% and 23% for necessities and luxuries respectively. 
Both rates are applicable, the former being charged if the 
machine is purchased from the agents or a sewing machine 
centre; the latter rate applying if it is purchased from a 
furniture shop (furnishing being regarded as luxuries). 
Labour also presents problems in measurement, because of non-
homogeneity, varying work hours and non-uniform wages. 
The best option would have been man hours worked per unit of 
time. However, informal sector information was too unreliable 
for such figures to be used. The proxy used has, therefore, 
been number of individuals involved in all aspects of product-
ion (including management) at the time of the survey, i.e. 
there has been an implicit assumption of labour homogeneity. 
Griliches and Ringstad point out that the value of the R
2 
coefficient tends to be far higher if value added is used as 
the dependent variable rather than labour productivity (their 
choice of labour measurement). They add, however, that 
"Such transformations do not, of course, 
'improve' the fit in any real sense. 
They just change the base against which 
it is measured." Cop.cit., 1971, p.64) 
Output was measured in terms of current prices, and converted 
to value-added, where required, by subtracting raw material · 
costs. (Not total costs, excluding wages and interest, since 
this would reduce the comparability of the two sectors, 
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water, power, municipal rates, etc., seldom being part of the 
informal producers' costed expenses.) The variability which 
often results when questionnaires are completed by inter-
viewees was avoided by having only one interviewer, the data 
being supplied in the course of a structured conversation, 
additional information being noted on the return. 
V.2 PRODUCTION FUNCTION THEORY 
The concept of the production function as a tool of inter-
firm comparison is not a new one. Cobb & Douglas (1928) 
started a movement which was soon taken up in the field of 
agriculture, to which it seemed ideally suited (e.g., 
Tintner, 1944; Heady & Pesek, 1960), and even in industry 
(Murti & Sastry, 1957; Katz, 1969; Griliches & Ringstad, 
1 971 ) . 
The results of production function studies may be used to 
show such diverse points as: 
1. the major sources of growth; 
2. the roles of technical progress, returns to scale and 
elasticity of substitution, as opposed to changes in 
volume of factors of production, in increasing output; 
3. whether factors of production have operated with even 
intensity over time; 
4. whetter technical progress has been neutral or biased; 
5. the relationship between market structure and factor 
productivity; 
161 
6. distribution of income between factors, and 
7. the effects of increasing output on employment of 
labour. 
The second, third and fourth of these require the use of time 
series data, and are, therefore, precluded from a study in-
volving the informal sector in which many enterprises do not 
keep records. In order to demonstrate how the others may be 
estimated, the following few paragraphs will describe a com-
paratively simple model, the Cobb-Douglas, which has the 
advantage of being linear in its log transformation. It takes 
the form: 
Q = 
where Q represents output, N labour and K capital. 
a and S are the respective elasticities of output with 
regard to labour and capital. They are the parameters 
obtained when estimating the linear form of the equation. 
LnQ = LnA + o.LnN + SLnK 
The equation is homogeneous of degree a+ S. Hence, when 
a + S > 1 these are increasing returns to scale, while 
conversely, when -~ + S < 1 there are decreasing returns. 
If the function is linear homogeneous ( a + S = 1) , it 
indicates that given perfectcanpetition, factors are paid 
their marginal revenue products, with the revenue being 
distributed between labour and capital, according to the 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
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values of a and S. (Euler's theorem, see Henderson & 
Quandt, 1980, Chapt.5.1). 
Unfortunately, ·under constant returns and perfect competi-
tion and assuming fixed factor and product prices, the 
optimal size of the firm is indeterminate. Moreover, 
Marschak & Andrews (1944) pointed out that, given these 
assumptions, all firms should be combining factors of pro-
duction in an identical ratio, irrespective of firm sizes. 
The result is that, while the production function yields an 
expansion path, the isoquant map degenerates to a set of 
points on this path, hence no information may be deduced about 
the marginal rate of technical substitution. Clearly, the 
prices of output and factors of production will vary in 
reality as the level of output changes. This being the case, 
neither the total cost nor the total revenue functions would 
be linear, and a profit maximizing output could be determined. 
Maximizing profit, ~ = Q(K,N)P - (Nw+Kr) where P, Wand 
r are the constant unit prices of finished goods, labour 
and capital respectively, shows optimal utilisation of 
capital where 
N = a QP w \3) 
and . K = s QP r (4) 
These show proportionality of capital, labour and output; 
substitution of these values of N and K into the profit 
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equation yields no determinate optimal output. This result 
is consistent with the non-satisfaction of the second order 
necessary conditions for profit maximization. 
In an attempt to escape this problem, Walters (1963) alludes 
to Kaldor's observation that the inclusion of entrepreneur-
ship, which is not evenly distributed, would result in 
variations in the size distribution of firms, even given a 
single optimal capital/labour ratio. 
In more practical terms, Griliches & Ringstad (1971, p.5) 
provided four explanations for intra-industry size variations 
betwen firms: 
1. Firms are constrained by their stock of inherited capital. 
At reasonable prices, this can only be changed slowly. 
2. Factor prices facing different enterprises are not 
constant. According to size, there may be variations 
in access to credit, and there may be regional variations 
in wage rates and other costs of production. 
3. Capital/Labour ratios may be determined in the light of 
expecta~ions of future prices, rather than current factor 
price ratios. Variations in expectations will occur from 
firm to firm. 
4. While under perfect competition, with every factor being 
paid its marginal product, there should be only one 
efficient size of firm, empirically, there are wide 
fluctuations in capital/labour ratios, and sizes of 
enterprise within clearly defined industries. This is 
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a justification in itself for the validity of a single 
equation O.L.S. treatment. 
The Cobb-Douglas model is open to attack on a number of 
grounds, many of which are shared by the constant elasticity 
of substitution (C.E.S.) models to be discussed next, and of 
which the Cobb-Douglas is a special case. 1 Griliches & 
Ringstad mention the prob~ems of both single and simultaneous 
equation estimation 
" ••. we are likely to be subject to both 
'simultaneity' and 'errors in variables' 
problems. There isn't much that we can 
do about it, ••• except to investigate 
the possible magnitude of such biases 
and convince ourselves that much of 
the interpretation that we shall put 
on our results is correct, nevertheless." 
( pp • 1 5 I 1 6 ) • 
It should now be clear that these forms of the production 
function have grave limitations as analytical tools. 
However, precedent has given them authority, and it appears 
that, despite their theoretical flaws and the frequent 
limitations of the data used in their estimation, they may 
serve as useful heuristic devices. 
The restrictions of the Cobb-Douglas function in its homo-
geneous form Q a 1 -a = AN K , or even in the more general 
form Q = ANaKS are clearly severe. While the C.E.S. 
1. Only if a+ S = 1, i.e. under CRTS. If a+ S ~ 1 
the Cobb-Douglas no longer has constant elasticity of 
substitution. See Henderson & Quandt, 1980, Ch:5.1. 
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function operates under many constraints, common also to the 
Cobb-Douglas, it does have the advantage of additional free 
parameters. Furthermore, as can be seen most clearly in 
Equation (8), the C.E.s. format embodies the simpler model 
as a special form. Hence, if the Cobb-Douglas is realistic, 
this will be evident on the estimation of the C.E.S. function. 
The model eventually chosen was Krnen ta' s ( 1 96 7) . linearisation 
of Brown & de Cani's (1963) formulation. The advantage of 
this model over the earlier A.C.M.S. (1961) version being that 
it included directly a scale parameter, while Kmenta's work 
allowed for ease of computation. It must again be stressed 
that the Cobb-Douglas function is merely a special case of 
the C.E.S. with isoquants equidistant from one another, with 
a homothetic expansion path and unitary elasticity of sub-
stitution. 












y is an "efficiency parameter" indicating by how much out-
put will change, following a given change in inputs with the 
capital/labour ratio unchanged; in a time series study y 
would, therefore, be a measure of neutral technical progress. 
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cS is the "distributive parameter". Just as a. and 1-a. 
represented factor shares in the constant returns case of 
the Cobb-Douglas, so cS and 1-6 represent the factor shares 
of labour and capital in the C.E.S. model. Thus, if two 
regressions yield the same estimates of CJ , a change in 
o will means a change in the distribution of income. 
v is the "scale parameter" indicating the degree of homo-
geneity of the function, corresponding to a.+ B in the 
Cobb-Douglas. Thus 
v > 1 increasing returns to scale 
v: 1 constant returns (linear homogeneity) 
v < 1 - decreasing returns 
p is the "substitution parameter" used in the calculation 
of CJ, the elasticity of substitution: 
CJ = 1 
1+p 
= 1-d(K/N)J I fd(cSK/cSN)J 
L K/N L cSK/ oN 
which shows the way factor proportions react to changes in 
cSK 
the marginal rate of technical substitution, oN · Thus, if 




it is clear that the Leontieff type input/output case will 
give CJ = 0, while perfect subs ti tutabili ty will give CJ = 00 • 
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The Cobb-Douglas case has p =O~cr=1. 
The problem with Equation (6) is that in this form it cannot 
be estimated, using O.L.S. It was in an attempt to overcome 
this problem and ease the computational difficulties of 
detennining the flow regression parameters, that Kmenta (1967) 
presented a linearisation of the C.E.S. function, based on a 
truncated Taylor series expansion in which third and higher 
powers were omitted. 
Thus, LnQ = Lny + voLnK + .v(1-o) 1 2 LnN - 2 pvo (1-o) LnK-LnN 
or .alternatively, 
If a4=o, Equation (8) is simply a Cobb-Douglas function; 
if a4;o, the squared term is a correction for non-unitary 
elasticity of substitution. 
One could, of course, provide successively higher order terms 
to obtain a closer approximation to th~ original function. 
However, the evidence of Griliches & Ringstad (1971, Table 4.4, 
pp.71/2) shows that even the inclusion of the second order 
term 
" •.• does not improve matters greatly. 
Its coefficient is significantly 
different from zero (at the conventional 





A result which was borne out by regression in this study 
(see Section V.3). 
To obtain the C.E.S. parameters from the regression coefficients 
of Equation (8), the following substitutions are performed: 
y = e 81 
v = 82 + 83 
cS = 82 
82 + 83 
-2 84 (82+83} p = 
82 83 
1 
(J = 1+p 
A potential source of problems at this point was demonstrated 
by Kennedy (1983). The estimation of a dependent variable 
from the calculated regression parameters of the independent 
variables, can be subject to bias, if the original equation 
was linearised logarithmically, the problem being particularly 
evident, if the figures used in the prediction are outside the 
original data set. 
It will be noted that Equation (8) is only an approximation to 
the C.E.S. function. The closer the value of 84 is to zero, 
the better the approximation. There are a number of reasons 
for this: firstly, the higher order terms become increasingly 
important as one moves away from the Cobb-Douglas case, which 
Griliches and Ringstad suggest will have unpredictable effects 
on the value of 84 (p.9). Moreover, they point out 84 1 0 means 
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that the production function is not Cobb-Douglas, but not that 
it is C.E.S.; hence a more generalised function may be in 
operation. To test for constancy of elasticity of substitution 
and homotheticity, Griliches and Ringstad suggest that subsets 
of data be fitted to the Cobb-Douglas function, regressed, and 
the regression parameters compared. tpp. 1 0 /11 ) • (This was done 
as a matter of course, when performing the Chow Test, see 
Appendix to this chapter.) 
V.3 RESULTS OF DATA MANIPULATION 
In order to ascertain the elasticity of substitution in the 
clothing industry, and the validity of a Cobb-Douglas treatment 
of the data for any subsequent analysis, three regressions were 
performed, using, respectively, capital measured at purchase, 
current and shadow prices. 
Krnenta's linearisation of the C.E.S. function was used in all 
three cases, with the results in terms of Equation (8) being 
summarised in Appendix I of this chapter. 
1. Capital valued at purchase price* 
This regression was used both as a control and as a source of 
estimates of the production parameters, although the values 
have neither been inflated to current prices, nor corrected 
for depreciation. 
* The data for this, the roughest of the estimates, was obtained 
directly from the questionnaire where the value, plus the date 
of purchase and details as to the condition of the capital (new 
or second hand), were recorded. 
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The correlation matrix for the entire industry indicated 
substantial multi-collinearity with a partial correlation of 
0,9 between labour and capital. As a result, the model's 
ability to isolate the production parameters must be regarded 
with suspicion. Unfortunately, no real escape from this 
problem is available. The high level of correlation between 
the factors of production is, nevertheless, informative, 
indicating in advance of any further results, that whatever 
the elasticity of substitution, capital/labour ratios are not 
likely to alter significantly for the bulk of producers, 
irrespective of the volumes of capital employed. 
Accepting the caveat of high levels of multicollinearity (the 
constancy of the variance will be treated separately), the 
following were the results for the industry as a whole, 
obtained for the equation: 
Table V.3.1: 
~Q = 81+8 2 LnK1 + 8 3LnN+8 4 (LnK1-LnN) + e 
81 = 5,183 (14,710) 
~2 = 0,349 (2,424) 
83 = 0,855 (5,949) (t statistics in parentheses) 
84 = -0,017 (-0,973) 
Since 84 is not significantly different from zero at a 95% 
confidence level, the result could have been written in Cobb-
Douglas form as 
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Q = 178,2 N' 85 K' 35 
showing clear evidence of increasing returns to scale across 
the range of enterprise sizes since a+ 6 > 1. 
In terms of the C.E.S. parameters, the results were as 
follO\fs: 
Table V.3.2: 
Efficiency parameter (y) 
61 
178,163 (14,720) = e = 
Distribution parameter lo) = 
Returns to scale parameter (v) = 
Substitution parameter (p) = 
a2 = 0,290 (7,715) 
62+63 
= 1,204 (19,846) 
-2S 4 lS 2+a 3 ) 
62 • 63 
: 0 I 1 37 (0,855) 
Elasticity of factor substitution (cr} = 1 = 0,88 
1 + p 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 
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The low value of p and its low t statistic indicate that 
p only becomes significantly different to zero at an 80% 
confidence level. This suggests that the clothing industry 
does not provide significant efficient opportunities for 
variation in the input mix. This does not mean that such 
variations cannot take place, but that production is not at 
minimum cost away from the ideal mix. The value imputed to 
his own labour by the informal operator is, therefore, crucial 
to the determination of the actual factor mix. 
It is noteworthy that p was low in both sectors, indicating 
that lack of factor substitutability was common to the entire 
size range of enterprises. 
A problem which appears at this junction is the computation 
of t statistics for each of the calculated parameters, the 
fact that the t 1 s of each component are significant being 
no guarantee that the t statistics of their products will 
be so. The theoretical details of these calculations are to 
be found in Appendix III to this chapter. 
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It will be remembered that the accuracy of the Kmenta linear-
isation process varied inversely with the size of the s4 
parameter, i.e. the larger the squared term at the end of 
Equation (14), the poorer the equation it is as a linear 
estimate of Equation (11). For this reason, it was of interest 
to note that the estimates of e4 , irrespective of the capital 
valuation system, were extremely low, being respectively: 
Table V.3.3: 
$4 (1) -0,0 .17 
$4 (2) -0,009 




None of these was -significantly different from zero at a 
95% confidence level. 
This being the result, the estimates of s2 and e3 would 
approximate to Cl+ $, the elasticities of output with regard to 
the two factors, irrespective of the system of capital valua-
tion. The same may be said of the results in the formal and 
informal sectors, e4 not being significantly different to 
zero, irrespective of sector or valuation method. 
It is possible, in the light of these observations, to compare 
the results yielded by the two sectors. The greater variation 
in methods of production, and the significance of the quality 
of the entrepreneur in the small enterprise, was revealed by 
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the regression results in two ways. R2 (the heuristic measure , 
of the goodness of fit of the model as a whole, once corrected 
for degrees of freedom) was 0,92 in the 32 larger enterprises 
studied. In other words, 92% of the variations in output can be 
explained by changes in the levels of inputs. The high degree of 
multicollinearity revealed by the correlation matrix resulted in 
a weakening of the power of the regression, made manifest by the 
extremely low t statistics obtained. Some measure of relief from 
this predicament is provided by the high partial correlation coeffic-
ients between each independent variable taken separately, and the 
dependent variable. Thus, although the short run production coef-
ficients of each factor cannot be presented confidently, the long-
run equilibrium factor combination along the expansion path can be. 
By contrast, the 59 observations of the enterprises employing under 
five workers showed that the model only explained 40% of variation. 
(See Appendix I). Moreover, where there was evidence of increasing 
returns to scale in the larger enterprises, there was apparent 
linear homogeneity in the production function of the small-scale 
operators; the parameters for capital and labour being 0,34 and 
0,65 respectively, the t statistics, however, were significant 
at a 95% level. 
It has already been pointed out that the regression coefficients s2 
and s3 represent the elasticities of output with respect to capital 
and labour respectively, i.e. the proportionate increase in output 
caused by a unit increase in the variable factor, the other being 
held constant. 
The estimates of s2 are virtually identical for both sectors; 
even though the t statistics are low for formal production, there 
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s no reason to believe that capital, added in isolation, would 
rovide greater benefits in either sector. When combined with 
he associated amount of labour, however, results suggest increas-
.ng returns to scale in informal production, and marginally de-
~reasing or constant returns for the informal sector. 
The implications of the low R2 for the informal sector are 
clear. The mere provision of additional capital, while making 
a recognisable difference to production, would not necessarily 
be adequate in itself. The model omits management, a potent-
ially crucial variable. This omission may be the factor 
behind the lack of explanatory power of the model, as tested. 
In terms of stimulating the small-scale economy, one implica-
tion is that basic business training might be as good, if not 
a better, investment than subsidised loans for the purchase 
of new capital. 
If the squared term in Equation (8) is assumed to be zero, 
which is justified Dor both sectors, then the marginal rate 
~ 
of technical substitution would be i.e. the MRTS 
K for the informal sector manufacturers would be 0,86 ( N 
while for the formal sector clothing producers it would be 
K 0,42 ( N). These results accord with the theory proposed 
earlier (Chapter I.2) that technical substitutability should 
be lower in the formal sector. 
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2. Capital valued at current second-hand market price 
If second-hand price estimations were wholly free of bias, 
and if the market were perfect, this method would have pro-
vided the ideal system for valuation of capital. Unfortunately, 
neither proviso was reasonable, especially in the case of 
formal sector enterprises, where equipment tended to be far 
more specialised than that used by small-scale operators and 
therefore lacked a permanent market from which prices could 
be drawn. For this reason, the manufacturers' own estimates 
for insurance purposes had to be accepted as a valuation. 
(For details of informal sector values, see p.158). 
The results did not differ markedly from those using either 
of the two alternative capital valuation methods, as the 
following table (and the results appended to this chapter) 
show. 
Tabl V 3 4 Parameter using capital valued at second-hand e • • : - -
and shadow prices (N=91) 
Capital at Capital at 
current prices shadow prices 
y 172,967 (14,544) 181,534 (14,437) 
v 1,162 (17,387) 1, 187 (14,104) 
0 0,272 ( 3,930) 0,258 ( 2,297) I 
p 0,0917 ( 0,467) 0,099 ( 0,593) 
·a 0,924 0,910 
' 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
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The standard errors and the coefficients of the three regressions 
and hence the t statistics of these estimates, are roughly 
similar to those calculated for the first valuation system, 
the small differences remaining indicating the general con-
gruity between the three estimation systems. 
3. Capital valuation at shadow (South African) prices 
This estimation was performed solely on the assumption that 
the artificial foreign exchange position in Zimbabwe since 
1965 would have affected local capital prices, raising them 
out of proportion to the wage rate and the prices of finished 
goods. It was, therefore, used only as a control, the similar-
ity between the results of this and the other two regressions 
indicating that an approach using shadow prices in this 
manner is not strictly necessary. 
For the informal sector, the prices used were those presented on 
p.158. The formal sector, however, generally imports its machinery 
directly. The local value corrected for the exchange rate which 
prevailed in the latter years of the sanctions period (Z$1 = R1.24) 
was therefore used. The similarity of the results to those obtained 
in the other two regressions suggested that no real benefit would 
be derived from a more detailed shadow price analysis and hence no 
attempt was made to correct for capital age. 
Just as it was shown that the 82 estimates for the formal and 
informal sectors were not significantly different when capital 
was measured at purchase prices, so it was found that they did 
not differ significantly for either of the other two capital 
valuation systems. (The same applied to 83). The policy 
178 
f thl..·s i's that any decisions on soft loans to implication o 
either sector should not be made with a bias in favour of 
either sector, except insofar as management appeared less 
subject to variation, and probably caused less "noise" in 
the formal sector. Where assistance in the form of access to 
scarce resources (e.g., foreign exchange) is involved, the 
competence . of management should,therefore, be examined parti-
cularly rigorously in the case of small-scale enterprises. 
The details of returns to scale are also of note. 
Table V.3.4: Estimated sectoral returns to scale 
(v = s2+ s3 ) 
Ca.pi tal Valua.ti01 Cati:>ined Sectors FOllllal Sector 
82 + B3 . 82 + 133 
Purchase price 1,248 1, 1939 
Current price 1, 1091 1 ,0115 
South African pric 1 ,0096 1 ,0396 
InfOJ:mal Sector 




It will be seen that, while there was evidence of increasing 
returns to scale across the industry as a whole, irrespective 
of the valuation system employed, the result was closer to 
constant returns when either of the two sectors was appraised 
independently. This suggests that there is a sharp rise in 
productivity with the transition from informal to formal pro-
duction methods. 
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In essence, the results of real note in the estimation of the 
clothing industry's production function were: 
a) the robust evidence of economies of scale with the switch from 
one sector to the other, although no such major scale economies 
were apparent in either the informal or the formal sectors alone; 
b) that the regression coefficients did not differ significantly 
intersectorally, although the variances of formal and petty 
producers' production functions were not uniform; (See 
Appendix II, pp.196-200); 
c) that, for practical purposes, a Cobb-Doublas function would 
not be inappropriate, the squared term of the Kmenta C.E.S. 
function not having proved substantially different from zero; 
d) capital's share (o), at estimated current values, was sub-
stantially lower in the informal than the formal sector; 
/o (informal) = 0,290, o (formal) = 0,492~7; although this 
was not as clear when o was estimated from capital valued at 
purchase price; 
e) that there is substantially more 'noise' in the informal 
production process, made visible in a heuristic sense by the 
correspondingly lower R2 for the sector's production function, 
and implying a more significant role for entrepreneurship, 
the major variable omitted from the analysis. 
The points of greatest interest, however, are the productivity- and 
employment-yielding potentials of a unit of capital in the two 
sectors, since these have direct implications for develpment policy . 
Looking at the first: 
f) a survey of the non-CMT enterprises in the data set yielded 
surprising results in terms of values added per worker and 
per unit of capital, as evidenced by the table below: 
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Table V.3.6: Value added by size of firm (N = 93) 
Size of fi:rm No. of 
Value added per year 
by no. of fi:rms per worker per dollar value of capital 
anployees z $ z $ 
< 2 I 41 1 036 5 t 1 
3-5 18 883 8 t 1 
6-15 11 2 344 6,5 
16-40 3 2 591 4,8 
41-100 9 4 047 7,2 
> 101 9 3 756 0 ,6* 
' 
Given that the industrial minimum wage at the time of the data's 
collection averaged between $80 and $100 per month, the smaller 
enterprises could clearly not have been offering returns to labour 
on a par with those in the larger ones, the labour productivity 
within the informal sector being comparatively low. The 
question which is naturally asked is: to what extent can this low 
labour productivity be attributed to capital shortage? An indica-
tion of the answer may be found in the elasticities of output with 
regard to capital and labour, these being roughly of the order of 
0,50 and 0,51 for the formal sector, and 0,30 and 0,73 for the 
informal sector (valued at current second-hand prices) although 
cognisance must be taken of the low t statistics associated with 
the formal sector figures, i.e. the elasticity of capital with 
regard to output is greater in the informal than the formal 
sector. Hence, it would seem that marginal flows of 
capital would be better directed to petty producers than to 
formal enterprises, but it must be added, only if the 
* This result has been biased strongly downwards by one major 
return. For an alternative view, see Table I in the statistical 
appendix (I) to this chapter. 
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technology used is the same! 
If, however, one wishes to go further and ascertain the 
optimal firm size in the industry, any constant elasticity 
of substitution model presents a major difficulty since the 
very constancy of the parameters makes a profit maximization 
problem indeterminate. A possible bypass of the problem by 
using entrepreneurship as a separate factor in production, was 
effectively countered by Walters (1963) who argued convincing-
ly that entrepreneurship could not be measured independently 
of the size of the firm. His argument was that entrepreneur-
ship is not a homogeneous attribute, but a heterogeneous set 
of skills which have to be appropriate to the needs of the 
enterprise being managed, and are, therefore, correlated with 
the size of the firm. Thus one is led to conclude that the 
ideal size of enterprise is contingent on the particular set 
of skills to be found in its management. 
g) With increasing firm size, the observed capital/labour ratio 
rose steeply in the formal sector, while the productivity of 
capital fell. (See Table I in statistical Appendix I to this 
chapter.) Thus, firms employing between 6 and 15 workers, i.e., 
small formal enterprises and those in the intermediate range 
between the sectors, produced the greatest output per unit of 
capital, having the second lowest ratio of capital to labour 
and suggesting diminishing returns. Unfortunately, labour 
productivity was relatively low, although substantially higher 
than in the informal sector proper. These results still held 
when the data were treated in terms of value added (see Table 
V.3.5)· . What is of note here is that small formal firms are, 
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on average, providing greater employment per unit of capital, 
and greater productivity per unit of capital, than either 
large-scale enterprises or the informal sector - observations 
which could not be made from the results of C.E.S. production 
functions, for the reasons already given. 
V. 4 CONCLUSION 
The general purpose of this research was to ascertain whether 
the petty production sector could make more efficient use of 
capital than could formal enterprises producing the same type 
of goods. This would also ascertain whether the enthusiasm 
about the informal sector, which has pervaded Southern African 
development circles in the past 12 years, has been justified 
in its central assertions~ 
Observation and analysis suggested that the more efficient 
small-scale entrepreneurs, unfettered by the legal constraints 
governing larger businesses (prescribed wages, safety require-
ments, audits, etc.) were capable of producing and providing 
employment marginally faster, per unit of capital, than their 
formal competitors. (See Table I, in Appendix I, of this chapter and 
Table V.3.6, p.180). However, it became apparent that there was a sub-
stantial body of informal operators whose enterprises lacked 
a real capacity for growth. Equally clearly, if official 
policy is excluded, the constraining factor was not capital 
shortage as much as lack of managerial expertise and entre-
preneurial flair. Product differentiation and marketing 
technique seemed unknown to the townships' producers. 
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Given these observations, and given too the finding that there 
was no significant difference between the patterns of utilisa-
tion of capital and labour in the two sectors (see Appendix II 
to this chapter), it seems logical that development funds, if 
earmarked for the informal economy, should go to what House 
(1984) termed "the intermedate sector". In purely practical 
terms, the problem is the identification of those entrepreneurs 
"most likely to succeed" when there is an inadequate frame of 
reference for use in an interview situation. 
It was clear from the interviews conducted that capital scarcity 
was not regarded as a major growth constraint by those in the 
informal sector, but that lack of bookkeeping experience cer-
tainly was. The greater variation in production techniques 
within the informal sector can be explained as being the re-
sult of imperfect managerial knowledge. However, given that 
the capital employed is relatively homogeneous within the 
sector and that managers are equally competent, inter-firm 
variations in the capital/labour ratio should only result from 
discrepancies in the marginal productivity of labour. These 
would be smoothed out in large firms, but in small enterprises 
might prove a substantial cause of variation and hence be a 
factor contributing to the low R2 of the informal sector pro-
auction functions. 
What of the view that informal sector aid develops business 
skills? At the moment, the attrition rate within informal 
sector enterprises is high, and while an advantage of the 
relatively low capitalisation of the sector is that the entre-
preneur can recover quickly after each bankruptcy, it must remain 
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an extremely inefficient way to learn basic business principles. 
The introduction of "bookkeeping" and "principles of manage-
ment" as foundation courses in the schools, and into the 
adult literacy programme seems, therefore, a more likely way 
to stimulate the small-scale economy, than the simple injection 
of capital. 
It has been stated already that an optimal firm size, in terms 
of productivity and employment creation, cannot be ascertained. 
The missing variable, ascribed to the expertise of the enter-
prise's management, cannot really be introduced into a pro-
duction function analysis. However, even if the stimulation 
of informal enterprises could be shown to result in their 
transformation into small-scale, but formally run, businesses, 
the injection of cash as development aid would remain problem-
atic. Not only might it destroy indigenous financing systems, 
but it might also result in the development of firms past 
their optimal size. For this reason, it has been given an 
appendix of its own in Chapter III. 
Informal operators certainly appear to make more efficient use 
of their capital than do their formal counterparts, especially 
when it is taken into account that the underemployment of 
factors of production, which characterises a system of pro-
duction in which there is little division of labour will bias 
downwards the respective production parameters~ 
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Looking at Table V.3.6 (p.180) and at Table 1-3 of Appendix II 
of this chapter, it will be seen that the intersectoral comparison 
of capital productivity is confused by the major differences between 
value added and simple output data. This is further reflected in 
the low t statistics and hence wide confidence intervals of the 
production coefficients. One point, however, is clear: the 
range of factor productivities is far greater in informal enter-
prises than in their formal equivalents (as reflected in the 
former' s. substantially lower R2 figures.) • 
Moreover, informal production does have a training value in the 
generation of technical, but more particularly of business, skills. 
From a purely objective point of view, there is, therefore, a 
point to be made for such limited development funds as exist 
to be directed to the stimulation of selected larger and 
more viable informal enterprises. The side-effects and doctrinal 
implications of such a policy are not, however, so clearcut, 
as the first three chapters should have shown. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE: 
1. How many workers to you employ? (Detail) 
a. Under 5 ( ) ; b. 5 to 1 5 ( ) ; c . 1 5 to 3 0 ( ) ; 
d. 30 to 100 ) ; e . 1 0 0 to 3 0 0 ( ) ; f. Over 300 ( 
2. According to your balance sheet what is the total value of 
the capital you employ? i.e., all your machines etc. 
Alternatively, give type, age and purchase price of machines. 
3. In the last financial year, what was the total (value) 
volume of your output? 
4. In how many days do your suppliers of fabric, buttons, 
thread, etc. normally expect to be paid? 
5. How many days credit do you allow your debtors? 
6. Is the fabric you use obtained through: 
a. The factories; b. Wholesalers; c. Your clients; 
d. Import allocation? 
If more than one applies, please indicate this. 
7. What is the average monthly wage paid to your: 
a. Designers ( ) ; b. Cutters ( ) ; c. Machinists )? 
8. What proportion of your total sales is formed by contracts 
with: 
a. Government ); b. Private sector ( ) ; 
c. Foreign buyers )? 
9. If possible, indicate the volume and the value of your 
output over the past five years. If you do not wish to 
provide figures, a ratio or percentage worked against the 
,980 figure is fine. 
) . 
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10. Do you keep a. Separate bank* accounts for you and 
your firm ( ) ; b. One bank account ); 
c. Not use a bank account ( )? 
(* If POSB or building society is used please detail this) 
1 1. Is your book-keeping method a. Double entry ) ; 
b. Single entry ) ; c. Other, e.g. Memos ) ; 
d. None ( ) ? 
12. Was your firm acquired by a. Purchase as a going concern 
) ; b. Development by you from the start ) i 
d. Inheritance ( ) ? 
13. How long has your firm been in existence? 
14. What is your age, or the average age of your managerial staff? 
15. Did you have prior experience in the clothing industry before 
entering this firm? 
16. Did you have prior experience in any other industry before 
entering this firm? 
17. Has any of the machinery 
specifically for you ( 
locally ) ? 
you are using been designed 
) • If so, was it manufactured 
18. What proportion of the fabric you buy has 100% local 
content ( )? 
19. Does your operation work on a shift basis or not? 
20. Can you break down your sales dollar? (Detail) 
21. How many of your managerial staff are women? 
22. What proportion of your man~gement do they represent? 
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APPENDIX I: 




Annual output/capital, annual output/labour 
and capital/labour ratios by firm size.* (N=92) 
of workers No. of firms 0/K 0/N K/N 
< 2 41 4,80 1539,71 320,74 
3-5 18 1 t 30 200,00 154,06 
6-15 11 12,50 3321,88 265,69 
16-40 2 9 t 11 6226,82 683,56 
41-100 9 5,74 6008,52 1047,97 
> 101** 
I 
8 1 t 37 5370,54 5017,85 
i 
for value added figures, see main text, p.180. 
this figure excludes data from a company of 1 000 
workers whose K/N ratio seemed abnormal at 10 000. 
The following results are taken from responses by_ 69 informal 
and small-scale operators involved in clothing, footwear and 
upholstery. 
4. Credit received 
Pure CMT work ... 3 
Cash with CMT 11 
Cash . . . 51 
30 days 2 
60 days . . . . 1 




5. Credit given 
Cash 29 
Month end 5 
30 days . 26 
60 days . 5 
90 days . 3 
180 days . 1 
10. Banking (responses include POSB and building 
society accounts) 
Separate personal and 
business accounts 
Only one account 
No account 
11. Bookkeeping system 
Double entry •. 
Single entry •• 
... 










Purchased as a going concern .• 1 
Established by owner 59 
Inherited 9 
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13. Age of enterprise 
< 5 years 21 
5-10 years 15 
11-15 years 1 1 
16-25 years 6 
> 26 years ... 16 
1 5 • Average age of owner(s) 
< 25 years 2 
26-30 years ... 5 
31-40 years 16 
41-50 years ... 21 
51-60 years 18 
> 60 years 7 


























SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
1 • Capital valued at purchase price 
Combined sample (N=91) -
81 = 5,1827 (0,3521) R2 = 0,910 
-2 
82 = 0,3490 (0,1440) R = 0,907 
83 = 0,8552 (0,1438) F = 220,1773 
84 = -0,0170 (0,0175) (Std. errors in parentheses) 
(14,720°') 
,,. 
y 178,163 p 0, 137 (0,855) 
v 1,204 ( 1 9 I 846"'> a 0,879 
0 0,290 ( 7,715) Correlation of LnK to I.nN = 0,8979 
(* students t) 
Formal Sector (N=32) 
. 
81 = 5,7524 (1,7313) 
82 = 0, 336 3 (0,5624) 
83 = 0,7485 (0,6006) 




R2 = · 0, 930 
-2 .R = 0,923 
F = 93,057 
p 0,125 
a 0,889 
Correlation of LnK to LnN = 0,9594 
J 
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Informal Sector (N=59) 
81 = 5, 30 21 (0,3954) 
R2 = 0,435 
-2 
82 = 0,3401 (0,1884) R = 0,404 
83 = 0,6494 (0,2595} F = 10,568 
84 = -0,0192 (0,0266) 
y 200,758 p O I 172 
v 0,990 a 0,853 
0 0,344 Correlation of LnK to LnN = o., 3706 
2. Capital valued at current second-hand prices 
Combined sample (N=91) 
81 = 5,1531 (0,3543) 
R2 = 0,9119 
-2 
82 = 0,3161 (0,1350) R = 0,9089 
83 = 0,8462 (0,1347) F = 225,173 
84 = -0,0094 (0,0158) (Std. errors in parentheses) 
( 14 t 54.f) 
JI. 
y 172,967 p 0,0817 (0,467) 
v 1,162 ( 17 I 381) (J 0,924 
0 0,272 ( 3, 93d") Correlation of LnK to LnN = 0,9125 
(* students t) 
Formal Sector (N=32) 
81 = 5,1227 (1,6002) 
R2 = 0,9336 
82 = 0,4974 (0,4877) 
R2 = 0,9265 
83 = 0,5137 (0,5415) F = 98,371 
84 = -0,0198 (0,0342) • 
y 167,788 p 0,157 
v 1 t O 11 a 0,865 
0 0,492 Correlation of LnK to LnN = 0, 96 90 
3. 
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Informal Sector (N=5 9) 
81 = 5,2658 (0,4046) R2 = 0,4356 
82 = 0,2957 (0,1889) . R2 = 0,4048 
f3 3 = 0,7257 (0,2693) F = 10,6107 
84 = -0,0104 (0,0273) 
y 193,610 p 0,099 
v 1, 021 (1 0,910 
0 0,290 Correlation of LnK to LnN = 0,3297 
Capital valued at shadow {South African) prices 
Combined Sample {N=91) 
81 = 5,2014 ( 0, 360 3) 
82 = 0,3063 ( 0, 1 367) 
83 = 0,8812 (0,1357) 
84 = -0,0113 (0,01577) 
y 181, 5 34 ( 14I4371 
·v 1,187 (14,101> 
0 0,258 (2 ,291) 
Formal Sector (N=32) 
81 = 5,4938 (3,406) 
62 = 0,3906 (0,780) 
83 = 0,6558 (1,215) 
84 = -0,0154 ( -o, 4 4 3) 
y 243,179 
v 1 ,046 
0 0,373 
R2 = 0,9097 
-2 R = 0,9065 
F = 219,011 
(Std. errors in parentheses) 
~ 
p 0,099 {0,593) 
a 0,910 (& stats. in parentheses) 
Correlation between lnK & lnN = 
(* students t) 
R2 = 0,9313 
-2 0,9239 R = 
F = 94 I 889 
p 0,126 
cr 0,888 
0. 90 36 
• 
Correlation between LnK & LnN = 
O I 9668 
Informal Sector 
8 ,i = 5,3078 
82 = 0,3001 
83 = 0,7126 

























In order to ascertain whether, 
a) the variance was constant across the data set as 
required for an OLS estimate to be blue 
(homoscedasticity) 
b) whether the production methods varied distinctly 
between the formal and informal/small-scale sectors. 
Treating (b) £irst: The data was split into two sections, 
one of 59 small-scale enterprises and the other of 32 larger 
ones. The distinction is not a wholly satisfactory one, 
having been made on the basis of employment, any enterprise 
employing five or less individuals (including the entre-
preneur himself) was treated as small-scale, while any enter-
prise giving work to six or more workers was treated as large. 
Initially, it was felt that the capital/labour ratio might 
prove a better source of division. However, convention and 
the existence of a few one or two-men enterprises, with 
abnormally high capital/labour ratios in a distinctly informal 
establishment, suggested the use of employment figures instead. 
The method used (the Chow Test, see Koutsoyianis, 1977, pp. 
164-168) is based on the calculation of an F ratio from the 
squared residua·ls of the regressions performed on the two sub-






- o: e~ + 
K 
The residual values for the three regressions were as 
follows: 
1. For capital measured at purchase price: 
tep 2 50,0081 = 
2 36,1135 te1 = 
2 10,3227 te 2 = 
2. For capital measured at current prices: 
2 48,9963 Ee p = 
2 36,0499 &e1 = 
2 9,7071 Ee 2 = 
3. For capital measured at a shadow price: 
Eep 2 50,2502 = 
2 36, 6 5 91 te 1 = 
2 10,0389 te 2 = 
198 
F1 = 0,9180/0,5583 = 1,6443 
F O, 0 5 = 2, 5 with v 2 = 8 3 & v 1 = 4 
Since F1 < F0105 the null hypothesis, that there is 
no difference between the coefficients of the two 
subset regressions, is accepted. 
F2 = 0,8098/0,8513 = 1,4690 
again accept H. 
0 




I rrespective of the method of valuing capital in the equation, 
the results of the Chow Test therefore indicate that the 
production parameters would not differ significantly between 
t he sectors at a 95% level. 1 
To ascertain whether the variances of the two groupings of 
data were significantly different (i.e. heteroscedastic, an 
1 . The alternate hypothesis can be accepted at a 75% level 
of significance, however. 
F* > F. 25 = 1,37 for all values of F*, hence at the 
75% level one can state that the methods of production in 
the two sectors, as evidenced by their production functions, 
are significantly different. 
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F ratio was constructed from the residuals of the two 
. 
sectoral regressions, each corrected for the number of 
degrees of freedom. 
where n 1-K = 
F* = 1 , 7 354 1 
F* = 1,8243 2 
F* = 1,7938 3 
57 and n -K 2 = 28 
Perfect homocedasticity would be indicated by F* = 1, 
however the data is accepted as homoscedastic if F* ~ F. 
i.e. 1 < F* < F. 
F o I 1,77, FOl 2,26 F ~2 5 = 1 ,56 
suggesting that at a 95% level of significance one could 
assume heteroscedasticity, although this would not be assumed 
at a 99% significance level. 
The observation that the variances of the two data subsets 
are not equal would, under normal circumstances, suggest that 
1. Based on Koutsoyianis, 1977, pp.185/6. 
200 
tests of significance, and hence confidence intervals, could 
not be accurately constructed from the data. The answer 
would, therefore, be to correct any misspecifications in the 
regression equation or to weight the heteroscedastic variable, 
thereby correcting it. In this case, however, the observed 
change in variance may be informative in itself. It indicates 
that, with increasing size, firms are apparently constrained 
by relatively common technology, and perhaps that the quality 
of the entrepreneur is not likely to greatly distinguish the 
operational system of one enterprise from that of another. 
By contrast, among the informal manufacturers the potential 
for variation in productivity is greater, given the alloca-
tion of factors of production, possibly because of variations 
in the capital and labour used, but more likely because of 
variations in marketing (urban/rural) and in entrepreneurial 
skills. This result stresses, therefore, the significance 
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I p = 
and estimates of the t-statistics associated with these · 
parameters are required. For small variances, it can be 
shown that, if a parameter n is a function of two regression 
coefficients 81 and 82 , 
an 2 an 2 Var (n) = w- Var 81 + 38·2 Var ~2 + 1 
+ 2 an µn Cov (81,82) a 81 a8i 
The variance of the above parameter can then be calculated from 
the elements of the variance-covariance matrix obtained during 
the regression as follows: 
Var (v) = 
Var (o) 
202 
Var (e) = 4 ( 1 + _1 _ 1 2 Var ( 8 4 ) + 8 2 s; 83 4 
lcov(8 2 ,s 4 ) 
822 
+ 
2 Cov (8 2 , 8 3 
+ 
28 4 822 832 
- 28 (-1 + _1 ) 
4 82 83 
The t statistics are then obtained in the normal way, for 
instance, 
** 
** to = 
(Var(o))! 
I acknowledge the assistance of Drs. G. Barr and J. Whittaker, 
who pointed out the necessity for this appendix and assisted 
in its compilation. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis is concerned with the growth prospects of the 
informal sector in Zimbabwe, and with the factors affecting 
these prospects. It has, therefore, been necessary that the 
constraints on informal sector development be identified as 
either external or internal to th~ firm. It is exogeneity 
of growth constraints that leads to involution and the 
progressive emiserisation of the sector's members, and that 
\ 
is reflected in Seeber's statement that 
" ••• its potential depends mainly on 
gaining official recognition and 
encouragement, even to the extent 
of the authorities actively directing 
work towards the informal sector." 
(Seeber, 1975, p.2) 
If, however, the curbs on the growth of informal enter-
prises are endogenous, e.g., shortages of skills, capital and 
expertise, then the prospects for the individual firm need 
not be gloomy. In this case official assistance in the 
development of the informal enterprise will only cease bearing 
fruit when the firm has expanded to the limits of the entre-
preneur's ability. 
This thesis has suggested that the limits to the expansion 
and evolution of the informal sector are neither wholly 
endogenous nor wholly exogenous, but rather a mixture of 
both. As the third chapter illustrated, the sector's 
relations with the authorities do constitute a definite 
exogenous factor, as does the market structure (see Chapter II) . 
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However, isolating the precise nature of the constraint is 
not always easy. For example, Brand (1982) asserted that 
" .•. security of tenure of workplace was found to be asso-
ciated with higher levels of earnings and greater propensity 
to save," (ibid., p.41). The .direction of the causality 
here was not clear and hence neither was the nature of the 
constraint: was the raised propensity to save a function of 
security of tenure, or did those possessed of entrepreneurial 
flair (including a greater ability to accumulate capital) 
strive more than them to achieve such security? 
Certainly, features such as market structure and the pre-
vailing legislation are important both to the individual 
entrepreneur and to the informal sector as a whole. The 
ability to accumulate capital over time, however, depends 
on the expertise of the operator and his ability to generate 
profits. The marginal enterprise will not be in a position 
to accumulate; it must be noted though that unless the 
supply function is infinitely elastic, the intra-marginal 
enterprise should be able to achieve a producer surplus. 
There is no doubt that the informal economy as a whole is 
capable of capital accumulation, though the potential for 
' this is far less in those branches of it which accord with 
the I.L.O. 1972 features, in particular, "ease of entry" 
and "unregulated and competitive markets", both of which 
imply high elasticities of supply. Moreover, Zimbabwe's 
informal economy has a clear structure for the provision of 
credit and savings facilities, (loan sharking and RCAs being 
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prevalent), while interaction with the rural areas provides 
an institutional framework for investment and for borrowing. 
In addition, the savings potential of the younger generation 
of African males as a whole, irrespective of their places of 
employment, will be further raised if Central Government 
succeeds in its stated aim of reducing the current high 
rates of lobola payments demanded by the families of new 
brides. 
To that extent that endogenous factors constrain the informal 
economy, House's (1984) disaggregation of it into an inter-
mediate sector and a community of the poor is useful. 
Conversely, if the constraints are exogenous, then Lebrun 
and Gerry's (1975) warning must be taken seriously. They 
commented that even if petty producers trying to accumulate 
wealth are differentiated from those merely trying to repro-
duce the means of subsistence, the former group have no real 
long-term prospects. There is, in terms of their argument, 
a cycle of development and collapse where, 
' ••• internal growth is almost entirely 
involutionary, taking place against a 
backdrop of restriction, constraints and 
distortions imposed by the dominant 
capitalist mode of production." 
(ibid., p.20) 
Despite Lebrun and Gerry's argument having been couched in 
terms of deP.endency theory, it is a useful adjunct even to 
J 
a nee-classical approach. Thus Hall .(1983) showed that a 
combination of capital accumulation in the modern sector and 
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land reform, together with new techniques and high-yielding 
seeds in rural areas, may be necessary before the levels of 
demand can be achieved which are a prerequisite for growth 
at the warranted rate. Hall's view provides an insight into 
the development role of the informal sector as well, although 
he himself states that the notion of informality is too 
vague to be of real use. The informal network of production 
and distribution appears to result in fewer imperfections 
and speedier adjustments in both the product and factor 
markets and thereby enhances both the level of effective 
demand and the desirability of further investment. 
Over and above the standard constraints on the informal 
economy, legislation, shortage of capital and shortage of 
skills, which are virtually omnipresent in informal economies, 
there are three factors which seem particularly appropriate 
to a discussion of the Zimbabwean situation. 
a) Infrastructure: 
The nature of the informal sector militates against 
certain changes in the physical environment within 
which it operates. Thus competition from pavement 
vendors is reducing the viability of those operators 
who make use of officially provided market facilities, 
and to a degree keeps these facilities under-utilised. 
(Chronicle, 22/2/85). Moreover, police action has 
little apparent success when directed at individuals 
whose activities are accompanied by severe negative 
externalities (a substantial, but somewhat inconclusive 
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correspondence on the subject has taken place between 
the ZRP and the Director of Housing and Community 
Services). 
The implication is that where negative externalities 
to informal activities exist, which necessitate some 
sort of official control, those operators trying to 
expand into "intermediate" operations may also be 
constrained by lack of legal access to the market. 
Illegal activities which would be undetected in a 
smaller enterprise would be conspicuous, given the 
firm's higher profile, while operation at a fixed 
site may reduce access to the public. The implication 
of this observation is that careful thought must be 
given to the ramifications of legal curbs on the sector, 
and to the siting of markets, so that entrepreneurs 
intent on expansion can achieve their end legitimately 
and successfully. 
b) Indigenous Resources: 
The 1972 ILO report on Kenya mentioned that there was 
there a reliance on indigenous resources~ While this 
is not universalfY a characteristic of the Zimbabwean 
informal sector, (see p.49) there are undoubtedly 
enterprises which use materials whose content is en-
tirely local, or locally recycled. Where these are 
J 
purchasable, no problem arises. However, where these 
materials have to be collected in their natural state, 
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or sought out as discards suitable for resale after 
repair, the informal enterprise may be characterised 
by substantial underemployment unless specialisation 
takes place, in which case the collecting, preparation 
and sale of the items would be undertaken. by different 
individuals. Even here, one has to accept that 
"lumpiness" may be a feature of human as well as 
physical capital. 
The situation is not necessarily ameliorated by the use 
of imported resources in the production process. The 
supply of these is often uneven as a result of the 
strained foreign currency position of the economy, and 
suppliers naturally tend to direct scarce inputs towards 
their more valued clients. Catering for this insecurity 
introduces further excess capacity to the informal 
sector, while this dimension of risk in the sector's 
activities constrains initiatives involving special-
isation or expansion. 
c) Social: 
The low propensity to save, especially on the part of 
married women, and the lack of incentive to reinvest 
on the part of co-operative members, lead to slow rates 
of capital accumulation. In urban areas these are off-
set to a degree by the revolving credit associations 
etc., already mentioned. The social interaction between 
urban and rural areas, however, deserves further mention 
since the countryside plays both a positive and a negative 
role in the accumulation of funds. 
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Social custom often dictates the movement of savings 
from the urban to the rural areas for the purposes of 
(i). lobola payments, which it must be noted may continue 
over a substantial period of time both before and after 
marriage, and (ii) diversification of the individual's 
savings portfolio through the acquisition of livestock. 
It must be noted that cattle in the rural areas do pro-
vide a source of stored wealth, which can be readily 
realised. The commonly held notion that Zimbabwe's 
tribal population is unwilling to sell its animals was 
disabused by the number of interviewees who claimed to 
have obtained the capital to commence or expand pro-
duction by either the sale of their own stock, or by 
borrowing the proceeds of such sales from their families. 
In the light of the difficulties which these three factors 
constitute, and the lack of managerial experience which 
accompanies an informal apprenticeship, the informal sector's 
contribution to measured GDP seems likely to remain small. 
In terms of exogenous factors, its ability to metamorphose 
into formal business is likely to depend as much on the 
business climate as on official policy. If the economy re-
covers from its currently depressed levels to a position 
equal to that in the two years immediately following inde-
pendence, then the incentive for informal enterprises to 
make the transition into formalised business will be in-
creased. For as long as real incomes remain at depressed 
levels, however, the risks of entry into the formal economy 
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will remain high. This is not to say that Government could 
not play a part in speeding such a transition, but rather 
that this part should not be overrated. The economy must 
provide the incentive, and the enterprises be able to 
respond effectively to it before Government assistance can 
be of general value. Demol (1982) seems to have faced a 
similar problem in his Younde study. He concluded it with 
the following warning, 
"It is indisputable that the official 
environment in which the sector functions 
could be more encouraging in order to 
step up national output. Nevertheless, 
any staps to facilitate access to credit 
markets, etc. run the risk of being 
ineffective or even harmful if they are 
not accompanied by changes in the under-
takings themselves aimed at improving 
the use at present made of the factors 
of production." (p.87) 
Demol's prime concern seems to have been the tendency by 
the informal producers in his study to regard new capital 
as a source of wealth in its own right rather than as an 
asset whose value depends on the flow of earnings it can 
generate. If the same can be said of Zimbabwean informal 
entrepreneurs (there is nothing in my data either to 
support or to dispute Demol's view), then stimulation of 
capital accumulation might lead only to increasingly in-
appropriate technology rather than the expansion of output 
using labour-intensive methods. Viewed in these terms, 
the economy and the informal sector would be best served 
by a policy of minimum involvement, official aid being 
reserved for carefully screened borrowers, and controls 
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only being placed on activities with excessive negative 
externalities. 
There was insufficient evidence in this survey to make any 
definitive statement about the level of mobility of 
entrepreneurs from informal to formal activities. General 
observation, however, tended to support Bannerjee's (1983) 
Indian observation that such mobility as did exist appeared 
proportional to the level of education attained. By implica-
tion, an expansion of the adult literacy campaign might be 
beneficial to the economy, and in the light of the previous 
paragraph would seem a prerequisite before any official 
programme of enhanced access to capital could be viable. 
Further evidence, that it is the shortage of business skills 
rather than scarcity of capital which is proving the primary 
constraint on small enterprises in Zimbabwe, comes from the 
FEBCO monthly statistical report. Looking at the preceding 
sixty seven months it summarised the situation with the 
following comment (note in particular the final sentence): 
"Out of the 1830 requests 915 (50%), 106 
(5,79%) being readvances were approved by 
the Advances committee; 25 (1,37%) were 
pending while 177 (9,67%) were withdrawals, 
and 713 (38,96%) were regrets. 
The average number of applications received 
per month at 23,8 was a figure slightly below 
the 25 expected by the Wilshere Committee. 
On average (the) number of monthly approvals 
was 11,9 vis-a-vis the Wilshere 20." 
It seems clear that the problem, at least as faced by FEBCO, 
is not a shortage of loanable funds, but rather a scarcity of 
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worthwhile enterprises for which to make capital available. 
This in no way diminishes the development function of the 
informal and small-scale sectors; it does, however, suggest 
that where capital and foreign exchange shortages are acting 
as constraints on growth in an industry, the limited amounts 
available should not be directed at small-scale enterprises 
in the simple belief that they are best able to use them in 
the creation of additional employment opportunities. The 
analysis in Chapter V suggested that, in the clothing 
industry, the difference between the sectors lay in the 
increase in efficiency with the transition into formal 
production. This implies that decisions concerning alloca-
tion of foreign exchange between secto~s should be made on 
an individual basis, if effective allocation is to be 
achieved, despite the difficulties for the Reserve Bank. 
For the bulk of this thesis, the development of the informal 
sector has been at least tacitly equated with its trans-
formation into formal business, as well as its increase in 
size. In any conclusion it must, therefore, be asked 
whether (i) an individual informal unit can expand without 
losing its informal character, and (i) whether this would 
be desirable? 
Looking first at the second question: while the maintenance 
of efficient labour-intensive production methods, or at 
least the use of 11 appropriate 11 technology, is to be desired, 
there is no automatic correspondence between labour-intensity 
and viability in a labour surplus economy, as the fate of the 
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Indian home weaving experiment showed. It does not seem 
desirable to perpetuate a mode of production which is in-
trinsically inferior in a technical sense, unless it offers 
non-pecuniary advantages to those who deal with it and in it. 
The first question presents an additional problem, in that 
the answer depends to a large degree on the way in which 
the informal sector is defined. For purposes of this study, 
enterprises employing under five workers and not registered 
in terms of the Companies Act or through any professional 
council or association of artisans, have been classified as 
informal. The requirement of a maximum number of employees 
was, however, flexible to a degree. Certain enterprises 
involving large numbers of family members, or apprentices 
employed at rates and in conditions unacceptable to formal-
ised industry, were also regarded as informal. Clearly, 
many enterprises which fell into the ambit of the informal 
sector in this study would not have done so, if the character-
istics suggested by the 1972 ILO report had been regarded as 
definitive. The informal sector has, therefore, been taken 
as including House's "intermediate" grouping. Given this 
less constrained definition, it seems plausible that stimu-
lation of the sector as a whole might result in an increase 
in the number of firms falling into the Intermediate category, 
without immediately increasing the numbers transformed into 
formal operations. 
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A further possibility is that stimulation of informal enter-
prises may lead to formalisation accompanied, however, by 
all the failings of the initial system. This has been par-
ticularly apparent in the case of co-operatives. There have 
been widespread pressures and incentives brought to bear on 
informal producers and vendors to co-operatise their acti-
vities. Where these st~muli have been successful, the 
result has been a co-op with all the outward characteristics 
of a formal enterprise in terms of administration, etc., 
but nevertheless frequently showing the flaws of an informal 
enterprise which has expanded beyond the level of its admin-
istrative competence. Indeed, Government itself recently 
advised its ministries that the non-viability of women's 
co-operatives was due to ulack of planning, managerial skills 
and transport problems", (Chronicle, 22/2/85), precisely 
the problems afflicting the informal entrepreneur! 
It may be argued in the light of these observations, that 
the ability 0£ an informal enterprise to expand without 
losing the rather dubious attribute of "informality" will 
depend on the individual entrepreneur's managerial abilities. 
To this extent, one would anticipate, as has been suggested, 
that the greater the degree of literacy, the greater the 
probability of expansion being accompanied by a transition 
into formalised operation. What remains unresolved, how-
ever, is why an informal method of operation should be re-
garded as "intrinsically inferior" and whether this is 
indeed the case? 
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To a degree, the answer to these questions must depend on the 
nature of the enterprise. If it consists of small-scale 
retailing, expansion need not improve the quality of the 
service offered and employment provision is unlikely to rise 
in proportion to the increase in turnover. An increase in 
enterprise size by an informal manufacturer, however, is 
likely to result in an improvement in the quality of the 
goods actually offered. There may well be an upward shift 
in capital intensity accompanied by an increase in linkages 
to the remainder of the formal economy. One is led, accord-
ingly, to draw a conclusion for the informal sector similar 
to that drawn by Sutcliffe (1971) for small-scale enterprises: 
their long-run roles will depend on their ability to compete 
unassisted against existing firms rather than on their 
ability to soak up ,the urban underemployed. 
A qualification to this view has been provided within the 
context of a nee-Marxist framework. An example of this is 
Mkandawire's (1983) statement that the informal sector must 
either evolve into co-operative organisations or into "fully 
fledged small-scale capitalist enterprises formally linked 
to the corporate or state sector", adding that, "Whether this 
link is complementary or exploitative will depend on the 
dominant mode of production in the particular social 
formation." 
Free marketeers contend that a policy of minimal direct 
involvement by Government in the informal sector is probably 
the most efficient method for the distribution of scarce 
funds, allocation in this case being done by market forces, 
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albeit subject to imperfections. One aspect of this 
recommendation, however, requires expansion. This thesis 
has suggested that managerial and entrepreneurial skills 
are the major constraints on the evolution of small enter-
prises in particular, although also of the Zimbabwean 
economy in general. Since managerial skills are relatively 
indivisible, the available supply of this resource is 
optimally allocated only when each manager is administering 
an enterprise at the efficient limit of his ability. The 
identification and stimulation of skilled managers whose 
talents are underutilised in the informal sector, rather 
than blanket assistance to small enterprises, should, 
therefore, be a goal of official policy. 
There is no denying that exogenous constraints on the via-
bility of the informal economy do exist; some of these are 
justifiable on the grounds that the enterprises thereby 
constrained impose negative externalities on the public, 
although the specific curbs used to not have an outstanding 
record of success. Others, however, are a result of con-
flict with the vested interests of the formal and government 
sectors. Nevertheless, the dominant constraint appears to 
be an endogenous one - the shortage of skilled entrepreneurs. 
It is a constraint which the authorities can only ameliorate 
indirectly by appropriate official expenditure on education 
and training, and more directly by the continued use of 
institutions such as FEBCO which perform a joint role in 
screening and then stimulating small enterprises, while 
providing advice and monitoring the further progress of the 
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loan recipient. It must be noted that the loans are extended 
at market interest rates, a policy which should be maintained. 
Certainly, there is little to justify Zimbabwe's adoption of 
the 1972 ILO recommendation for Kenya, that official con-
tracts be extended to the informal sector. 
Both observation and the two tests detailed in the second 
appendix of Chapter V, indicate that manufacturing methods 
are not the same in the two sectors. Formal production has 
more productive labour and derives the benefits of not only 
its own scale economies, but also of the economies resulting 
from formal production methods. In addition, the training 
it offers is more widely accepted than similar training 
offered by the informal sector. 
Bearing these points in mind, together with the various 
caveats raised in the course of this thesis, a tentative 
answer can be provided to the question, should aid go to 
the formal or the informal sector? 
If officially imposed exogenous constraints are lifted, and 
informal manufacturers are capable of producing competitively, 
then the informal sector should be stimulated by making 
capital available and if possible, widening the markets in 
which these goods are exposed. It is likely that, unless 
market-related interest rates are charged, the sole result 
will be an increase in the numbers of producers involved in 
the informal branch of the industry, i.e. involution. 
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The result of charging market rates, and using normal 
commercial criteria to determine those who should receive 
loan finance, will probably be the development of an 
elite within the sector. Such a group would be likely to 
formalise production methods, being probably composed of 
"intermediate" producers. 
This conclusion does not suggest that such a policy should 
be abandoned in favour of assistance directly to formal 
enterprise. The truly informal producer will still produce 
for consumers who lack access to the formal market in 
either a financial or a geographical sense. However, the 
intermediate producer can expand his market and his enter-
prise more readily, if loan finance is available to him. 
A policy of selective assistance should, therefore, enhance 
the allocative efficiency of the industry as a whole. 
It should not, however, be hoped that both output and 
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